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This dissertation argues that we can hold other agents morally responsible without expressing 
blame and, more strongly, that doing so is preferable. I first argue that blame is fundamentally 
retributive, and that blame’s retributive foundation is incipiently present even in civilized guises. 
As such, even though some forms of expressed blame are quite civilized, expressed blame 
always involves a risk of emotional damage, entrenchment, and escalation. To make things 
worse, I argue that anger is an exacerbating feature of blame’s retributive foundation. I then 
argue that, generally speaking, cases of public blame involve higher stakes than cases of private 
judgments of blame. This difference in stakes informs the warrant we have to make private 
judgments of blame, as compared to the heightened warrant we need to make public expressions 
of blame. Throughout the dissertation, I make repeated use of the idea that even if expressing 
blame to a wrongdoer is fitting for a given case of wrongdoing, it might not be appropriate to 
express that blame, due to the practical, epistemic, and ethical risks that expressions of blame 
invoke. Finally, I present three alternate modes of response to moral wrongdoing that allow us to 
hold wrongdoers responsible (construed as answerability) without expressed blame. I further 
argue for their context-dependent superiority to expressed blame. My hope with this project, 
more generally, is to expand the range of useful responses to moral wrongdoing one can take. Put 
simply, I aim to shift our default impersonal moral strategies of response to wrongdoing away 
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Introduction. What is Blame? 
 
I. Statement of Thesis 
 
There has been a recent surge of interest in the philosophical study of blame. For 
example, some philosophers discuss the connection between blame and moral responsibility. 
(Gideon Rosen, Elizabeth Harman) Others discuss the connection between blame and free will. 
(Derek Pereboom, J.J.C. Smart) Others try to pin down just what blame is. (Angela Smith, T.M. 
Scanlon, George Sher) Others defend the connection between blame and retributive punishment. 
(Christopher Bennett, Antony Duff) Others discuss blame from a clinical therapeutic context. 
(Nicola Lacey, Hanna Pickard) 
Whatever blame is, we surely do it a lot. Judging and then expressing blame to 
wrongdoers is a central feature of our daily lives. Expressing blame is a moral practice with wide 
ranging expressions. Sometimes expressed blame is angry or indignant. Consider expressions 
like How could you do that!! I cannot believe you. What were you thinking?!?!  Other times 
expressions of blame are somber or disappointed. Consider expressions like You let me down. 
This really hurts me. I’m so disappointed in you. We infer the emotional valence of expressions 
of blame through the blamer’s tone, body language, volume, facial expression, etc. We express 
blame to a variety of agents—ourselves, our friends and family members, acquaintances, 
strangers, celebrities, social institutions, politicians, etc. We blame these agents for morally 
culpable (or what we perceive to be morally culpable) actions. When someone does something 
that we find morally objectionable, our natural response is to judge them blameworthy and then 
express blame towards them. 
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This practice of expressing blame to wrongdoers does not always last for a long period of 
time. Sometimes we express blame towards someone and then forgive them mere moments later. 
For example, when my friend misremembers the time that we arranged to meet at a local coffee 
shop and mistakenly shows up a half an hour late, I might express blame towards her for a few 
seconds, and then we quickly move on. Her tardiness is not a big deal to me, so I do not hold a 
grudge or even really think twice about it. It is not typical behavior from her. It was an innocent 
mistake. I forgive her completely. Sometimes the process of expressing blame is brief and gets 
resolved quickly. Other times, the blame we express towards others is much more hostile, and 
lasts for months, if not years. We might angrily express blame towards someone and then 
continue to blame them and stew in those resentful and indignant feelings for years to come. The 
feeling might weaken in intensity, but not fully dissolve, even years later. Major cases of moral 
wrongdoing often involve a more drawn out process of expressing blame and do not get resolved 
quickly. Sometimes the wrongdoers in these cases are never forgiven. Either way, expressing and 
receiving blame with others in our shared moral communities is deeply embedded into the fabric 
of our interpersonal lives.  
Indeed, blame is such a fundamental part of our daily lives that we often express it 
publicly without even realizing that we are doing so. When a close friend forgets to call us on 
our birthday, someone cuts in front of us in line at the grocery store, our partner betrays us, or a 
colleague takes all the credit for a project we jointly worked on, our first response is likely to 
express blame (to varying degrees) to each of these agents.  
Blame has become our default response to being morally wronged. As Jeffrey Blustein 
explains, the standard philosophical view is “Why wouldn’t one want to blame the offender if 
one is convinced of his wrongdoing? After all, if one wants the offender to change, to stop doing 
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what he has done, isn’t blame the most efficacious way of bringing this about?”1 Rather than 
think through all of the possible reasons why the individual acted in a morally bad way, most of 
us jump immediately from feeling wronged by someone to expressing blame to them. There is 
rarely a pause for reflection about how certain we are about the wrongdoer’s culpability. Worse 
still, many times this expression of blame is highly affective, meaning that the blame is 
expressed with some set of negative emotional attitudes, such as resentment, indignation, anger 
or a desire for revenge.  
This heated, emotional expression of blame is considered justified by most of us because 
when others wrong us, we take their bad actions to mean that they deserve to feel badly in 
response. When others hurt us with their wrong actions, we not only want them to know that they 
hurt us, but, more strongly, we want them to feel badly about it. We can achieve this goal—
wanting the wrongdoer to feel badly—through expressing blame to them. One of the major 
functions of expressing blame is to inspire remorse in wrongdoers. Blamers want wrongdoers to 
feel badly about their actions, in order to motivate them to change their behaviors. On this view, 
wrongdoers need to feel badly about their actions to be motivated to act better next time. By 
feeling remorse, wrongdoers gain the motivation to make morally better choices. If wrongdoers 
lack remorse, the traditional view argues, then wrongdoers might not be motivated to change 
their behavior. So, it is typically thought that expressing blame is not only warranted, but, more 
strongly, that it is a required response to wrongdoing because it serves the positive function of 
inspiring remorse in wrongdoers with the aim of helping them gain moral motivation.  
Is this the picture of our daily moral lives we want? Do we want to be so critical of each 
other’s actions, so constantly looking for and then expressing the faults in others? Without 
                                                        
1 Blustein, Jeffrey (2018). “Should We Get Rid of Blame?” Unpublished manuscript, p. 2. 
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proper pause for reflection, we risk doling out hostile expressions of blame to innocent agents. 
Given blame’s centrality in our daily lives, it is important to ask whether it is, in fact, morally 
and socially valuable to us. As D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini ask, “If blame turns out 
to have little or no value, then shouldn’t we try to excise it, and its associated pain and suffering, 
from our moral lives?”2 Traditionally, expressing blame to moral wrongdoers has been deemed 
valuable on the grounds that its evaluative force, while not always pleasant to endure, is 
necessary for wrongdoers to grasp the significance of their wrongs and to be motivated to 
change. At the same time, all of us have been on the receiving end of blame and can viscerally 
understand how emotionally (and sometimes physically) unpleasant it can be. Michelle Mason 
aptly describes this philosophical tension: 
Being viewed with reproach, at least by those we care about, is disconcerting and 
something we properly aim to avoid. Yet, blame has a more appealing face: Holding, and 
being held, accountable is, I take it, important to us and such accountability arguably 
requires that we remain within blame’s purview. Blame thus challenges the philosopher 
to ground its special importance without denying its reproachful quality and associated 
justificatory burdens.3 
 
My dissertation takes up this philosophical tension in blame—its simultaneously pleasant and 
unpleasant faces. The scope of my project is quite narrow. The type of blaming practices I am 
interested in are specifically interpersonal and public. I discuss public communications of blame 
between two people, or at most a small group in interpersonal moral settings. This dissertation 
does not address blame that is expressed in larger group contexts, such as blaming institutions, 
corporations, or world leaders. Further, I will not discuss the role of blame in larger structural 
contexts, such as blaming the stock market, Capitalism, or the Walmart Corporation. Finally, I 
                                                        
2 Coates, Justin D. and Tognazzi, Neal A. (2012). “The Contours of Blame” in Blame: Its Nature and Norms, eds., 
D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini. Oxford University Press, p. 23. 
3 Mason, Michelle (2011). “Blame: Taking it Seriously”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83:2, p. 473. 
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will not discuss the role of non-human blame, such as Hurricane Sandy being to blame for a loss 
of power and significant, sustained structural damage in New York City.  
I am interested in how expressed blame manifests in our daily lives interpersonally 
among and between those closest to us. Of course, I recognize that interpersonal expressions of 
blame cannot help but intersect, to some degree, with institutional or political forms of blame. 
Nevertheless, the two are distinct, and for the purposes of this dissertation, will remain distinct. 
In this dissertation, I argue that expressing blame in interpersonal contexts comes with a host of 
troubling social risks such as escalation and entrenchment. I further argue that we can hold others 
responsible in our interpersonal lives without expressed blame, and that we may be best served 
doing so. However, this does not carry over to a claim about whether blame is necessary in 
institutional or political contexts. The two realms—interpersonal and institutional—might need 
to be attended to entirely differently.  
As anther logistical note, this dissertation focuses exclusively on dyadic cases of blame. I 
have chosen to limit myself to this dyadic, interpersonal realm of blame so that I have a 
manageable topic to work with given the constraints of this dissertation. I leave open whether 
expressed blame should continue to be the default response in political or legal spheres. Though I 
anticipate that my worries about interpersonal blame certainly bleed, to some degree, into 
political and legal realms, I am not making an argument against expressed blame in settings 
outside of interpersonal cases. I have now mentioned the term expressed blame in this chapter 
several times. In what follows, I will refer to the type of blame we communicate interpersonally 
in response to moral wrongdoing as expressed blame. I define the term as follows. 
Expressed Blame: Blame that is publicly communicated to a wrongdoer (or perceived 
wrongdoer) in response to a wrongdoing (or perceived wrongdoing) in interpersonal 
settings. Such communication is most often expressed affectively, in emotional registers 
that can include anger, indignation, resentment, and retributive impulses.  
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We express blame daily to our mothers, our partners, friends, coworkers, bus drivers, and so on. 
The blaming practices I will home in on are those that are communicated. This communication 
usually happens verbally, but sometimes silence itself is a way to express blame. Further, we 
communicate our blame through our body language, facial expressions, gestures, volume, and 
tone, too. Expressed blame is a social practice that mutates over time as our social conventions 
change. 
Expressing blame in interpersonal contexts is a practice we each, to varying degrees, 
participate in. The practice of expressing blame is a wholly separate issue from the issue of 
determining (or judging) whether or not one is blameworthy. I am interested specifically in the 
social harm done by publicly expressing blame, and not in the cognitive judgment of determining 
an agent’s culpability. The difference is obvious. Judgments of blameworthiness are not always 
expressed. I can have the private thought ‘My brother oversleeping is the reason we are now late 
to the concert’ and in doing so internally judge my brother as responsible for our lateness. But, 
that private judgment does not mean I will actually express blame to him verbally. Judging one 
blameworthy is to judge that one has acted wrongly. Oftentimes, when we make this cognitive 
judgment, we also go the additional step of expressing blame on the basis of deeming one 
blameworthy. However, going this extra step is not required. This extra step of actually 
expressing the blame publicly—and the social risks involved in doing so—is the sole focus of 
this project. 
Thus blame, as I refer to it throughout this dissertation, is fundamentally a public 
communication between a blamer (or blamers) and a wrongdoer (or wrongdoers). My argument 
about expressed blame works in two stages. First, I will argue that expressed blame, even in its 
most civilized forms, involves an underlying retributive spirit. I will argue that this retributive 
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spirit is morally bad, in that it often leads to escalation such that expressions of blame can 
quickly spiral out of control. Drawing upon work by Victoria McGeer and Martha Nussbaum 
(among others), who each discuss the connection between retribution, anger, and blame, I claim 
that blame’s retributive nature gives us good reason to be wary of expressing it interpersonally in 
response to moral wrongdoing. I will further claim that anger is an exacerbating feature of 
blame’s retributive spirit, rendering angry forms of blame the worst kind. 
I shall then strengthen this argument by offering an epistemic argument about reasons to 
be skeptical about judgements of blameworthiness. In doing so, I discuss Gideon Rosen’s 
epistemic skepticism and use his view as support for my own. Rosen argues that we rarely have 
the proper warrant to make positive judgments of culpability. I will expand Rosen’s discussion 
regarding warrants about judgments of culpability into the realm of public communications of 
blame. I argue that if we cannot be sure whether or not someone is culpable, it follows to exert 
caution before making private judgments about culpability about them, in addition to exerting 
extreme caution in publicly expressing blame to them. As I will argue, the stakes involved in 
public expressions of blame are much higher than the stakes involved in private judgments of 
blame, and our practices of expressing blame should reflect this difference. 
Finally, chapter four provides practical, alternative methods of responding to moral 
wrongdoing that do not require or rely upon the use of expressed blame. Contra the standard 
view that expressed blame is required to serve the functions of 1. Motivating and 2. Holding 
others morally responsible, I will argue that we do not need expressed blame to achieve either 
function, and that we have other viable options. If I am right that it is possible to cultivate habits 
of moral response such that we can hold others morally responsible and motivate them to change 
without expressed blame, and granted that blame often has at a problematically hostile 
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expression, then there is a strong prima facie case for thinking that holding each other 
responsible without expressed blame is a preferable option. Though many philosophers raise 
skepticism about blame’s positive value, few end up arguing, as radically as I will, that we can 
hold wrongdoers responsible without expressed blame, and that doing so is preferable. 
I will use the remainder of this introductory chapter to briefly discuss the four 
predominant accounts about what blame is in the literature. I will be drawing upon them in the 
chapters to come.  
 
II. What is Blame? 
 
There are four established views about what blame is: cognitive, conative, affective, and 
functional. In this section, I will spend more time discussing affective and functional accounts of 
blame, because I argue that blame is a combination of affective and functional. I will not be 
developing my own definition of blame in this dissertation. Instead, I will make the case that 
expressed blame often plays a functional role and takes an affective expression.  
First, cognitive accounts suggest that blame is a judgment or evaluation someone makes 
towards another person due to her attitudes or actions (See Hieronymi (2004), Zimmerman 
(1998), Scanlon (1986, 2008) and Watson (1996, 2004)). If blame is primarily a judgment, then 
it need not be expressed. Instead, the judgment could simply remain privately held in the 
blamer’s mind. For example, Zimmerman writes that when we blame someone, there is a 
“discredit or debit in his ledger…(we have decided) that his ‘moral standing’ has been 
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diminished.”4 Zimmerman’s account suggests that blame merely involves the cognitive judgment 
that someone’s moral standing has been diminished.  
Second, conative accounts of blame argue that desires and intentions, rather than 
judgments, are essential to blame (See Sher (2004)). According to George Sher, to blame is to 
have a belief-desire pair. The belief held by the blamer is that the wrongdoer acted wrongly. The 
desire held by the blamer (and maybe the wrongdoer, too) is that the wrongdoer not have acted 
badly in that way. The desire is a backward-looking desire about the wrongdoing, which can be 
quite similar to regret for the wrongdoer. The wrongdoer desires that she not have done that 
wrong action. Sher claims that we can understand blame based solely on this belief-desire pair.  
Third, affective accounts take our emotions to be central to what blame is (see Wolf 
(2011), Bell (2013)). These blaming emotions are largely, if not entirely, negative. Common 
blaming emotions include: anger, indignation, resentment, or disappointment. In the 
interpersonal domain, expressed blame is highly affective. We can make sense of cooler forms of 
blame when blame is expressed to a stranger for some minor moral wrongdoing or to the leader 
of a country far removed from one’s own. These expressions of blame are likely cooler in 
intensity due to the distant nature of the relationship between the blamer and wrongdoer. It might 
be hard to get all that worked up over situations of wrongdoing that do not directly apply to our 
lives or to the lives of those close to us. Differently, with those close to us, our blaming emotions 
tend to arise more strongly and are more personal. For example, when my sister says something 
racist about our mutual friend, I feel much more betrayed than if a stranger makes the same racist 
statement. I expect better of my sister, and I have an expectation of her that is not being met. 
Though I might also express blame to the stranger who expresses the same racist sentiment, it is 
                                                        
4 Zimmerman, M. (1988). An Essay on Moral Responsibility. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 38. 
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less personalized, because we have no prior relationship or expectation of one another that has 
now been broken. 
P. F. Strawson’s Freedom and Resentment (1962) is widely regarded as the catalyst for 
emotional theories of blame. Strawson argued that to blame someone (or oneself) is simply to 
have an emotional response, or set of what he termed reactive attitudes. According to Strawson, 
the reactive attitudes are “attitudes belonging to involvement or participation with others in inter-
personal human relationships,"5 such as resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, and anger. This list of 
reactive attitudes is quite diverse. Gratitude is clearly a positively-valenced emotion, and 
forgiveness also seems positively-valenced, whereas resentment and anger are clearly 
negatively-valenced. Gratitude is unlikely to crop up in our expressions of blame, whereas the 
negative emotions on the list are ordinary blaming emotions.  
Although anger, resentment, and indignation are not identical emotions, and it might seem 
too hasty to lump them all together, they each have a negative charge for the one who emotes 
them, and they are received negatively. It hurts to be on the receiving end of anger, resentment or 
indignation. The subtle differences between these terms in the particular context of expressing 
blame, while interesting and important, do not concern me. Which of these negative emotions we 
habitually gravitate towards in our blaming practices depends on the particulars of one’s 
personality traits, lived experience, upbringing, cultural customs, etc. The crucial point is how 
negative and hostile most of the typical blaming emotions are. 
Fourth, functional accounts of blame pick out blame according to its functional role (See 
Smith (2013), Fricker (2016)). For example, Miranda Fricker argues that the most explanatorily 
basic form of blame is communicative blame. She claims that the function of communicative 
                                                        
5 Strawson, P.F. (1962). “Freedom and Resentment”. Proceedings of the British Academy (48), pp. 1-25. 
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blame is to inspire remorse (understood cognitively) in wrongdoers, thereby achieving shared 
moral understanding between the wrongdoer and the wronged party. Fricker argues that 
communicative blame “aims to bring the wrongdoer to see or fully acknowledge the moral 
significance of what they have done or failed to do.”6  The process of bringing the wrongdoer to 
acknowledge the moral significance of her actions aims to increase the alignment of moral 
understanding between the wronged and the wrongdoer.  
Remorse, in this context, refers to “a moral perception that delivers a pained understanding of 
the moral wrong we have done.”7 Remorse, while painful, has a well-intentioned aim: to get 
wrongdoers to see things differently and gain the desire to make positive moral changes in 
themselves. The psychological pain remorse brings to the wrongdoer is considered a necessary 
motivational tool to get the wrongdoer to want to change her behavior.  
I agree with Fricker that a primary function of blame is to get wrongdoers to see the moral 
significance of their actions and be motivated to change their behavior. The blamer aims to 
promote the moral development of the wrongdoer by forcefully getting her to see reasons to act 
differently next time. This aim is useful and important. We of course want wrongdoers to 
acknowledge the moral significance of their actions and feel motivated to change their behavior. 
However, as I will argue, because of its forcefulness or hostility, expressed blame might not be 
the best way to achieve this aim. 
I will assume, in what follows, that expressed blame plays a combination of affective 
(negatively-valenced) and functional roles in the aftermath of wrongdoing. This leaves room for 
expressed blame to take many forms. Affectively, blame might take expression as anger, 
indignation, resentment, or even disappointment. Functionally, expressed blame serves to make 
                                                        
6 Fricker, Miranda. (2016). “What's the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation”. Noûs, 50, p. 173. 
7 Fricker, p. 173. 
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wrongdoers feel badly for what they did and to motivate them to change. But, how this process 
of getting wrongdoers to feel badly unfolds depends on the particular blamer as well as the 
particular dynamic between the blamer and the wrongdoer. We each have different emotional 
and psychological dispositions. Some of us are quick to anger, some of us are quick to 
depression. Some of us are quick to take the blame, some of us are extremely defensive. Some of 
us work well with others, some of us are better off working alone. Blame can surely be other 
things—a judgment, a belief, an attitude, etc. But, whatever else it is, I argue that it is primarily 
affective (negatively-valenced), and functions to communicate to the wrongdoer the significance 
of her wrongdoing and inspire remorse.  
 
III. Blameworthiness Versus Blame & Appropriateness Conditions 
 
 In addition to trying to pin down what blame is, many philosophers discuss if, and under 
what circumstances, blame is appropriate. Determining whether one is blameworthy involves 
determining 1. Who is culpable for a given wrong, and 2. Why. Recall that I am focused on the 
public practice of expressing blame, not on private judgments of culpability. However, the two 
are closely related, as many authors take expressed blame to be appropriate only if one is 
culpable for a given wrong. Specifically, many argue that one can only be considered 
blameworthy, and thus a candidate for blame, for actions over which one had the capacity to 
control. If one could not but have done a given wrong action, it seems obvious that one is not to 
blame for the wrong action. Matthew Talbert summarizes this standard view: 
Many theorists assume that wrongdoers are open to serious moral blame only if they had the 
psychological, emotional, and motivational resources to respond to the moral considerations 
that counted against their behavior. This assumption imposes a moral competence 
requirement on blame…(according to which) only competent wrongdoers can reasonably be 
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exposed to moral blame because only these agents are reasonably held to the expectation that 
they respond to moral considerations.8 
 
For example, sometimes blame is a fitting response to wrongdoing, but it is not appropriate 
to express it.9 The two can come apart. For example, sometimes a situation or statement is very 
funny, but it would be rude to laugh about it given the circumstances (at a funeral, during a 
breakup, and so on). In this same way, so too is it not always the proper moment to express 
blame, even if blame is fitting for the situation. We rightly do not always express blame to those 
we deem blameworthy, due to a variety of contextual factors. I will return to this distinction 
between fittingness and appropriateness throughout the dissertation.  
 Additionally, blame comes in degrees. The severity of a case of expressed blame depends 
on the severity of the wrongdoing. For example, it is not appropriate—in fact, it is nonsensical—
to blame to such a degree that I end a relationship with a close friend for her being five minutes 
late to meet me for lunch. However, it makes more sense to express blame harshly, perhaps to 
the point of rupturing or even ending the relationship, when I learn that my assistant has been 
stealing money from me for ten years.  The stakes of the case matter a great deal in determining 
the appropriateness and severity of expressions of blame. 
 A related question is who has the standing to blame. For example, many argue that if one 
has engaged in or is currently engaging in the very behavior of the wrongdoer, one’s standing to 
blame the wrongdoer is weakened, if not totally negated. This condition is called the ‘hypocrisy 
condition’. Put simply, the pot cannot call the kettle black. For example, if Rita recently had an 
affair with a married man, she likely does not have the standing to judge her friend, Sanaz for 
also having an affair with a different married man. In this case, Rita’s judgment of Sanaz is 
                                                        
8 Talbert, Matthew (2012). Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest. Journal of Ethics 16 (1), p. 89. 
9 See D’Arms and Jacobsen (2000) for more on the fitting versus appropriate distinction. 
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hypocritical. The hypocrisy condition does not prevent blame from being appropriate. It may 
well be that Sanaz’s actions are worthy of blame, and she should be blamed for them. But, the 
hypocrisy condition limits who has the standing to express that blame. Rita might not have the 
standing to blame Sanaz, but someone else who has not broken the hypocrisy condition 
regarding this issue might have the standing to blame Sanaz for her actions.  
 In addition to the hypocrisy condition, there may be agents we simply are not in an 
epistemic position to appropriately express blame to, such as strangers or acquaintances. In these 
cases, we might not know enough about the wrongdoer to blame them with full confidence about 
their culpability. Again, blame might be appropriate in these instances if expressed by those who 
have the standing to blame. However, strangers may not have the standing to blame each other, 
because they lack sufficient knowledge of the case. Angela Smith (2007) argues that one’s 
standing to blame depends both on one’s relationship to the wrongdoer and on whether one has a 
“relevant interest or stake in the matter.”10 By relevant interest or stake in the matter, she means 
that the blamer should likely either know the wrongdoer personally, or should be affected by the 
wrongdoer’s actions in some way, broadly construed. For example, if a stranger starts a giant fire 
in my apartment building, even though I do not know this stranger, I have a relevant stake in the 
matter, since my property is at stake because of her actions. 
As a second example, it may be inappropriate for me to express blame towards a stranger 
on the subway who is speaking condescendingly towards his friend. In this case, I may feel that 
it is not my place to chime in. I lack the standing to express blame since I do not know these 
people and will, in a matter of minutes, likely never see them again. I do not have any 
background context for their specific situation, and I do not know what their relationship is like. 
                                                        
10 Smith, Angela (2007). On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible. The Journal of Ethics 11, p. 478. 
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However, I do have the standing to express blame when my roommate suddenly decides to stop 
paying her portion of our rent. This is because, following Smith’s conditions, I have a close 
relationship with the wrongdoing agent and a relevant interest in the matter. So, my expressed 
blame is likely to be appropriate in this case. Assuming I have not committed the same wrong 
towards her, i.e. suddenly decided to not pay my portion of our rent, my expressed blame is not 
hypocritical, either. 
 
IV. The Best Case for Blame 
 
Finally, in this introductory chapter, I will briefly explore the underlying features of cases 
of expressed blame that work well. I will consider the best-case scenario for expressed blame. 
Surely blame is sometimes useful to express. When, specifically, does expressing blame work 
well. Put another way, when does expressed blame help a given interpersonal conflict? By ‘work 
well’ or ‘help’, I argue that the blamer’s expression of blame needs to have practical uptake. 
Practical uptake means that the wrongdoer understands the content of the blame and is motivated 
to make positive moral changes as a result of the blamer’s blame. The moral point comes across. 
In addition, a part of blame working well or having practical uptake means that there was no 
major emotional damage done by the blaming interaction. Not only does the moral point come 
across, but it does so without creating lasting emotional damage between blamer and wrongdoer. 
On my view, such emotional damage (shouting, giving the other person the cold shoulder, nasty 
comments, vengeful acts, etc.) is not a hallmark of effective blaming practices. 
Before I begin my arguments against expressed blame in the chapters to come, I would 
like to give expressed blame the most charitable interpretation I can. As such, below l briefly 
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sketch some characteristics of cases in which expressed blame may usefully serve an 
interpersonal situation. After doing so, I will spend the rest of this dissertation demonstrating that 
a given interpersonal situation must be so idealized for expressed blame to be useful, that on the 
whole, it is not worth putting any hope into expressed blame usefully serving our interpersonal 
moral conflicts. More often than not, expressed blame makes things worse for the blamer, the 
wrongdoer, or both. 
 Still, I will imagine the characteristics involved in cases in which expressed blame works 
well. I argue that there are three general elements underlying these sort of cases: 
1. The blamer does not express the blame angrily 
2. The wrongdoer does not get defensive 
3. The blame has practical uptake with the wrongdoer (she learns the lesson and does not do 
it again) 
 
These three elements are intertwined. Expressed blame’s best shot in interpersonal contexts is 
when the wrongdoer does not get defensive. When the wrongdoer gets defensive, it makes 
intuitive sense that she is less likely to listen to the blamer’s attempts to motivate her to change 
her behavior. Her emotions forestall positive moral change as she is focused only on defending 
herself, and not on hearing the other person’s perspective. This is especially true when the 
blamer gets overtaken by anger. In chapter two, I will argue that anger is an exacerbating feature 
of blame. The blamer’s anger, coupled with the wrongdoer’s defensiveness, prevents actual, 
productive dialogue from occurring. Lost in the heat of emotional turmoil, it is hard to 
understand the moral message that another agent is trying to express.  
Indeed, the first two conditions (the blamer does not get angry and the blamer does not 
get defensive) are process oriented. They are conditions involving the process of expressing 
blame. The third condition is outcome based. It is a condition regarding the ways in which the 
blamer’s moral point comes across. The best case for practical uptake is when the wrongdoer is 
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not defensive, and when neither agent lets their anger overtake the communication. If both agents 
(blamer and wrongdoer) are able to calmly and rationally respond to a case of wrongdoing, there 
is certainly a chance that expressed blame can effectively lead to positive moral change. 
Expressed blame does sometimes work well. However, so many things have to go 
correctly in order for blame to work well. First, the blamer has to not overreact, and not let her 
anger spiral. Second, the wrongdoer has to not get defensive when receiving the blame. Third, 
the blame has to have practical uptake. The point of this initial discussion was to prompt 
reflection on when blame has practical uptake, in order to contrast it to the myriad cases I will 
present in the chapters to come in which blame is counterproductive. As I will argue, these three 
features (defensiveness, anger, and lack of understanding) are pervasive elements of many of our 





 As a preview of the arguments to come, my overarching view is that despite any good 
intentions that blamers have when they express blame, to carve up the world through the lens of 
expressed blame in response to wrongdoing is, on the whole, worse for our interpersonal moral 
lives than not expressing blame is. Indeed, I am arguing something quite radical: We can, and 
often should, hold wrongdoers responsible and incite proper motivation in them without 
expressing blame. I am not suggesting that no one is ever responsible for a given moral wrong or 
that we should never respond to or discourage wrongdoing. Rather, I argue that we have good 
reason to think that expressed blame is not required to hold others responsible. Even though 
 18 
expressed blame is currently the default response to being wronged in our interpersonal moral 



























 This dissertation argues that expressing blame in interpersonal moral settings is, generally 
speaking, unhelpful and unnecessary, even in its most civilized guises. This is an argument about 
social expressions of blame, not about private judgments of blame. I propose that alternatives to 
expressing blame can equally serve the goals of motivating wrongdoers to recognize the 
significance of their actions and change their ways, as well as holding them responsible for their 
actions. Not only can we hold each other responsible without expressed blame, but, more 
strongly, we have reason to think that our interpersonal moral lives will go better without 
expressed blame. 
 I will argue for this conclusion by first offering a critical discussion of recent literature on 
the reactive attitudes, retribution, and blame. In particular, Victoria McGeer’s recent work 
provides a defense of a certain form of blame and offers a strong foil to my view. I will mount 
my case against expressed blame by arguing that blame is fundamentally retributive and that 
blame’s retributive root is incipiently present even in civilized guises.  
 
II. Blame is Retributive 
 
There is good reason to suspect that all forms of blame are at least incipiently retributive. 
This holds not only for overtly angry forms of blame but also for more civilized, less 
emotionally-heated forms of blame. This does not imply that all forms of blame will involve 
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patently retributive elements. Rather, I argue that blame’s primitive foundations involve a 
retributive spirit that remains at least incipiently at play in even our modern-day interpersonal 
expressions of blame. 
There is support in the philosophical literature for the view that blame is, at root, 
retributive. McGeer discusses the connection between blame and retribution in her two papers 
“Co-reactive Attitudes and the Making of Moral Community” (2010) and “Civilizing Blame” 
(2012). In the first half of this chapter, I will provide a critical survey of McGeer’s work in order 
to, in the second half of the chapter, build my case for blame’s retributive nature.  
In “Co-reactive Attitudes and the Making of Moral Community”, McGeer develops and 
builds upon P.F. Strawson’s account of the “reactive attitudes” in his paper “Freedom and 
Resentment” (1974).  As mentioned in my introductory chapter, Strawson first coined the term 
“reactive attitudes”. He describes the reactive attitudes as special affective responses that are 
deeply ingrained in our interactions with one another. These reactive attitudes include: gratitude, 
resentment, hurt feelings, indignation, shame, guilt, remorse, and so on. According to Strawson, 
the reactive attitudes constitute the ways in which we relate to one another in our practices of 
holding each other morally responsible.  
Strawson’s account has had wide-reaching influence since it was first published. For 
example, in Responsibility and Moral Sentiments, R. Jay Wallace builds on Strawson’s account. 
Wallace argues that we can use the reactive attitudes as a criterion of responsibility. Specifically, 
his account “treats the stance of holding people responsible essentially in terms of attitudinal 
conditions.”11 According to Wallace, to hold an agent responsible is essentially to subject them to 
the blamer’s reactive emotions. For example, when you betray my trust and tell my secret to a 
                                                        
11 Wallace, R. J. (1998) “Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments”. Harvard University Press, p. 66. 
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room full of people, I hold you responsible through making you a target of my hostile reactive 
attitudes, such as anger or indignation. According to Wallace’s view, wrongdoers are held to 
account through being on the receiving end of these attitudes and then responding by making 
positive changes to their moral behavior. 
However, the reactive attitudes do not cover the full range of emotional responses one might 
have in the aftermath of wrongdoing; they are not exhaustive. McGeer notes that an agent might 
well feel pity or compassion for a wrongdoer, neither of which are included in Strawson’s list of 
reactive attitudes.12 It seems unlikely that expressing pity towards a wrongdoer could serve as a 
practical way to hold a wrongdoer responsible, even though pity is a perfectly sensible response 
to some, likely minor, forms of wrongdoing.  Still, generally speaking, when an agent wrongs us, 
and we feel that the agent is responsible for the crime, we naturally respond with one (or a few) 
of the specific negative reactive attitudes.13 While being on the receiving end of these negative 
reactive attitudes is largely unpleasant, McGeer claims that the reactive attitudes deliver a 
positive and important message. 
McGeer explains 
Just what are we communicating (to wrongdoers) though our reactive attitudes then? (The 
reactive attitudes say that) we hold them accountable to an ideal of moral agency because we 
think them capable of living up to that ideal. So reactive attitudes communicate a positive 
message even in their most negative guise – even in the guise of anger, resentment, 
indignation. The fact that we express them says to the recipients that we see them as 
individuals who are capable of understanding and living up to the norms that make for moral 
community.14 
 
                                                        
12 McGeer, Victoria (2012). “Co-Reactive Attitudes and the Making of Moral Community”. In Emotions, 
Imagination and Moral Reasoning, eds., C. MacKenzie & R. Langdon. Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive 
Science, Psychology Press, p. 2. 
13 It should be noted that not all individuals are appropriate targets of our reactive attitudes. The standard view is that 
individuals with cognitive-abnormalities and young children might not be in the position to have known better when 
they acted wrongly. Only agents who are participants in our shared moral norms are proper targets of the reactive 
attitudes. 
14 McGeer, p. 7. 
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In this passage, McGeer defends the positive message conveyed through the harsh affective 
expression of the reactive attitudes. When we communicate blame towards a wrongdoer through 
our hostile emotions like anger or resentment, McGeer claims that this anger positively and 
helpfully communicates that we see the wrongdoing agent as someone capable of knowing better 
and acting more in line with our shared moral norms. We are communicating, through our harsh 
reactive attitudes, that we demand that the wrongdoer acts better next time.15 This communication 
shows wrongdoers that we respect them as moral agents who should know better than to act as 
they did. Further, it encourages them to act better next time. 
 On McGeer’s view, then, there is nothing wrong with communicating our negative 
reactive attitudes to wrongdoers as a way to show respect towards them and to get them to act 
better next time. She calls the responsiveness a wrongdoer brings to being the target of a 
blamer’s reactive attitudes co-reactivity. McGeer defines co-reactivity as “a sensitivity to the 
scaffolding structure of reactive emotions that is displayed by most human beings most of the 
time.”16 Responsible agency requires just this sort of co-reactive sensitivity. Indeed, this was one 
of Strawson’s own points. Strawson argued that the reactive attitudes are a way to hold other 
agents accountable in an essentially interpersonal and interactive way, and that this process 
involves a response from the wrongdoer. 
Similarly, in “Respect and the Second Person Standpoint” (2004), Darwall expands on 
Strawson’s point. Darwall argues that a second-personal reason “is one whose validity depends 
on presupposed authority (hence accountability) relations between persons and, therefore, on the 
possibility of the reason’s being addressed person-to-person.”17 McGeer’s proposal regarding the 
                                                        
15 See also Darwall (2006) for a similar argument. 
16 McGeer, p. 1. 
17 Darwall, Stephen (2004). “Respect and the Second Person Standpoint”. Proceedings and Addresses of the 
American Philosophical Association, Vol. 78, No. 2, p. 46. 
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co-reactive structure of blame involves reasons of just this second-personal variety. Darwall 
further argues that second-personal reasons “always derive from agents’ relations to one another, 
(so) they are invariably agent-relative in some way or other; they apply to us from within the 
network of these relations.”18 Darwall highlights the context-sensitive nature of our interpersonal 
relationships. How we respond to wrongdoers and how they respond to us, in our interpersonal 
lives, depends on the dynamics involved in that specific relationship and other context-sensitive 
factors about the given situation.  
 McGeer accepts Strawson’s picture of how the reactive attitudes arise in our interactions 
with others, particularly in our practices of holding each other responsible. Further, she combines 
this Strawsonian picture with recent cognitive science research about the reactive attitudes to 
strengthen her defense of blaming. For example, she discusses Greene and Cohen’s paper “For 
the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything” (2004), in which the authors argue 
that our reactive affective system is part of our evolved biological heritage, making it “very 
unlikely to be cognitively penetrable.”19 Greene and Cohen ague that although “we may come to 
regard our reactive attitudes (e.g. resentment, indignation, retributive anger) as embedding a 
hopeless error in the way we regard human agents, we may be stuck with such attitudes in the 
hurly-burly of everyday life.”20 By this, Greene and Cohen mean that no matter how evolved we 
have become, to some degree, we are stuck with our primitive-based negative reactive attitudes. 
Put more strongly, Greene and Cohen suggest that these reactive attitudes, including 
retributive feelings, are likely to be an ineradicable feature of the human psyche21 that are “driven 
                                                        
18 Darwall, p. 46. 
19 Greene, J. & Cohen, J. (2004). “For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything”. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences: 359, p. 1784. 
20 McGeer, p. 16. 
21 McGeer’s phrase not mine (McGeer, p. 23). 
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by phylogenetically old mechanisms in the brain.”22 Try as we might, we cannot simply get rid of 
or evolve past our negative reactive attitudes. This is a substantial and, on first pass, seemingly 
hopeless conclusion. The conclusion is that while we may be able to train and tame these 
retributive feelings through habitual effort, we simply cannot eliminate them from our brains. 
This gives us reason to think that those feelings will, to some degree, continually crop up in our 
interpersonal moral lives, despite our best efforts to tame them. This finding mirrors Adam 
Smith’s view in A Theory of Moral Sentiments, in which he argues that “revenge, the excess of 
resentment, appears to be the most detestable of all the passions, and is the object of the horror 
and indignation of everybody.”23 Even though revenge is a natural habit and one we likely cannot 
eliminate, Smith finds it the worst of all our emotional responses, deeming it a “savage 
disposition”24 to embody. 
Optimistically, however, Greene and Cohen do not think that the fact that retributive 
feelings are ineradicable features of our human psyches should force us to make legal and policy 
decisions that involve retributive forms of punishment. We should not feel resigned to a 
retributive-based legal system. Instead, Greene and Cohen suggest that we might be able to 
bracket-out our reactive attitudes when we make policy decisions about criminal justice, as well 
as when we make moral decisions in our everyday interpersonal lives. By bracket-out, Greene 
and Cohen mean that we might be able to design institutional forms of justice that intentionally 
do not cater to these negative impulses. Just because these negative attitudes and impulses will 
likely continue to arise in our minds regardless of how much we train to eliminate them does not 
mean we will necessarily be compelled to always act on them. Instead, we can train ourselves to 
                                                        
22 Greene & Cohen, p. 1784. 
23 Smith, Adam (1759). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Gutenberg Publishers, p. 68. 
24 Smith, p. 160. 
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be aware of those reactive attitudes arising and take care to not let them solely dictate our legal 
policy decisions.25 In the same way that many of us would prefer to eat cookies and ice cream 
every day, but are able to train ourselves to moderate our sugar intake because we value our 
health and longevity, perhaps we can also train ourselves to be aware of and moderate the 
expression of our reactive attitudes with consistent effort. 
Greene and Cohen’s finding applies not only to the legal realm, but also to our daily 
interpersonal moral lives, too. It is important to consider whether the fact that retributive feelings 
are ineradicable features of our human psyches forces us into a retributive-based interpersonal 
moral system. Greene and Cohen do not elaborate on whether the ability to bracket-out our 
retributive impulses in our daily moral lives is practically available to most of us. Perhaps the 
moral saints among us are able to express blame in a highly civilized manner, void of any of 
these primitive retaliatory impulses. But, this may not hold true for the rest of us. It is likely 
unrealistic to expect the average moral agent to so diligently and constantly bracket-out their 
retributive impulses. In the next section, I will consider the strategy of civilizing blame, which 
will help shed light on the plausibility of our ordinary abilities to bracket-out our retributive 
impulses. 
 
III. Civilizing Blame 
 
The project of civilizing blame aims to show that blame can be a “morally acceptable, 
even constructive feature of human life.”26 An extreme version of Civilized Blame is what 
                                                        
25 For further, related discussion, see Martha Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought (2001) where she argues that we 
must not let emotions dictate the law. 
26 McGeer, Victoria (2013). “Civilizing Blame”. in Blame: Its Nature and Norms, eds., D. Justin Coates and Neal A. 
Tognazzini. Oxford University Press, p. 1. 
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philosophers refer to as Sanitized Blame, a view that McGeer finds psychologically unrealistic. 
Advocates of sanitized versions of blame argue that even if blame involves underlying retaliatory 
elements, perhaps these baser instincts can be sanitized, if not wholly eradicated. According to 
McGeer, it is simply not possible to purge blame of all its unsavory psychological features. The 
Sanitized Blame strategy is unrealistic because part of what it is for humans to respond to 
wrongdoing naturally is for us to express our reactive attitudes to one another, including our 
retributive impulses. Perhaps the moral saints among us are capable of such a drastic eradication 
of their baser instincts, but this achievement is not available to the rest of us. 
A less extreme version of this is Civilized Blame, which McGeer explains as aiming to 
“preserve (blame’s) normative power while purging its unsavory psychological features.”27 
McGeer endorses a version of Civilized Blame under the title Domesticated Blame, which I will 
survey in the next section. Assuming it is at least psychologically possible to dispense with the 
negative emotional elements of blame, McGeer examines whether this would be a normatively 
preferable state of affairs. She recognizes and agrees with me that blame’s affective elements 
Can be highly destructive, leading to cruel and excessively punitive behavior. They can also 
be self-destructive, leading to unpleasant ruminations, loss of trust, loss of more general 
goodwill…They can generate downward spirals, where one person’s anger begets what may 
seem to others justified anger and resentment in turn, refueling the anger originally felt and 
encouraging more anger in return.28 
 
Despite this recognition, McGeer argues that as dangerous as the blaming emotions are, “the 
state of affairs in which such emotions are missing or absent from blame should not be 
recommended on normative grounds.”29 McGeer defends this claim with the premise that 
emotions constitute a uniquely powerful form of communication. McGeer argues that we need 
                                                        
27 McGeer, p. 1. 
28 McGeer, p. 26. 
29 McGeer, p. 27. 
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the forcefulness of anger, indignation, and resentment in order to make salient the contents of our 
expressions of blame. Without the forcefulness of these negative emotions, the wrongdoer might 
not clearly get the message that what they did was wrong. McGeer explains that biologically 
speaking, we are  
Involuntarily disposed to react to—that is, both detect and care about –the good or ill will 
that others manifest toward us….(reactive attitudes) are attention-grabbers for us, 
providing a form of triangulation that draws our attention both to the person manifesting 
the attitude and to the behavior—whatever it was—that prompted the attitude.30 
 
According to this view, we are involuntarily disposed to reacting negatively when we are 
on the receiving end of emotionally-laden forms of blame. The forceful charge of affective 
expressions of blame, then, incites a reaction in wrongdoers that non-emotional expressions of 
blame may not. McGeer, then, rejects the Sanitized Blame strategy on the grounds that it is 
unrealistic and that the reactive attitudes successfully grab wrongdoers’ attention and force them 
to respond. To strip blame of these forceful components would not yield as successful a moral 
outcome. McGeer argues that blaming emotions “convey to transgressors both how seriously 
blamers regard the offense and their sincerity in pressing their normative demands.”31  
Thus, McGeer concludes that “if we do not wear the costs of angry blame, then we 
cannot reap its considerable rewards…(we should not try) to take the emotional guts out of 
blame.”32 She is aware of the unsavory aspects of blame, i.e. the forcefulness and retributive 
nature of our blaming emotions. However, McGeer concludes that those negative emotions are 
necessary means to the important end of getting wrongdoers to forcefully recognize their 
wrongdoing and to commit to acting in morally better ways. 
                                                        
30 McGeer, p. 27. 
31 McGeer, p. 28. 
32 McGeer, p. 29 
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While McGeer and I are in full agreement both that blame fundamentally involves retributive 
elements and that the Santized Blame strategy is ineffective, our arguments diverge beyond these 
points of agreement. Like McGeer, I also find the Sanitized Blame strategy psychologically 
unrealistic, but I disagree with her that we need to express the reactive attitudes in order to most 
successfully get wrongdoers to recognize their wrongdoing and commit to changing. That we 
disagree on this point is very important, because I conclude, in the chapters to come, that the 
social, ethical, and practical risks involved in expressing blame make it an ill-advised 
interpersonal moral strategy, whereas McGeer’s conclusion is in favor of continuing our blaming 
practices. Before I argue for why I have come to this conclusion, I will give McGeer’s account 
its due, and will discuss her defense of a form of blame, which she terms Domesticated Blame. 
Given that McGeer finds the Sanitized Blame strategy unsatisfying, she instead proposes an 
account of blame, Domesticated Blame, that aims to tame (but not shy away from) our 
retributive impulses. I will first summarize her account, and then provide objections to her view, 
of a kind that will reveal in what respects my position is much more radical than hers. 
 
IV. Domesticated Blame 
 
McGeer argues that her alternative to civilizing blame, Domesticated Blame, is a happy 
medium between blame’s primitive, retributive origins and overly-sanitized versions of blame. 
McGeer’s strategy is a form of blame, and one that she argues more accurately depicts the 
psychology of blame as a “complex, emotionally charged reaction to wrongdoing, with 
inseparable savory and unsavory features.”33 Rather than transform the psychology of blame 
                                                        
33 McGeer, p. 1. 
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(Sanitized Blame’s futile goal), McGeer’s domestication method aims to reform our very 
institutions of blame, while leaving the psychological origins of our blaming practices intact. 
McGeer’s strategy does not attempt to sanitize or strip blame of its retributive origins, but rather 
aims to get at the foundational, structural underpinnings of our blaming practices. 
McGeer urges her readers to recognize that the ‘affective complex’ associated with blame, 
while unsavory—which she terms “warts-and-all”—still provides valuable normative work “so 
long as it is constrained by social and institutional practices that support its more constructive 
features.”34 In this way, Domesticated Blame retains all of the negative emotional aspects of 
blame, but constrains them within a structured social and institution model that encourages 
morally productive dialogical exchanges between blamer and wrongdoer. 
At the heart of McGeer’s strategy is a dialogical exchange between blamer and wrongdoer. 
Recall my earlier discussion of the co-reactivity involved between blamer and wrongdoer in 
response to moral wrongdoing. That co-reactivity is central to the dialogical exchange. For 
McGeer, blame grounded in a dialogical exchange is normatively acceptable because the 
dialogical dimension is what makes blame “no longer just a primitive punitive response but one 
that builds onto this crude regulative structure a cognitively sophisticated dialogical dimension.”35 
According to McGeer, Domesticated Blame is not merely a hostile and retributive exchange 
because it involves a non-hostile, co-reactive back and forth dialogue between the agents.  
This co-reactive dialogical exchange involves two elements. First, the blamer responds to 
something a wrongdoer has done. Second, the blamer calls for the wrongdoer to appropriately 
respond to the blamer’s sense of being wronged.36 The two agents co-react to the situation and to 
                                                        
34 McGeer, p. 4. 
35 McGeer, p. 30. 
36 McGeer, p. 30. 
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what one another is saying in the moment. The wrongdoer is allowed, even encouraged, to 
defend herself against the blamer’s charges if she feels that they are unfair. The dialogue 
encourages each agent to explain their own perspective. McGeer further argues that the point of 
this dialogical exchange is to 
Draw wrongdoers into a kind of exchange where they are perforce challenged to exercise 
their capacities as responsible agents, to reflect on what they have done, whether or not it is 
legitimate, and if it is not, to take responsibility for what they have done and for what they 
will do in the future. Thus despite the fact that such a process aims to change a person’s 
actions and attitudes, it is not by means of the blamers’ exercising engineering control.37 
 
In this passage, McGeer explains that the dialogical force of blame is, just as Darwall argued 
above, essentially interpersonal. It involves the two (or more) agents jointly reflecting on the 
wrong moral actions that occurred, and then jointly coming to a consensus about how to move 
forward. Importantly, McGeer admits that the dialogical process aims to change the wrongdoer’s 
actions and attitudes, yet McGeer maintains that this is not equivalent to the blamer’s attempting 
to gain control. The dialogical exchange is not an attempt on behalf of the blamer to gain control 
because the wrongdoer has the chance to respond to the charges of blame. It is not a one-sided 
verbal exchange, but rather is an active, ongoing, collaborative process between the agents. 
McGeer further explains that  
 
Drawing putative wrongdoers into such an exchange, and thereby fully crediting them 
with the capacities of responsible agency, opens blamers themselves to being challenged 
on the legitimacy of their blame.38 
 
Indeed, the dialogical exchange between blamer and wrongdoer that McGeer envisions aims to 
create space for wrongdoers to put the burden of justification back onto the blamer, if the 
wrongdoer feels that the blamer has unfairly charged them with the wrongdoing. Pushback from 
the wrongdoer is an expected and inevitable part of the dialogical exchange.  
                                                        
37 McGeer, p. 25. 
38 McGeer, p. 25. 
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For instance, the dialogical exchange might involve a candid discussion of fault between the 
two agents. The wrongdoer might offer excuses or explanations of her actions. She might 
apologize. She might commit to reforming her actions. She might defend her behavior as being 
non-culpable. At this point, the blamer then has another chance to respond to the wrongdoer’s 
own response. The back and forth dialogue might consist of several rounds of exchange. 
McGeer’s account does not limit the number of back and forth exchanges the agents can or 
should have. Whichever form the conversation takes, dialogical exchange aims to reinforce both 
of the agents’ commitments to their shared moral norms. This dialogical exchange builds on the 
fact that we are reactively sensitive creatures, and are emotionally primed to respond to one 
another through this sort of dialogue.  
McGeer finds this dialogical dimension of our blaming practices to be normatively valuable 
“both from the point of view of repairing the variety of wrongs done by any transgression (to the 
victim, to the stability of shared norms, to a sense of security, and so on) and from the point of 
view of regulating behavior going forward.”39 McGeer’s dialogue-based Domesticated Blame 
strategy thus aims to create a structure for fruitful dialogue within a system of blame to occur 
between the blamer and wrongdoer with an eye towards lasting moral change.  
 
V. Objections to McGeer 
 
A. Building on Top of a Retributive Core 
While I am quite sympathetic to McGeer’s dialogical strategy and her focus on 
constructive communication between the agents involved, I have two objections to her view. 
                                                        
39 McGeer, p. 30. 
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These objections support my view that because expressed blame comes with a host of social 
risks, we would be best served avoiding expressed blame in our interpersonal moral lives.  
My first objection is that McGeer’s account is overly optimistic about the practicality of 
building a domesticated moral system on top of a fundamentally retributive core. McGeer writes 
that this dialogical dimension is what makes blame “no longer just a primitive punitive response 
but one that builds onto this crude regulative structure a cognitively sophisticated dialogical 
dimension.”40 The dialogical dimension might superficially mask the primitive foundations of 
blame, but it does not make those primitive foundations disappear.  
Building a more domesticated form of blame on top of an undomesticated foundation 
seems both strange and risky. Why not build a new system of responding to wrongdoing, one 
that is not built on top of an existent, primitive structure? Blame’s retributive core is much more 
powerful and enduring than McGeer acknowledges. In the same way that living in an earthquake 
fault zone always comes with the active risk of earthquake-induced damage to one’s home, so 
too does building a system of responding to wrongdoing on top of a dangerous platform—
retribution—always come with risks.  We see frequent, seemingly glorifying depictions of 
retribution in our media, for example in the recent films The Revenant and Inglorious Bastards. 
Exerting retributive aims when others wrong us seems to be an ordinary feature of our daily 
moral lives both on screen and off. Relatedly, recall Greene and Cohen’s persuasive argument 
that our retributive feelings are likely to be an ineradicable feature of the human psyche41 “driven 
by phylogenetically old mechanisms in the brain.”42 Because of this, our retributive impulses can, 
in mere seconds, devolve back into purely retributive (without McGeer’s domesticated dialogical 
                                                        
40 McGeer, p. 30. 
41 McGeer’s phrase not mine (McGeer, p. 23). 
42 Greene & Cohen, p. 1784. 
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structure) forms of blame, depending on the situation and dynamic between the agents involved. 
A retributive foundation is not something we can so easily build a sophisticated moral system on 
top of. 
In light of this, McGeer is overly optimistic to think we are able to tame our retributive 
impulses, generally speaking. Although we might be able to tame our retributive impulses on 
occasion, and we certainly can attempt to train ourselves to do so, we cannot, so readily, 
domesticate blame’s retributive core. To some degree, many of us have domesticated our 
retributive impulses fairly successfully in our daily moral lives. In our country on the whole, we 
peacefully exist in our shared moral communities much of the time without much trouble. 
However, the process of domestication is rigorous and ongoing. Except for perhaps the moral 
saints among us, we have not (nor can we) domesticate our primitive retributive impulses, full 
stop.  
Even if McGeer is right to think that some forms of blame are more domesticated, and 
many steps evolved from this primitive foundation, still, these domesticated forms of blame 
remain descendants of more primitive forms of blame. Even if one’s expression of blame 
appears quite civilized, we must remember that our evolutionary impulse is to retaliate, and that 
we are not so far evolved from that root impulse.43 Therefore, because the dialogical exchange at 
the heart of McGeer’s domesticated blame strategy is built on top of a retributive foundation, 
there is always a chance of it devolving (and devolving quickly) into its retributive core. 
 In response to my objection, McGeer might claim that there is no obvious harm to 
building a more domesticated version of blame on top of its primitive version. However, in 
response to this line of thought, I still argue that building a new version of blame on top of a 
                                                        
43 See Haidt (2001) for further details 
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primitive foundation is not worth the escalated social risk. Further, I argue that there are 
additional l harms to McGeer’s domesticating blame strategy. Expressions of blame, even in 
their most domesticated or civilized guises, are rarely affectively neutral. Indeed, expressions of 
blame often induce a visceral, emotional reaction from both the blamer and the wrongdoer. As I 
argued in my introductory chapter, part of what it is to express blame is to express negative 
emotions (anger, indignation, resentment) at a wrongdoer with the aim of inciting moral change 
in them. When expressions of blame are especially hostile and heated, there is a specifically 
social harm involved. Sometimes, the rebuke involved in expressed blame is not merely a 
normatively symbolic retributive mechanism, but it is also a psychological sting explicitly aimed 
to incite remorse, guilt, or shame in wrongdoers. There is substantial empirical evidence for the 
view that moral judgments are emotional in nature (see Prinz (2006); Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, 
and Eslinger (2003); Greene et al. (2001)).  
We aim to psychologically get revenge on each other in response to wrongdoing in all sorts 
of affective ways: passive aggressive verbal censure, aggressive body language, emotionally (or 
physically) distancing oneself from the wrongdoer, and so on. Each of these strategies involve a 
social harm in and of itself. It is hard to create space for the type of authentic dialogue that 
McGeer’s strategy requires when one (or both) agents is predominately focused on 
psychologically wounding the other person by discharging their negative emotions onto that 
person.  
In response, it may be remarked, what is so wrong with retributive expressions of blame in 
our moral lives? Someone might agree with me that blame is retributive, but also think there is 
nothing wrong with this. In response, I argue that all expressions of blame (however civilized) 
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remain socially risky. That social risk may be manifestly present, or may just be incipient, but 
the risk is there in either case. One obvious social harm is escalation.44 
For example, when I express blame to my friend for repeatedly running late and cancelling 
plans we made at the last minute, I might give her the cold shoulder or behave in a passive 
aggressive way when she finally shows up. I am not only expressing to her that I blame her, but I 
am further punishing her in a psychologically painful way. I want her to feel remorse. I want her 
to feel badly. In that moment, I am not trying to communicate authentically with her to resolve 
the conflict. Instead, I want her to feel badly because she has hurt me. I felt disrespected by her 
not valuing my time, and I want her to psychologically suffer in kind. This intention is a form of 
psychological retributivism, one that creates social harm.  
The social harm is twofold. First, it is a social harm because the blamer’s psychological 
retributivism aims to hurt the wrongdoer. Second, it is a social harm because this retributive aim 
is not only harmful for the recipient, but makes it harder for the agents to authentically 
communicate about how to resolve the wrongdoing.  The productive and authentic dialogical 
exchange that McGeer envisions becomes hard to create in a psychologically hostile atmosphere. 
It is harder to resolve interpersonal moral conflicts when retributive aims are at play. In the case 
described above, I have deemed my friend’s tardiness and flakiness as an expression of her 
unfairly treating my time as less valuable than hers. The harm I want to come to her is due to her 
unfairly harming me. This is psychologically harmful to her, and it is harmful to our attempts at 
resolving the conflict because I am too focused on trying to make her feel bad. That focus on 
                                                        
44 Because my dissertation focuses on expressed, interpersonal blame, rather than private or self-blame, I am most 
worried about the social effects of blame. If I were focused on private blame, the social effects might be lessened. 
But even private forms of blame might manifest publicly in subtle ways, such as passive-aggressiveness, social 
withdrawal, etc.  If private blame gets communicated at some level (even non-verbally), then it’s incipiently 
expressed. 
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making her feel bad restricts my ability to engage in inquisitive moral dialogue with her. This 
further social harm provides an additional reason for why McGeer’s Domesticated Blame 
strategy is overly optimistic about our ability to build a sophisticated and affectively-tame 
structure on top of a primitive retributive foundation. 
 
B. Bad is Stronger Than Good: A Second Social Harm Argument  
My second objection to McGeer’s view involves an additional social harm invoked by the 
Domesticated Blame strategy. The additional social harm is that expressed blame creates a 
dynamic of resistance from both blamer and wrongdoer, a dynamic which produces a socially 
and morally unhelpful outcome. This is because each agent is wired to be resistant to change 
(indeed, they are likely to dig in their heels), after the blame has been expressed. 
Empirical research in Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and Vohs’ paper “Bad is 
Stronger Than Good” (2001) sheds additional light on this resistance. The authors argue for the 
general psychological principle that bad is stronger than good.45 This applies to the greater power 
of: bad events over good ones, bad feedback over good feedback, and bad stereotypes over 
positive stereotypes. In general, bad impressions, emotions, and information form more quickly 
in our minds and are more resistant to disconfirmation than good impressions, emotions, and 
information. Applying this insight to the case of interpersonal blame, the thought is that events 
that are negatively valenced will have a greater impact on agents than positively valenced events 
of the same type.46 So, if I simultaneously blame and praise you, it is likely that my blame 
(because it is negatively valenced) will have a greater impact on you than my praise (because it 
                                                        
45 Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). “Bad is stronger than good”. Review of 
General Psychology, 5, pp. 323. 
46 Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, p. 323. 
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is positively valenced). Similarly, you will be more likely to remember my blame than my praise, 
because it is negatively valenced. My expressed blame likely has a more lasting negative impact 
on you than any positive impact my praise has. 
Other researchers have confirmed this finding, calling it the positive-negative asymmetry 
effect.47 Generally speaking, Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and Vohs argue that “learning 
something bad about a new acquaintance carries more weight than learning something good 
about them, by and large.”48  This makes intuitive sense. None of us likes to receive criticism, 
blame, or censure. It can be very hard for us to shake off the negative impressions of others, even 
in light of witnessing their positive attributes. Given that the content of blame is negative, and 
given that negative events will likely have a greater impact on us than positive events, there is a 
privileging of the negative events over the positive events in instances of expressed blame. The 
bad actions that an agent takes may carry too much weight in blamers’ minds, and the good 
actions that an agent takes may carry too little weight in the blamers’ minds. This bias impacts 
how we weight wrongdoer’s bad moral actions. 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and Vohs further explain that “Close relationships are 
more deeply and conclusively affected by destructive actions than by constructive ones, by 
negative communications than positive ones, and by conflict than harmony.”49 This asymmetry 
cannot help but affect the interpersonal dynamics between blamer and wrongdoer. In addition, 
“bad moods and negative emotions have stronger effects than good ones on cognitive 
processing.”50 Simply put, bad emotions have more power and lasting impact on us than positive 
emotions do.  
                                                        
47 See Anderson (1965); Peeters & Czapinski (1990); Skowronski & Carlston (1989). 
48 Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, p. 324. 
49 Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, p. 355. 
50 Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, p. 355. 
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Although Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and Vohs do not address expressed blame 
directly, they do conclude their article with a caution about punishment. They write that 
“punishment may not be optimal for education, even if it does produce optimal learning, because 
the side effects of punishment can be damaging.”51 By this, they mean that while punishment 
might create a positive environment for learning, the harmful emotional effects of punishment 
may outweigh the educational benefits. That is, even if we learn best (morally speaking) through 
expressed blame, it must be remarked how emotionally wounding receiving expressed blame can 
be. The learning outcome should not be prioritized above all else. Indeed, the sacrifice of 
creating a successful learning environment is that we create a hostile emotional and 
psychological environment, due in part to the positive-negative asymmetry effect. Other agents’ 
expressions of blame might motivate us to change, but it often comes at the great cost of 
emotional and social harm. A practice that is emotionally damaging, even if it produces good 
learning outcomes, is not a best practice.  
In our daily moral lives, most of us do not exhibit much, if any, caution about expressing 
blame; we are largely blind to the positive-negative asymmetry effect. Additionally, our 
tendency to give negative emotions more power than positive emotions means that we might 
exaggerate the appropriate emotional reaction to a case of moral wrongdoing. Because we tend 
to give our negative emotions more attention than our positive ones, we might tend to give our 
angry or resentful blaming emotions undue credence. When analyzing the facts and deciding 
whether to express blame to someone, we may be giving unfair weight to our negative emotions 
about the wrongdoer. 
                                                        
51 Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, p. 362. 
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These observations, then, strongly encourage the idea that all expressions of blame, even 
the highly civilized versions among them, belong to a family of response that are, at root, 
retributive, and emotionally damaging. Though our retributive impulses will not always arise, 
there is always a risk that they will arise when expressing blame, and the results of these 
impulses arising can be quite socially risky, due to the volatile and heated nature of our 
retributive impulses. For this reason, we are better off, on the whole, moving away from 
expressed blame as the default mode of response to wrongdoing. This, again, is a much more 
radical claim that McGeer makes. McGeer’s account aims to domesticate blame. Differently (and 
more radically) I aim to move our interpersonal habits of moral response away from blame 
altogether.  
 
VI. Fittingness Versus Appropriateness 
 
There is an important distinction at play in cases of retribution and expressed blame, and one 
that I will continue to utilize throughout this dissertation. This distinction is motivated by Justin 
D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson’s paper “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of 
Emotions”. D’Arms and Jacobson argue that an emotion “can be fitting despite being wrong to 
feel”.52 D’Arms and Jacobson offer the following example. Imagine that you are at a funeral and 
your Uncle slips and falls while walking to his seat. It might be fitting to laugh at him—the 
situation is undoubtedly humorous—yet it might also be inappropriate to laugh, given the somber 
setting. Other guests might not appreciate the humor in the situation, given the somber setting. 
This example demonstrates the general claim that certain emotions can very well fit an event 
                                                        
52 D’Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobsen (2000). “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions”. 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 61:1, p. 65. 
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(laughing at someone falling), without being appropriate to feel in the specific context (a 
funeral).  
The authors claim that it is a moralistic fallacy to infer “from the claim that it would be 
wrong or vicious to feel an emotion, that it is therefore unfitting.”53 Instead, the authors argue that 
an emotion can be fitting despite being wrong (or inexpedient) to feel. As such, “the wrongness 
of feeling an emotion never, in itself, constitutes a reason that the emotion fails to be fitting.”54 
D’Arms and Jacobson divide their considerations of fittingness into two kinds: shape and 
size. The authors offer the following example: 
Suppose you envy Susan the cabin in the woods where you believe she spends her weekends. 
Your envy would be unfitting on the grounds of shape if the cabin is primitive and you're keen 
on comfort, or if she really has no cabin and spends the weekends caring for a sick relative.55  
 
In this example, my envy’s shape would not match the situation in either of these cases, because 
I have no real grounds for envy over Susan’s situation. If the cabin is primitive, then there is no 
need for me to be envious of Susan, since I have better accommodations in my current 
apartment. Likewise, if Susan goes to her cabin in order to care for a sick relative, again my envy 
makes no sense (it does not fit the situation), because caring for a sick relative is painstakingly 
emotional and involves arduous physical labor, a circumstance far removed from an idyllic 
vacation.  
My envy can also fail to fit with regard to its size. Perhaps Susan’s cabin in the woods is 
luxurious and I am quite right to be envious of her (in this case, my emotion has the right shape). 
However, if I am exceedingly envious, my emotion is an overreaction; it is the wrong size. If I 
am envious of every aspect of Susan’s life merely on the grounds of her having a luxurious 
                                                        
53 D’Arms and Jacobson, p. 69. 
54 D’Arms and Jacobson, p. 69. 
55 D’Arm and Jacobson, p. 73. 
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cabin, I am overreacting. My envy is too large. I do not have the proper information about Susan 
in order to be envious of her in all areas of her life. The size of my excessive envy does not fit 
the situation. 
Beyond the fittingness of size and shape of our emotions, we must attend to the moral 
reasons at stake in our expressions of our emotions. D’Arms and Jacobson offer another helpful 
example: 
If you are widowed with young children, you must bring them up as best you can. Too much 
grief risks further harm to them, so it is incumbent upon you not to fall apart. Since the 
children need to go on with their lives, with as much security and as little trauma as possible, 
it would be wrong to indulge in the fitting amount of sorrow-the amount that accurately 
reflects the sadness of the situation. But this is not to suggest that the loss of a spouse isn't all 
that sad. Instead, it demonstrates that some moral reasons not to feel grief are irrelevant…in 
particular, those trading on the consequences of feeling some way, for yourself or others.56 
 
This example demonstrates that although widow’s grief is very fitting for her situation, there are 
other considerations—the wellbeing of her children—that impact how the widow should act and 
impact the appropriateness of her grief. Further, the example reveals that a period of grief in 
which one cannot function in an everyday way might be fitting, and yet, if one has 
responsibilities—i.e. parenting—it cannot be morally appropriate to feel the grief, all things 
considered. Emotions may fit their object, despite being wrong to feel. Beyond grief, D’Arms 
and Jacobson claim that this holds for all basic emotions, such as anger, guilt, amusement, and 
jealousy.57  
 I will now apply their argument to the specific context of expressed blame. Taking 
D’Arms and Jacobson’s point, one’s blaming emotions can be fitting, despite being wrong to feel 
or inappropriate in a given situation. The blaming emotions are often fitting to feel when one has 
been wronged, and they may indeed serve a useful role, but generally speaking I argue that they 
                                                        
56 D’Arms and Jacobson, p. 77. 
57 D’Arms and Jacobson, p. 82. 
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remain wrong to express because of the harms that expressed blame can so easily bring in its 
wake. 
In light of this, I propose that even when expressed blame fits a situation, it is often 
inappropriate, even wrong, to express, due to its retributive root and the social risks involved. I 
wholly agree that many of the things philosophers say are blameworthy are, indeed, morally bad 
and blameworthy, but we should not express blame in response to these actions. We can 
privately judge something blameworthy (and find the expression of blame fitting) without 
expressing blame. I will make use of this fitting versus appropriate distinction as applied to the 
case of expressed blame in the chapters to come, as well. For now, my goal in introducing this 
distinction has been to highlight the ways in which expressing blame and blameworthiness can 
come apart, as well as the ways in which expressed blame can be inappropriate to express, even 
if it fits the situation.  
 
VII. Vargas  
 
Finally, I will introduce Manuel Vargas’s account of blame to explore how we can achieve 
blame’s instructive and motivating aims without expressing blame. The goal of this critical 
overview of Vargas’s work is to make the idea that we can understand our moral lives without 
expressed blame seem more plausible. I will extend this line of argumentation—that we can, 
practically speaking, make sense of our interpersonal moral lives without blame—at length in 
chapter four of this dissertation. 
Vargas argues that blame serves an instrumental role in providing agents the opportunity to 
grow their moral agency and learn to act in morally better ways in the future. That is, blame can 
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be instrumentally useful insofar as it helps agents grow in morally positive ways. When the 
norms of blame are internalized by a wrongdoer, those norms can motivate that agent to act in 
line with the correct moral considerations in the future. This point is very much in line with 
McGeer’s discussion of blame. We saw that McGeer argues that even though blame has an 
unsavory retributive root, still it can serve an instrumental role in a modified form. McGeer 
writes that “The fact that we express (the reactive attitudes) says to the recipients that we see 
them as individuals who are capable of understanding and living up to the norms that make for 
moral community.”58  
However, in line with what I have argued up to this point, Vargas does not think that 
responsible agency always tracks being blameworthy. For example, he distinguishes between 
responsible agency and being responsible for some bit of behavior. He explains that 
One can be a responsible agent at some time—alive to relevant moral considerations—
without it following that one is blameworthy for some act. And, in cases where there are no 
moral considerations in play, where the considered act is devoid of moral significance, the 
issue of being morally responsible for some behavior is simply not live.59  
 
Moreover, Vargas thinks an agent can be responsible in one context, yet not responsible in a 
different context. There is a deep context sensitivity involved in our determinations of 
responsibility. A main utility of our moral responsibility system, again, is that the norms of 
blame help motivate agents to act better. This is a purely instrumental case for blame. It is not the 
argument that blame is always necessary to express in every case of wrongdoing. Rather, it is the 
argument that there are context-sensitive considerations at play in determining one’s 
responsibility and, further, that when it makes sense to blame a given agent, doing so is an 
instrumental good. In this way, blame can be justified on the basis of the good effects it 
                                                        
58 McGeer, p. 7. 
59 Vargas, Manuel (2013). Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press, p. 
239. 
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produces, such as wrongdoers’ motivation towards pursuing moral growth. However, blame is 
not automatically justified for a given case of wrongdoing. 
 Relatedly, at the end of Building Better Beings, in a chapter titled “Blame and Desert”, 
Vargas discusses the ways in which blame can also be a liability in our social relationships. As 
important as holding others responsible is, he suggests that “it does not obviously trump all other 
considerations or concerns that can matter to a human life.”60 He argues that  
Sometimes blaming will be (locally) very costly, and perhaps even costly enough that it 
makes sense to maintain that one should not blame those who deserve it. In such cases 
forgiveness or even ignoring the transgression may, all things considered, be the better 
route.61 
  
Vargas rightly argues that sometimes blame is too costly from a social vantage point, and thus 
not worth the risks. This sentiment mirrors my argument in the previous section that even if 
blame is fitting, it might not be appropriate to express, due to blame’s retributive core and the 
heightened social risks involved. 
Vargas goes on to explain that forgiveness itself can be an alternative to blame. He 
explains that forgiveness can be administered without “turning a blind eye towards the moral 
significance of the transgression.”62 This means that forgiveness is not incompatible with holding 
others responsible and taking seriously the moral significance of their wrongdoing. In fact, he 
argues that when done properly, forgiveness 
Does not undercut the aim of the responsibility system so much as it presumes it. On an 
interpersonal level, it seems to me that there is much to be said in favor of forgiveness and 
the way it relieves the burdens of blame. Moreover, it permits a restoration of the social 
order. A degree of readiness to forgive might be salubrious for both individual and 
community.63 
 
                                                        
60 Vargas, p. 243. 
61 Vargas, p. 242. 
62 Vargas, p. 242. 
63 Vargas, p. 242. 
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As his chapter continues, however, Vargas does not readily endorse this position (forgiveness as 
a viable alternative to blaming). Throughout the book, he argues that the willingness of 
individuals to blame is plausibly a prerequisite on collective action64, meaning that blame in 
human life is, to some degree, inevitable. Still, if we focus on his claim that forgiveness “does 
not undercut the aim of the responsibility system so much as it presumes it”, we can see that 
forgiveness does not contradict or get in the way of the structures of moral responsibility 
embedded into our blaming practices. Both blaming and forgiving can be ordinary parts of our 
moral repertoires in response to wrongdoing. As I will argue in the chapters to come, expressing 
blame is not an essential aspect of holding others responsible in shared moral community, and 
Vargas’s view offers strong support for this argument. 
 Due to blame’s retributive core, which is liable to come out (and forcefully at that) during 
any blaming episode, however civilized the expressed blame may appear, we have good reason 
to reduce our daily expressions of blame. Vargas’s view is consistent with that goal insofar as it 
acknowledges that we can still make sense of our moral responsibility system without expressed 
blame, and that we need not always publicly blame others even when they are morally 
responsible, due to any number of context-depended factors. In this way, I am offering a 
generalized version of Vargas’s localized worry about blame sometimes being too costly. My 
view differs from Vargas’s view in that I argue that blame’s retributive root means that it is a 
liability in our daily moral lives. Further, because expressed blame is a liability in our daily 
moral lives, we are better off breaking the habit of blame and finding alternative practices 
through which we can hold each other responsible.  
 
                                                        




In sum, I have argued that expressions of blame belong to a family of responses that have 
retributive origins, and thus expressed blame involves a risk of emotional damage, entrenchment, 
and escalation. Even though some forms of expressed blame are quite civilized, and even though 
many of us train with great effort to tame our retributive impulses in our daily moral lives, it 
remains the case that expressed blame always has the capacity to devolve into its psychologically 
primitive form. On the one hand, just because retribution is evolutionarily hardwired in us does 
not mean that it is all that likely to surface in our interpersonal moral lives. On the other hand, 
when our immediate responses to wrongdoing are affectively hostile and retributive, those harsh 
emotions strip away the domesticated veneer of civilization in our everyday blaming practices.  
In this chapter, I have suggested we have reason to believe we are not as many iterations 
past the original, primitive forms of blame as we may like to think we are. It still requires a lot of 
daily effort for many of us to not let our blaming responses devolve into their primitive origins. 
Suppressing our retributive impulses in the face of wrongdoing is important. However, directing 
that energy into a civilized guise in the form of McGeer’s Domesticated Blame strategy fails to 
weed out the possibility of those primitive foundations manifesting.  
For this reason—deep reasons about the retributive nature of expressed blame—I am 
skeptical of the utility of civilized forms of blame, because they are not so far removed from the 
primitive origins they aim to avoid. In arguing this, I recognize what a radical claim it is. I am 
not only suggesting that there are blaming alternatives, and that we would be well-advised to 
consider those alternatives to expressed blame. More strongly, I argue that due to the social risks 
that blame’s retributive core invokes, alternatives to blame are preferable to expressed blame. I 
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have not (yet) laid out specific alternatives to blame—those will come in chapter four. In the 
next two chapters, I will present further arguments against expressed blame. This will prepare the 
way for me to propose concrete and practical alternatives to expressed blame in chapter four—

























In chapter one, I argued that blame has an essentially retributive core. In this chapter, I 
build upon that argument and take a closer look at one specific blaming emotion: anger. I suspect 
that anger is a common feature of many cases of expressed blame, particularly affectively-
charged cases of blame. In fact, anger and blame have been called a natural pairing.65 For this 
reason, a critical analysis of anger will help elucidate what is so off-putting and socially harmful 
about the affective component of expressed blame.  
While there are many different forms of anger with varying emotional intensities, the 
form of anger that is most strongly associated with our expressed blaming practices, according to 
the Stoic philosopher Seneca, can be characterized as heated and blinding anger. Seneca (among 
others) discussed this form of anger at length. Generalizing Seneca’s point, Owen Flanagan 
writes “anger almost always overreaches and overreacts; it is incontinent…As soon as anger gets 
its grip, I can’t see things—you, our relationship—as they are. I overreact, and things are 
spinning out of control, especially if you react angrily to my unjust behavior.”66  
I will focus on heated anger in this chapter, though I recognize that some forms of anger 
are less heated. For example, siblings (or any other agents in close relationship) can have a moral 
conflict which results in sustained, decade(s)-long angry feelings towards each other. 
                                                        
65 For example, psychologists Malle, Guglielmo, and Monroe (2014) argue that expressions of blame are frequently 
accompanied by anger, and that the two share many properties. See also Wranik & Scherer (2010); Averill (1983) 
for further discussion of the connection between anger and blame. 
66 Flanagan, Owen (2016). The Geography of Morals: Varieties of Moral Possibility. Oxford University Press, p. 
169-70. 
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Expressions of anger that involve such a long time-period are inherently less heated, since it 
seems implausible for anger to remain heated to the same intensity for the entire duration of a 
decades-long conflict. Over time, our emotions (positive and negative) naturally lessen, or 
weaken, in intensity. For example, while we may feel ecstatic the day we land our dream job, 
that positive emotion naturally weakens over time. It would be exhausting to feel constant joy or 
constant anger. Sometimes our expressions of anger are very intense, and sometimes they are 
more settled. Sometime our angry feelings are less on the surface of our emotional life, and 
instead are wedged deeper into our psyches, or even entirely repressed. In some ways, deep-
seated anger seems more emotionally and socially dangerous that immediate, intense forms of 
anger, because it has a greater chance for lasting collateral damage. We can think of one of the 
siblings in their decade-long dispute finally exploding after all of the repressed anger they have 
felt for ten years, and we can easily imagine this explosion causing irreparable harm to their 
relationship.  
Many philosophers have written on anger and the ways it is (or is not) retributive, 
including recent works by: Flanagan, Martha Nussbaum, Susan Wolf, and Nic Bommarito.  This 
chapter offers a critical survey of each of these four philosophers’ works to investigate the ways 
in which anger (especially heated, Senecan forms of anger), retribution, and expressed blame 
intersect, and problematically so. In my critical survey, the four authors will be split into two 
contrast pairs. Nussbaum and Wolf discuss angry blame in particular; Flanagan and Bommarito 
discuss anger more generally. Nussbaum and Flanagan are strongly skeptical about the 
helpfulness of anger in our daily moral lives; Wolf and Bommarito propose more moderate 
approaches in which they tentatively endorse the role of anger in our daily moral lives.  
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In my discussion of these four authors’ works, I will investigate the close connection 
between anger, blame, and retribution. My investigation into each of their arguments will 
helpfully reveal this close connection between anger and blame. Further, I will argue that their 
arguments, even though not all explicitly about angry blame, are highly applicable to the specific 
context of interpersonal angry blame. Further, I will expand on my argument from chapter one 
that expressed blame is, at root, retributive by adding the additional argument that anger is an 
exacerbating feature of blame’s retributive nature.  
 
II. Nussbaum  
 
A. Anger and Retribution 
According to Nussbaum, 1. Anger is retributive, and 2. Retribution is bad because it is 
premised either on magical thinking, or on a status-demotion, neither of which is a helpful 
response in our daily moral lives. Nussbaum strongly argues that we ought to avoid anger 
wherever possible. Nussbaum’s focus is on not just manifestations of anger in our moral lives, 
but on manifestations of anger in our lives more broadly. In her article “Transition Anger”, 
Nussbaum argues that “a close philosophical analysis of the emotion of anger will show that it is 
normatively irrational: in some cases, based on futile magical thinking, in others, based on 
defective values.”67 Indeed, she is pessimistic about anger’s capacity to serve any useful function.  
Nussbaum largely follows Aristotle’s definition of anger, which is that anger is “a desire 
accompanied by pain for an imagined retribution on account of an imagined slighting inflicted by 
                                                        
67 Nussbaum, Martha (2015). “Transitional Anger.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association, p. 41. 
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people who have no legitimate reason to slight oneself or one’s own.”68 Breaking this definition 
down into sub-parts, Aristotle argues that anger involves five elements:  
1. Slighting or down-ranking 
2. Of the self or people close to the self69 
3. Wrongfully or inappropriately done 
4. Accompanied by pain 
5. And linked to a desire for retribution 
 
Concerning the fifth aspect of Aristotle’s definition, the desire for retribution, Nussbaum 
expands Aristotle’s account. She suggests that this desire for retribution does not necessarily 
involve a violent wish for revenge. Anger’s retributive arm is not always about wanting the other 
agent to physically suffer. Rather, retribution can take many forms. Nussbaum writes, “I may not 
want to get involved in revenge myself; I may want someone else, or the law, or life itself, to do 
it for me. I just want the (wrong)doer to suffer.”70 The suffering we wish upon wrongdoers can be 
psychological or emotional, not just physical or material.  
For example, I might hope that a colleague who has wronged me will embarrass herself 
in front of our boss or that she will be psychologically unhappy. I might wish that her marriage 
goes badly or that she has a hard time on the academic job market this year. Even if I do not want 
to directly get involved in causing her suffering myself, I can still wish revenge on her indirectly. 
Desires for revenge come in a variety of types and degrees. The common thread behind our 
desires for revenge is the idea that because you, the wrongdoer, harmed me, you deserve to 
suffer as compensation for that specific harm you caused me.  
                                                        
68 Nussbaum, p. 42. 
69 Nussbaum agrees with Aristotle that anger involves a slighting or down-ranking, but disagrees that it must be of 
the self or those close to us. She objects that we often get angry even when the slighting happens to a stranger, not 
just to ourselves or our loved ones. Nussbaum suggests that we get angry about instances of wrongdoing that touch 
on or threaten our own core values, regardless of whether the instance happens to someone we know or a stranger. 
These cases often directly affect ourselves or our loved ones, but they can also arise in cases of wrongdoing done by 
strangers, so long as the wrongs touch on our core values. 
70 Nussbaum, p. 46. 
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On my view, retribution is not purely or merely revenge. Rather, it is revenge that also 
has a moralized rationale. If I have retributive impulses towards you, I not only want you to get 
you back, but I want to get you back because you harmed me and doing so is morally wrong. 
With retributive aims, there is a clear moralizing intent behind my payback. I want to get back at 
you because you did x to me, and x is morally wrong. I might take revenge on someone for a 
non-moral wrong they committed, whereas retribution has a narrower scope in its moralized 
intent. 
As I mentioned, Nussbaum finds any form of payback to be ill-conceived. The desire for 
revenge is ill-conceived because either it is premised on a form of magical thinking, or it 
involves a hyper-focus on status and an attempt to down-rank the wrongdoer. Neither of these 
paths serve a positive moral function. By magical thinking, Nussbaum argues that punishing 
offenders rarely repairs the damage that they did to us. Many of us may seek revenge in the 
hopes of something like closure or relief, but revenge rarely brings closure. It is simply magical 
thinking to believe that retribution will lead to anything like closure or relief.  
As an example, Nussbaum discusses a TV interview of legendary athlete Michael Jordan 
after his father’s murder. During the interview, Jordan is asked whether, if they ever caught his 
father’s murderer, he would want the murderer executed. Jordan responds, ‘Why? That wouldn’t 
bring him back’.71 Jordan’s comments in the interview reflect the type of magical thinking that 
Nussbaum argues is at the heart of anger’s retributive edge. Though retribution may seem to 
compensate for the harm done to oneself, in reality, the suffering retribution causes will not bring 
back what was lost. As his statements in the interview make clear, Jordan recognizes this and has 
                                                        
71 Nussbaum, p. 47. 
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no desire to get revenge on his father’s murderer. He knows it will not bring his father back, and 
that to think it will bring his father back is a form of magical thinking. 
In addition to magical thinking, retribution can also take the form of a status down-
ranking. Nussbaum explains 
Many societies do encourage people to think of all injuries as essentially about them and 
their own ranking. Life involves perpetual status-anxiety, and more or less everything 
that happens to one either arises one’s rank or lowers it.72 
 
Nussbaum finds this tendency towards status-anxiety fundamentally narcissistic, explaining 
 
The tendency to see everything that happens as about oneself and one’s own rank seems 
very narcissistic, and ill-suited to a society in which many aspects of human welfare have 
intrinsic value….The path of status…converts all injuries into problems of relative rank, 
thus making the world revolve around the desire of vulnerable selves for domination and 
control. Because this wish is at the heart of infantile narcissism, I think of this as a 
narcissistic error.73 
 
Nussbaum argues that this tendency towards an excessive focus on oneself and one’s status 
prevents a focus on problem-solving or considering the situation as a whole.  
Relatedly, as Jean Hampton notes, “if people are secure in their dignity, they won’t see an 
injury as a diminishment; but people are rarely this secure. They secretly fear that the offense has 
revealed a real lowness or lack of value in themselves, and that putting the offender down will 
prove that the offender has made a mistake.”74 Nussbaum expands upon Hampton’s claim to 
argue the more general assertion that because people care a lot about their own public standing, 
sometimes they express anger as a way to reaffirm their public standing in the face of being hurt. 
Broadly speaking, the claim is that people who are more secure in their public standing do not 
see harm done to them as an attack on their own worth. Nussbaum explains that anger may well 
induce a reversal of positions, “but only because the values involved are distorted: relative status 
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73 Nussbaum, p. 50-51. 
74 Nussbaum, p. 48. 
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should not be so important.”75 In this way, focusing on status down ranking is not a good reason 




Given the inadequacy of anger’s two retributive manifestations—as magical thinking or 
as a status down ranking—Nussbaum concludes that anger is not a helpful response to being 
wronged. Instead, she proposes a “borderline” species of anger. This form of anger, which she 
terms Transition-Anger, serves as a transition away from retributive anger and towards future-
oriented, constructive thinking about how to be useful in the face of wrongdoing.76 She urges 
victims of wrongdoing to focus on promoting future welfare, rather than on pursuing retribution. 
She calls Transition-Anger a “healthy segue into forward-looking thoughts of welfare and, 
accordingly, from anger into compassionate hope.”77 The Transition mentality, Nussbaum argues, 
wants justice and brotherhood whereas the payback mentality of anger wants groveling.78  
According to Nussbaum, “the way anger goes away in the Transition seems much more 
promising (than retribution): one stops thinking about one’s own inner states and starts thinking 
about how to do something useful, and perhaps even generous, for others.”79 While adopting 
Transition-Anger might seem challenging for many of us, Nussbaum is optimistic about each of 
our abilities to adopt Transition-Anger, instead of ordinary anger, in the face of being wronged. 
She thinks that being sympathetic about the motives of other people helps make Transition-
                                                        
75 Nussbaum, p. 42. 
76 Nussbaum, p. 42. 
77 Nussbaum, p. 53. 
78 Nussbaum, p. 53. 
79 Nussbaum, Martha (2016). Anger and Forgiveness. Oxford University Press, p. 136. 
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Anger more plausible. Rather than getting angry, Nussbaum argues we ought to aim to be moral 
problem solvers. Our aim should be to help wrongdoers morally develop. With this aim in mind, 
Transition-Anger is a useful and plausible strategy. Summarizing her view, Nussbaum explains, 
I am saying something very radical: that in a sane and not excessively anxious and status-
focused person, anger’s idea of retribution or payback is a brief dream or cloud, soon 
dispelled by saner thoughts of personal and social welfare…. when anger makes sense, it 
is normatively problematic (focused narrowly on status); when it is normatively 
reasonable (focused on the injury), it doesn’t make good sense, and is normatively 
problematic in that different way. In a rational person, anger, realizing that, soon laughs 
at itself and goes away.80 
 
Unlike traditional forms of anger, Transition-Anger does not seek revenge. If punishment is 
required, it is enacted in a helpful and kind spirit. For Nussbaum, it is pointless to dwell in the 
past. Instead, the future is the only thing we have the possibility of changing, so our focus should 
be on restoration, communication, forgiveness, and moral understanding.81  
In a related article, “Beyond Anger”, Nussbaum summarizes her view with the statement 
that payback “is a deeply human, but fatally flawed way of making sense of the world.”82 
Nussbaum is hopeful about our abilities to engage in moral problem-solving without anger or 
retribution. Instead, with Transition-Anger, the motive to avoid morally bad behavior ought to be 
connected to “morality’s positive goals.”83  
Likening this motivation to avoid morally bad behaviors to one’s relationship with others, 
she writes “a relationship of trust that depends on fear of anger is not a healthy relationship.”84 If 
one avoids bad moral actions purely out of fear of receiving anger or feeling guilt, this motive is 
                                                        
80 Nussbaum, p. 30-31. 
81 There is further support for Nussbaum’s view in the Buddhist and Stoic traditions. For example, Seneca writes, 
“Let us be free from this evil, let us clear our minds of it, and extirpate root and branch a passion which grows again 
wherever the smallest particle of it finds a resting-place. Let us not moderate anger, but get rid of it altogether: what 
can moderation have to do with an evil habit? (Seneca, De Ira, III. 42). 
82 Nussbaum, Martha C (2016). “Beyond Anger.” Aeon, 26 July 2016, aeon.co/essays/there-s-no-emotion-we-ought-
to-think-harder-about-than-anger.   
83 Nussbaum, p. 133. 
84 Nussbaum, p. 133. 
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not useful. Instead, one should avoid bad moral behaviors because one is committed to abiding 
by our moral system and wants to pursue morality’s positive goals. Rather than pursue the 
correct moral actions to avoid a guilty conscience, one should pursue the correct moral actions 
out of a deep and authentic concern for the welfare of others. 
In response, one might worry that while Nussbaum’s account is appealing in theory, we 
humans are hard-wired for both retribution and anger (as evinced by Greene and Cohen’s work), 
and so magical thinking and status-downranking are not elements we can so easily do away with. 
According to the worry, it might be overly optimistic to think that we can simply overcome our 
angry tendencies. Nussbaum predicts this sort of objection. In response, she explains that even 
though anger may have evolutionary roots, this does not imply that anger is an inevitable mode 
of behavior. She argues 
We work hard to correct many tendencies or propensities that are hardwired in human 
nature, from myopia to memory lapses. As with diet and exercise: we do not have to 
believe that we will ultimately free ourselves from all illicit cravings in order to embark 
on a program of self-cultivation. Who knows? Maybe non-anger will make our lives go 
so much better that we will not even miss the strife-torn days of our past, any more than 
we always retain an acute craving for French fries and donuts. And even if we continue to 
experience anger, we need not make public policy based on its misleading normative 
promptings.85 
 
In this passage, Nussbaum claims that we have a choice over whether or not to give into our 
angry impulses. When the impulse to express anger arises, choosing to express it is optional. 
This mirrors Greene and Cohen’s line of argumentation that even though retributive impulses are 
likely hardwired into our psyches, we still have choice (to some degree) over how we act on 
those primitive impulses. Like our inclination towards eating junk food, we have a natural 
disposition towards getting angry. However, this does not imply that we are bound to express 
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anger. As Greene and Cohen explained, we are able, to some degree, to bracket out those 
retributive impulses in our lives, even though they are hardwired into our psyches. With great 
effort, we might be able to train ourselves to bracket-out our retributive impulses, or to not 
habitually act on them when the impulses arise. Just as many of us are able to curb our junk food 
intake because we value our health, we might be able to tame (to some degree) our retributive 
impulses because we value non-hostile dialogue. Nussbaum is ultimately hopeful about our 
ability to decrease our expressions of anger from our daily lives.  
 
C. Nonviolent Communication 
 Marshall B. Rosenberg, author of Nonviolent Communication: A Language of Life, offers 
further support for Nussbaum’s view. Rosenberg agrees with Nussbaum about anger’s pernicious 
effects in our daily interpersonal lives. He argues that anger “can be valuable if we use it as an 
alarm clock to wake us up—to realize we have a need that is not being met and that we are 
thinking in a way that makes it unlikely to be met.”86 However, Rosenberg argues that at its core, 
anger reveals a need that is not being fulfilled. For example, people often feel angry when they 
are being (or perceive that they are being) mistreated. People sometimes feel much better after 
the catharsis of expressing anger to the person who mistreated them, as that expression of anger 
has alerted the mistreater to the angry person’s unfulfilled need. For example, when I angrily tell 
my partner that I resent doing most of the household chores myself, my expression of anger 
reveals my unfulfilled need to be respected. I feel disrespected by the unequal distribution of 
chores between us. I might also feel angry at him for other reasons relating to the case, but part 
of my anger stems from an unfulfilled need in me. 
                                                        
86 Rosenberg, Marshall B. (2015). Nonviolent Communication: A Language of Life. PuddleDancer Press, p. 144. 
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Rosenberg suggest that although expressing anger may be a natural way to express our 
unmet needs to others, expressing anger can also blind us to relevant circumstantial factors, such 
as potential ways in which the conflict is partially our own fault. Accordingly, it is well worth 
asking, in cases of interpersonal moral conflict: Is this partially my fault? Sometimes we project 
our anger onto others, and doing so blinds us to important considerations. In an attempt to be 
right, sometimes we discount our own partial culpability. Though this is not always the case, it is 
worth considering whether we (the blamer) have partially contributed to the wrong. 
 One problem with expressed blame, according to Rosenberg, is that it is a superficial 
expression of anger. It is not a direct expression of anger. Rather, it delays the process of 
expressing one’s anger by directing blame onto another person and making our anger their 
responsibility. In the case with my partner, it might be the case that my expressed blame aims 
largely to make him feel bad, rather than address the root of the issue, which is my unmet need 
for respect. This view mirrors Nussbaum’s idea that the payback element of anger does not solve 
the problem. It does not bring back what was lost in the wrongdoing. Sometimes anger 
successfully makes a lot of noise, without solving a problem. Similarly, Rosenberg argues, 
expressing blame makes a lot of noise and certainly can direct the wrongdoer to the problem, but 
it tends to aim primarily to make the wrongdoer feel bad. This aim to make the wrongdoer feel 
bad can delay the goal of moral problem solving.  
 Rosenberg’s non-violent approach to interpersonal conflict might be too extreme for 
many readers. It is not always the case that anger largely represents our unfulfilled needs. Surely 
our anger is sometimes very rightly about the other person and their wrongdoing. Nevertheless, I 
have included his view in this section to demonstrate precedent in the psychological literature for 
nonviolent alternatives to interpersonal conflict. Further, Rosenberg’s account directly supports 
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Nussbaum’s account of Transition-Anger in its renunciation of anger as a useful moral tool. 
Generally speaking, Nussbaum’s view is part of an increasing range of views (mine included) 
that question the utility of anger, blame, and retribution in our daily moral lives. 
 
D. Is Nussbaum’s Case Overstated? 
As mentioned above, Nussbaum defines anger in an Aristotelian sense. According to 
Aristotle, anger involves retribution of some sort. However, this might not be the case when 
anger arises in response to non-moral cases. It might be the case that Nussbaum’s account is 
overstated insofar as she generalizes all anger as retributive, rather than specifically moral cases 
of anger. For example, when I am angry that it is snowing again today, in April in New York 
City, this does not involve a hyper-focus on status or on payback. Additionally, when I 
accidentally stub my toe on the door, I have no desire to exact revenge on the door, or on myself, 
for failing to step around it. I am briefly angry because of the pain, but there is nothing 
moralizing about my pain-induced anger. In each of these non-moral cases, there are no 
retributive aims. 
Perhaps Nussbaum would say her account only applies to human-originated causes of 
anger. Even still, many daily cases of anger arise from human causes that do not lead to status 
injury or a focus on payback. Accordingly, I propose that Nussbaum’s account is too general 
about the ways in which anger is always retributive. Rather than all anger being retributive, it is 
the case that moralizing cases of anger are retributive. For example, when I am waiting in line at 
the drug store and the customer ahead of me is taking a very long time to count out her exact 
change to pay for her items, anger sometimes arises in me. I get impatient. I might feel especially 
angry if I am running late or am very busy that day. I might feel as if the slow customer is not 
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valuing the time of the rest of us in line. However, I have never felt the need to get revenge on 
this customer (or those like her). Likewise, I have never felt that her slowness in counting her 
change threatens or diminishes my moral status in any way. The slow customer is not doing 
anything morally wrong. It is completely her prerogative to count out exact change for her items.  
As this example demonstrates, Nussbaum is exaggerating the scope of anger’s retributive 
element. Retribution is simply not omnipresent in all cases of moral and non-moral anger. 
Nussbaum fails to make this distinction between moral and non-moral anger clear. Yet, when 
anger is mixed with expressed blame, Nussbaum’s account is spot on about the problematic ways 
in which retributive impulses arise. I argue that Nussbaum is right to think that we have a 
tendency towards retribution in response to being morally wronged. Thus, we can think of 
Nussbaum’s account of anger, in a narrower sense, as a compelling and correct account of angry 
blame. 
Nussbaum explains what is both incoherent and morally distasteful about retribution: that 
it is grounded in either magical thinking or a status demotion. Her persuasive argument about 
retribution helps make more salient why I find the risk of blame devolving into its primitive, 
retributive origins so problematic. But there is a deeper worry: when we add anger to the mix, it 
is an exacerbating feature of blame’s retributive nature. Because anger involved with 
wrongdoing tends to be heated, and because anger in moral contexts involves retributive aims, 
anger cannot help but exacerbate the underlying retributive core of expressed blame. While 
Nussbaum might be wrong to think that all anger is retributive, she is quite right to think that 
angry blame is, at its core, retributive.  
I have argued that moral cases of anger are essentially and conceptually retributive, but 
not all cases of non-moral anger are essentially and conceptually retributive. Similarly, some 
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forms of expressed blame overtly involve retribution, while others simply contain an incipient 
risk of devolving into retribution. When combining anger (especially Senecan anger) and 
expressed blame, it seems obvious that the risk of manifesting the retributive impulse will 
increase. Moreover, anger tends to restrict our ability to see things clearly. The raging bull is 
blind with anger, and sometimes in our interpersonal moral lives, we too become blind with 
anger. Anger can quickly become insufficiently focused, overdone, and excessive. Because anger 
tends to unravel, or to grow larger, it can make cases of expressed blame more heated and 
affectively nastier than they need to be. Other negative emotions associated with expressed 
blame (resentment, disappointment, and sadness) certainly run this risk, too. These emotions 
seem at least contingently hostile, if not retributive, depending on how they are deployed.  
Senecan anger feels unique in its close connection to retribution. The retributive spirit 
underlying expressed blame, coupled with an outburst of anger, is inherently a social risk in our 
daily moral lives. This is not to say that angry forms of blame will always devolve into 
retributive charges. But, I posit that retribution is more likely to occur in instances of angry 
blame than it is in affectively cooler forms of blame. Nussbaum’s account of anger’s retributive 
foundation helps make the social risks involved in expressed blame more vivid. Given that 
expressed blame is always incipiently retributive, blame is highly likely to be expressed 
retributively when the forceful heat of Senecan anger is brought into the mix. 
 
E. Fittingness Versus Appropriateness 
The fitting versus appropriate distinction I introduced in chapter one is highly relevant to 
my current discussion of Nussbaum’s view. On my view, both angry blame and retribution may 
well be fitting responses to a given case of moral wrongdoing. When others morally wrong us, it 
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quite rightly fits the situation to feel angry and want to express blame in response. However, as I 
have been arguing, more often than not, it is not appropriate to express blame (even when 
fitting) in our daily moral lives because the blaming emotions are such unpleasant modes of 
expression to receive, and they risk creating irreparable social harms. As discussed above, 
Nussbaum’s definition of anger, in which anger is essentially retributive, fails to consider that 
there are many non-moral cases of anger that do not involve retribution. However, she has made 
a very plausible argument for angry blame, in particular.  For this reason, the fitting versus 
appropriate distinction applies even more strongly to cases of angry blame than it does to cases 
of non-angry blame because angry blame is fundamentally retributive, and retribution amplifies 
the social risks involved in expressed blame. 
Recall that Nussbaum thinks that anger is premised on either a form of magical thinking, 
or on a focus on status. A focus on status (and the anger that arises when one feels that one’s 
status is downranked) certainly has an important place in society. There are times (war, for 
example) in which anger arising because of one’s status being diminished serves the situation in 
useful ways. To say that retribution is bad in all contexts would be too extreme and is not my 
view. However, I am arguing that even if retribution may be a fitting response to a given moral 
situation in our daily lives, it is likely not appropriate. Barring extreme cases, in our 
interpersonal moral lives, we should be able to rise above our retributive and angry impulses as 
often as possible.  
 
III. Wolf  
 
 
A. Wolf’s Account 
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Unlike Nussbaum’s account, Wolf argues that, generally speaking, angry blame works 
well as a response to moral wrongdoing. In her paper “Blame, Italian Style”, Wolf’s focus is not 
simply anger, but angry blame in particular. In the section above, I argued that angry blame is 
Nussbaum’s area of focus as well, even though Nussbaum herself presents cases she describes 
simply as cases of anger, not angry blame. However, I argued that while not all cases of anger 
are retributive, moral cases of anger, i.e. cases of expressed blame, involve retributive impulses. 
In this section, I will assume that Nussbaum and Wolf have largely the same focus—angry 
blame—in their respective accounts, even though they use slightly different terminologies. 
Wolf explains that angry blame is a central feature of her family’s daily interactions, and 
one that she cannot imagine them doing without. For her, angry blame is not the hostile, negative 
force that Nussbaum and I have made it out to be. Instead, Wolf finds angry blame to be a 
positive and indispensable daily moral tool. Wolf agrees with me that sometimes our expressions 
of angry blame can become excessive. But, on the whole, she argues that angry blame functions 
fairly well in our interpersonal lives and is best conceived as an important moral tool. 
One reason Wolf claims that angry blame plays such a positive moral force is that it 
provides a way for us to express our attachment, concern, and care for those close to us. Part of 
being close to others and creating deep, fulfilling bonds with them involves moral conflict from 
time to time. Furthermore, Wolf argues that getting angry and blaming one another is a normal 
and healthy part of our relationships with our friends and family members. Despite its negative 
affective expression, Wolf suggests that blame projects to our loved ones that we are committed 
to them, and that we want them to make morally better decisions, because we care about them 
and their well-being. For example, Wolf argues 
Although the angry emotions and attitudes do seem to me to be conceptually tied to a 
disposition to punish, and therefore with a willingness to make the object of blame suffer 
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in a particular way, it would be a serious mistake to identify this with a general 
withdrawal of good will. Even in the midst of my fury at my daughter’s repeated raids of 
my closet, there was never a moment when I wanted harm to come to her…I may have 
wanted her to experience the painful feelings of guilt and remorse. I never wanted her to 
break her leg, or even scratch her knee.87 
 
The example Wolf references in the quote above is an example of a daily moral conflict in her 
household: her teenage daughter repeatedly steals her clothes without asking. Wolf responds to 
her daughter with angry blame, but she does not see this harsh response as harmful or 
problematic.  However, Wolf does agree with me (and Nussbaum) that angry blame 
fundamentally involve the desire to punish wrongdoers.  
While Wolf does not use the term ‘retribution’ directly in the passage above, she does 
remark that the “angry emotions and attitudes do seem to me to be conceptually tied to a 
disposition to punish, and therefore with a willingness to make the object of blame suffer in a 
particular way.”88  While a ‘disposition to punish’ is not equivalent to ‘retribution’, the two are 
close cousins. Recall that I defined retribution as revenge that also has a moralized rationale. I 
not only want you to get you back, but I want to get you back because you harmed me and doing 
so is morally wrong. With retributive aims, there is a clear moralizing intent behind my payback. 
I want to get back at you because you did x to me, and x is morally wrong. Wolf explains her 
‘disposition to punish’ her daughter to be targeted, writing ‘I may have wanted her to experience 
the painful feelings of guilt and remorse’. This is a form of psychological retributivism because 
Wolf wants her daughter to suffer in a psychologically damaging way (through guilt or remorse) 
because her daughter stole her clothes, and Wolf finds this action morally wrong.  
                                                        
87 Wolf, Susan (2011). “Blame Italian Style”. in Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. 
Scanlon, Wallace, R. Jay, Rahul Kumar and Samuel Freeman (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 12-13. 
88 Wolf, p. 12. 
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Generalizing the point, anger often has an object. Anger is usually about something in 
particular. When the angry emotions involve punishment, that punishment is directed towards a 
specific agent for a particular reason. I am angry at you and now I want to punish you because 
you wronged me. However, Wolf does not think that angry blame is conceptually retributive. 
She merely thinks that angry blame is punitive. Further, Wolf does not perceive blame’s punitive 
nature as problematic. Wolf does not think this desire for wrongdoers to suffer is excessive. On 
Wolf’s view, then, expressing blame to those close to us in our daily moral lives is not as 
problematic from a social risk standpoint as I have thus far made it out to be. Wolf explains  
In some happy families, people may treat each other with unfailing respect and 
consideration…In some happy families, though, people get angry; they raise voices, they 
fight, they cry, and then they apologize, they kiss and make up. The spirit of 
multiculturalism calls on us to celebrate this diversity. I just want to make sure that we 
have a similarly diverse repertoire of concepts to match.89 
 
In the above passage, Wolf helpfully points out that different families, groups, and 
friends might each handle moral conflicts differently. Some families stay calm and kind to one 
another in the face of moral conflict, while other families repress moral conflicts by refusing to 
even acknowledge them. Other families address moral conflicts directly with big outbursts of 
anger, perhaps even physical fighting. The variation contained within our interpersonal responses 
to moral wrongdoing is striking. For Wolf, getting angry and expressing blame towards her 
family members is the organic and unproblematic way her own family dynamic operates. 
According to her, we do not want to discount this method. Instead, Wolf argues that we ought to 
embrace the variety of ways we respond to wrongdoing as a testament to the diversity contained 
within in our relationships. Angry blame is one way among many of responding to moral 
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wrongdoing. Wolf further explains how her family uses anger and blame on a daily basis to bring 
them closer together: 
(Consider) my daughter’s repeated raiding of my closet to borrow clothes and shoes 
without permission…If you heard the slammed doors and raised voices or saw the dirty 
looks and tight jaws that accompanied the discussion of these events, you would not think 
twice about whether to describe these as episodes of blame. But do they indicate that the 
parties involved hold attitudes that impair their relations with each other?...I have a very 
close family, with deeply gratifying relationships, which I cannot imagine having 
anything like their actual character in the absence of episodes like these.90 
 
For Wolf, these daily familial conflicts certainly count as instances of blame. However, she 
maintains that there is no lasting damage done in expressing angry blame when these sorts of 
conflicts arise. Expressing blame is a fundamental way her family communicates and resolves 
conflicts. She simply cannot imagine her interactions with her family without the tool of blame. 
Wolf concludes that “Getting angry and expressing it, and demanding a response, may 
bring people together and make them closer, rather than pushing them away. In part this is 
because such behavior encourages apology and remorse more than other shifts of attitude that 
reflect an impairment in relationships.”91 R. Jay Wallace echoes this point, arguing that “a failure 
to experience (blaming emotions) when e.g. someone has wronged us would tend to indicate the 
absence of the sort of emotional investment in moral values that we generally take to be 
desirable.” 92 Wallace argues that a lack of blaming emotions implies a lack of emotional 
investment. Though this is not exactly Wolf’s point, both Wallace and Wolf argue that the 
blaming emotions are highly useful indicators of our care for those close to us and of our interest 
in their moral growth. In this way, Wallace’s and Wolf’s views stand in sharp contrast to 
Nussbaum’s view insofar as they see angry blame as a positive, healthy way to express and 
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resolve moral conflict, whereas Nussbaum (and I) see angry blame as a socially risky and 
retributive strategy. 
 
B. Objections to Wolf 
 In light of Wolf’s argument, I must examine whether I have exaggerated the extent to 
which angry blame serves a negative role in our interpersonal moral lives. I have two objections 
to Wolf’s view. First, it might well be true that we can feel an overarching or generic sense of 
good will towards someone while still expressing angry blame towards them for a minor 
wrongdoing. However, it is hard to see how we can express angry blame towards someone 
without withdrawing our good will towards them, at least temporarily. When Wolf angrily 
blames her daughter for raiding her closet, Wolf certainly has an overriding, generic sense of 
good will and care towards her daughter. She might have a generic sense of good will towards 
her daughter no matter what events transpire between them, due to the inextricably close bond 
and relationship that they share.  
That generic sense of good will is not impacted by Wolf’s angrily blame about the 
specific instance of wrongdoing, her daughter raiding her closet. So, saying that Wolf can 
maintain a generic sense of good will towards her daughter while still angrily blaming her seems 
irrelevant to any hostile feelings or lack of good will exhibited in the exact moment of the 
wrongdoing. Because on the micro-level, when Wolf angrily blames her daughter, how can she 
not be withdrawing her good will, at least temporarily? A temporary withdrawal of good will 
towards another person is compatible with a generic or overall sense of good will towards 
another person. It would be an extreme view to think that the two—a temporary withdrawal of 
goodwill and a generic sense of good will—are incompatible. Furthermore, the fact that we can 
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retain generic feelings of respect and good will towards a wrongdoer does not mean our micro-
scale withdrawal of good will is not deeply harmful. Wolf needs to say more about how the 
forcefulness of angry blame does not involve any withdrawal of good will in the present 
moment. 
Indeed, many philosophers have written about the temporary sting or forcefulness 
involved in our expressions of blame. Summarizing this sort of view, Pamela Hieronymi writes, 
“the force of blame is located in the harms, burdens, demands, and expectations contained in or 
resulting from those blaming actions and attitudes that go beyond the simple belief that ill will or 
disregard was shown.”93 Further, in “The Force and Fairness of Blame” (2004), Hieronymi argues 
that while there is a characteristic forcefulness to blame, that forcefulness is not unfair or 
unnecessarily harmful. Hieronymi argues for the general conclusion that “a characteristic force 
of a judgment of ill will cannot render one unfair in making that judgment; it could at most 
generate obligations of judgment management.”94 
 Hieronymi further argues that the forcefulness (or lack thereof) of expressed blame “lies 
in the interpersonal significance of a judgment of it.”95 Hieronymi means that the forcefulness of 
expressed blame depends on the context-sensitive dynamics between the agents and the ways in 
which they interpret the expressed judgment of blame. Expressed blame is not automatically or 
necessarily forceful, but it becomes forceful based on the interpersonal significance the 
respective agents ascribe to it. As is clear in Wolf’s account, she and her family do not ascribe 
excessive significance to their interpersonal expressions of angry blame towards each other. 
However, this is dependent on context-sensitive factors about the dynamics of their specific 
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family structure. That same type of angry blame might feel very retributive and harmful to other 
family or friendship dynamics. 
 Even if Hieronymi is right, there is a wide range of interpersonal cases and dynamics in 
which blame’s forcefulness is harmfully active. I am not claiming that every single case of 
interpersonal moral wrongdoing involves actively forceful or hostile affective elements. Instead, 
I argue (in line with a common account of blame) that expressed blame involves a characteristic 




A. Flanagan Against Anger 
In his recent book, The Geography of Morals, Flanagan draws upon work in anthropology, 
empirical moral psychology, behavioral economics, and philosophy to explore the role of anger 
in our current Western moral system. In line with Nussbaum’s argument, Flanagan worries that 
anger is not the positive force that many Westerners think it to be. In order to be specific about 
what he is arguing against, Flanagan has created a taxonomy of anger, which I have summarized 
below: 
1. Anger or angry feelings refers to the phenomenal state(s) that is/are experienced as anger, 
the phenomenal state(s) that feels/is angry. It includes whatever psychophysical states the 
angry person experiences, reddening, heat, and the impulse to strike out. 
2. Angry behavior is any behavior in the world that results from anger, for example, strong 
words, criticism, gossip, shaming, striking. 
3. Anger norms: permissions or recommendations about appropriate anger, both 
phenomenal, how angry one is allowed or supposed to feel in different circumstances, 
and behavioral ones, what it is legitimate to do given those feelings. 
4.  Anger scripts: socioculturally and normatively specific scripts for anger and angry 
behavior. 
5.  Justified anger is anger that is at least permitted by anger norms, normally the 
justification involves there being considerations that warrant or speak in favor of anger. 
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6. Righteous anger is anger, the phenomenal state and the psychophysical accompaniments, 
which is warranted or considered warranted by high values, especially justice violations. 
7. Righteous indignation refers to the judgment that there has been disrespectful or insulting 
treatment of someone, others or me. The judgment involves feeling, the feeling that 
disrespect, insult, or injustice has occurred. It is not angry. 
8. Punishment, violence, war. These are all practices that may or may not be motivated by 
anger, as are rudeness, sarcasm, snark, irony, and passive aggressiveness. 
9. Annoyance, frustration, resentment, disdain, and contempt. These are all attitudes that 
seem to be, or are likely to be, in the anger family. They have negative valence, are 
heated, directed at an insult, obstacle, or impending threat, and typically come with a 
desire to harm the source, to kick the flat tire, tell you that you are racist slime.96 
 
I will first consider this comprehensive list in the specific context of angry blame. Each of 
these distinct types of anger can arise in a given case of moral wrongdoing, but most of the time 
one or two are dominant in a given situation. For example, imagine that I am about to have 
surgery and my sister has agreed to pick me up and drive me home afterwards. When my sister 
neglects to pick me up from my surgery, after she promised to do so, I am angry at her. She 
failed to live up to a promise she made to me, and as a result, I feel stranded and vulnerable 
while on painkillers without support. When I express this anger to my sister, I feel my anger is 
justified (type 5 in Flanagan’s taxonomy). I might also feel annoyance and frustration (type 9) at 
her, and very likely also angry feelings (type 1), but in this case justified anger is dominant for 
me.  
Consider another example. A colleague tells me she did not vote in the last election because 
she wanted to go home and watch The Bachelorette rather than stand in line for a few minutes in 
order to vote. In response, I might feel righteous anger (type 6). I might think that she made a 
morally bad decision, beyond just being lazy. She failed to live up to a norm of citizenship, and I 
am righteously upset. This is different from what Flanagan terms righteous indignation (type 7) 
in that indignation is when people, rather than our justice system in general, have been 
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mistreated. I might express righteous indignation when my neighbor steals the FedEx package 
outside my doorstep for her own enjoyment before I get home to grab it. In this case, the wrong 
affected me specifically (rather than U.S. citizens as a group, in the voting case) and so my anger 
is expressed as indignation rather than as righteous.  
 Flanagan’s taxonomy of anger is helpful to my own argument for a few reasons. For one, 
it reminds us of the variety of forms anger can take in our daily lives. Anger is not a singular or 
unchanging thing. As I mentioned at the start of this chapter, I am focused on heated, Senecan 
forms of anger. However, I am aware of the variety of forms of anger involved in our daily moral 
lives, and Flanagan’s list helps make this variety more specific. Second, Flanagan’s list narrows 
in on what is so bad about angry blame. He explicitly defines the attitudinal and behavioral 
accompaniments of angry states. In my focus on interpersonal blame, the types of anger that will 
most likely come up in our blaming practices are types 1 and 2 (anger and angry behavior), as 
well as types 7 and 9 (indignation and annoyance, frustration, resentment, disdain, and 
contempt). In what follows, I will continue to use the umbrella term angry blame and will be 
more specific if I am talking about other types of anger.  
 
B. Eliminativist Views About Anger 
 
Flanagan discusses the Stoic view of anger. In many ways, the Stoic mirrors Nussbaum’s 
argument against traditional forms of anger. Seneca offers an eliminativist view about anger, 
arguing that anger is something best avoided at all costs. In “De Ira”, Seneca argues that anger is 
not something we can or should moderate. Instead, Seneca thinks that we must banish dangerous 
emotions like anger entirely. He argues,  
Let us be free from this evil, let us clear our minds of it, and extirpate root and branch a 
passion which grows again wherever the smallest particle of it finds a resting-place. Let 
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us not moderate anger, but get rid of it altogether: what can moderation have to do with 
an evil habit?97 
 
Because Seneca views anger as entirely evil, he thinks that there is no point in pursuing a more 
moderate path. This extreme view of anger includes expressions of anger that seem appropriate 
or fitting for the situation. Even if expressing anger seems justified for a given case of 
wrongdoing, still, one should not express it. Seneca’s reasoning is that anger can, all too quickly, 
spin out of control.  
Flanagan compares Seneca’s extreme, eliminativist view to a Buddhist eliminativist view. 
For example, Santideva, an eighth-century master who wrote a book entitled “The Bodhisattva’s 
Way of Life”, writes about anger being the worst state of mind a moral agent can have.  Buddhist 
arguments against anger involve a metaphysical world view that, due to limited space, I will not 
discuss at this time.98 But, many Buddhists generally agree, like Seneca, that anger is a poison 
best avoided entirely. For example, Santideva writes 
Those who wish to cause me suffering 
Are like Buddhas bestowing waves of blessings 
As they open the door for my not going to an 
unfortunate realm, 
Why should I be angry with them?99 
 
This passage reflects the attitude that even those who cause us suffering should not receive our 
anger. On this view, even when others harm us in significant ways, still, we should not respond 
with anger. This is in stark contrast to a typical Western approach to anger.  Further, it seems 
very hard to enact, practically speaking.  
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Strikingly, contained within Santideva’s passage is the idea that when others harm us, it 
can provide us an opportunity to practice not getting angry. We can even be grateful to this 
person for the chance to practice responding to others without anger. Santideva’s attitude is 
wholly eliminativist regarding anger, just like Seneca’s view. With these two eliminativist views 
in mind, it is worthwhile to consider whether such an eliminativist position is overstated. 
According to eliminativists, anger’s tendency to overreact provides a strong enough reason to 
eliminate it from our moral lives altogether. However, as I will now argue, a modified version of 
the eliminativist view is more realistic. My moderate eliminativism draws inspiration from the 
Stoic and Buddhist views, as well as Nussbaum’s Transitional-Anger account, and is in stark 
contrast with Wolf’s defense of angry blame, yet it allows some space for anger in our daily 
moral lives. 
 
C. Modified Eliminativism 
In the rest of this chapter, I will argue that a moderate eliminativist position is the best 
approach to anger. While we should not try to eliminate all anger from our daily moral lives, 
since it can occasionally serve morally useful purposes, we should be aware of the destructive 
after-effects of anger, and only express anger when both fitting and appropriate. A modified 
eliminativist view of expressing anger involves caution about (but not full elimination of) anger, 
because of anger’s innate tendency to overact and spiral out of control, especially in moral 
contexts, i.e. angry blame. 
 There are several reasons why a modified eliminativism is attractive. For one, even if 
expressing angry blame functions in some positive ways, the excessive, spiraling nature of angry 
blame is an ever-present social risk. As an obvious example, a blamer’s anger can inspire the 
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wrongdoer to express anger back. We see this happen every day. When a car cuts in front of us 
on the highway, many of us respond in kind with some degree of road rage. We manifest this by 
speeding up and cutting back in front of them, and perhaps also shouting obscenities out the 
window. We do this to get even. The first driver’s aggressive driving spurred similarly 
aggressive driving in the other driver. This is clearly unsafe. The two drivers might continue to 
egg each other on, ending up in an accident.  
The same type of exchange often occurs in interpersonal moral conflicts, too. When 
someone gets angry at us, it is entirely unremarkable for us to get angry back, perhaps even 
amplifying their anger out of defensiveness. When my friend steals my idea for a new article and 
writes and publishes it herself before I have a chance to, I might respond by getting angry at her. 
In turn, she might get angry back. Then, mere moments later, we engage in an escalated, 
aggressive shouting match. The problem with this dynamic, as Seneca tells us, is that anger 
almost always overreaches and overreacts. It is natural to match the emotional tone of the person 
blaming us. The blamer is riled up, so we get riled up, too.  
 Relatedly, the blamer’s anger can encourage defensiveness from the wrongdoer. Being on 
the receiving end of such an aggressive emotional state can naturally lead to a defensive 
response. As demonstrated in Nussbaum’s argument against anger, hostility is an unhelpful 
response to moral wrongdoing because it does not move either agent towards productive 
dialogue and moral problem solving. Instead, defensiveness causes one (or both) agents to 
further dig in their heels. Thus, defensiveness is not only a pernicious emotion to be on the 
receiving end of, but it also leads to a further moral problem: lack of motivation to make positive 
moral changes. 
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 At the same time, angry blame can also function in positive ways. Wolf demonstrated 
that angry blame can, for some families and interpersonal dynamics, function productively. 
Sometimes, anger might instead serve as a useful signal, rather than as a spiraling outburst. In 
some cases, the angry blamer is signaling that she refuses to be treated this way, that the 
wrongdoer’s behavior is unacceptable. It is possible that the wrongdoer will react to this by 
wanting to correct her own behavior. She might take the anger as a useful motivational force to 
get her to act differently next time. When angry blame serves as a signal, this seems useful. 
However, I maintain that all too often, the emotional charge of the anger breeds further escalated 
anger and defensiveness, instead of motivation. If we can achieve those same signaling and 
deterring aims without expressing anger, this seems, on the whole, less risky and thus preferable.  
Contra the eliminativist position, I do not argue that we must eradicate angry blame. That 
may be impossible. We will, inevitably, sometimes angrily blame others and this is to be 
expected. In fact, there are some cases where anger is socially and morally useful. For example, 
when extreme and urgent injustice occurs in our daily moral lives, anger is sometimes the best 
response. 
Relatedly, philosopher Myisha Cherry defends the role of moral anger in her article 
“Moral Anger, Motivation, and Productivity”. Cherry’s subject is moral anger, which she 
describes as anger arising out of a moral wrong. This is just how I have described angry blame 
throughout this chapter, so I take it that we are focused on the same subject, and the difference in 
word choice is negligible. Cherry defends the productive role moral anger plays in our moral 
conflicts, remarking that “Moral anger is productive when anger leads one to work towards 
pursuing justice in ways that are moral and focused on reaching the goal of justice.”100 On 
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Cherry’s view, moral anger can be a motivating force for agents to want to make moral progress. 
She views anger as a positive and productive catalyst for change.101  
Cherry is right to think that sometimes moral anger can serve a positive function in working 
towards justice, despite its explosive tendencies. Even though anger can quickly escalate and 
become destructive, it does play a positive role in some of our moral practices. A moderate 
eliminitavist position allows for this positive role anger plays, especially in the face of grave 
injustice, while still recognizing the destructive after-effects of anger. In sum, I propose that even 
if anger is fitting for a given situation, all things considered it is rarely appropriate, given its 




A. Bommarito’s Account 
Finally, I will present a fourth account of anger, which serves as a contrast case to 
Flanagan’s account and as support for my own case for the moderate eliminativist position. 
Bommarito argues that anger “is morally virtuous when it is a manifestation of concern for moral 
goods.”102 This does not imply that anger is necessary for being virtuous. Instead, anger can 
become morally virtuous or vicious based on the underlying concerns it manifests. For 
Bommarito, anger can be virtuous or vicious, depending on the context. Bommarito’s argument 
is compatible with a moderate eliminativist position because he only finds anger to be morally 
virtuous when it manifests a concern for moral goods. In this way, he presents a cautiously (and 
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limited in scope) positive account of anger.103 Similarly, Bommarito thinks that anger can be 
retributive or non-retributive, depending on the circumstances. Bommarito explains,  
Richard is angry that the Red Sox have lost the World Series because he cares about the 
team doing well. Julia is angry that she must work on Christmas because she cares about 
celebrating the holiday with her family. By contrast, someone who does not care about 
American sports or Christian holidays is unlikely to be angry in similar situations because 
these things just do not matter to her.104  
 
Bommarito is not saying that caring about others requires getting angry. Rather, he is saying that 
getting angry requires caring about something. When that care is about something morally good, 
one’s anger is virtuous. He also holds that the inverse is true: “When anger manifests a lack of 
concern or immoral concern such as malice, contempt, or ill will toward them, then it is morally 
vicious.”105 
 Bommarito defends anger on the grounds that it is a mistake to assume reason involves 
being in control of our emotions and that anger rob us of that control.106 This runs counter to 
Seneca’s argument that anger prevents us from seeing things clearly, and for that reason should 
be banished from our daily lives. Differently, Bommarito suggests that anger need not be thought 
of something we fall prey to, or something that robs us of thinking clearly. Instead, anger can, at 
times, be something that inspires us, aids us, helps us be “more in control, less distracted, and 
less tempted.”107  
 Bommarito is right to think that anger can helpfully clarify what moral goods we care 
about. For example, I am hardly ever upset when a stranger breaks a promise to me, but I am 
almost guaranteed to be angry when my closest friend breaks a promise to me. In our 
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interpersonal lives, we tend to expect more from those close to us, and are understandably let 
down when they do not live up to those expectations. In this sort of situation, anger can be a way 
I clearly manifest what I care about, i.e. our friendship. I get angry at my friend (and much more 
so than I would at a stranger) because I value our friendship, and feel that my friend’s betrayal is 
not in keeping with the established bond of trust between us. I value the quality of trust within 
our friendship, and my anger arises in response to feeling that my friend has broken that moral 
norm and expectation of trust between us. Anger is the fuel for me to express what I care about. 
In this respect, Bommarito is surely right to say that sometimes anger makes more vivid the 
moral goods that we care about.  
I will now present two arguments against Bommarito’s account to demonstrate that while 
he is right to think that anger can be fitting when it is a recognition of moral goods, anger is in 
fact rarely appropriate. This argument will make further use of the fitting versus appropriate 
distinction I raised in chapter one. Further, this argument will support my moderate eliminativist 
position insofar as I grant that anger can sometimes serve a useful function in our daily moral 
lives, but that it is rarely appropriate. 
 
B. First Objection: Restraint  
 
First, Bommarito’s account of anger ignores an important condition of restraint. Anger 
that manifests concern for moral goods through yelling, kicking, stomping off, rage, and any 
other aggressive attitudes and gestures is not very virtuous. Even if the intent behind such 
behavior is to manifest concern for moral goods, the delivery of the message matters a great 
deal.  
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It is not enough to deem any expression of anger that manifests concern for moral goods 
as virtuous. The presentation (tone, body language, facial expression, volume, etc.) of the anger 
matters. In this way, Bommarito’s account is overly simplistic. What is missing from his account 
that anger can manifest concern for moral goods is the condition that the expression of that anger 
needs to be delivered in a morally appropriate way. I will not attempt to defend a full account of 
what that sort of restraint on delivery might look like, but I will offer some initial thoughts.  
As Nussbaum persuasively demonstrated, an expression of anger should be delivered 
with an eye towards being helpful to the wrongdoer, rather than adding more emotional or 
psychological damage to her. Good intentions are not enough. Angry agents also need to be 
aware of the ways in which they communicate their anger, and how that anger is received by a 
particular audience. Shouting one’s anger and throwing things around is unlikely to be morally 
helpful. In addition, expressions of anger might be more effective if not immediately delivered to 
wrongdoers. In the immediate aftermath of wrongdoing, tensions are likely to be high on both 
sides.  
For example, imagine that I see someone cut in front of someone else in a line we are all 
waiting in at the grocery store. I express my anger over what I perceive to be a moral wrong by 
cutting in front of the person who had originally cut line. This qualifies as a virtuous response on 
Bommarito’s account because my anger manifests my concern for the moral good of waiting 
one’s turn. I am demonstrating my commitment to that moral good through my angry actions. 
However, the way I manifest my anger in this case is not virtuous, because I am doing the very 
thing that the wrongdoer did, cutting in front of others in line. My actions are hypocritical. 
Bommarito might reply that there is an implied hypocrisy condition in his account, 
restricting my angry actions in this example from being virtuous on account of them being 
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hypocritical. Or, he might accept that my anger in this case did manifest concern for a moral 
good, and in this way, is virtuous, even though it is hypocritical. Either way, I propose that there 
is a big difference between anger in theory, and anger in our real, everyday interpersonal lives. 
Extreme sensitivity to the context-sensitive factors involved in our expressions of anger is 
crucial. Attention to this difference impacts our judgments of anger’s virtue, and Bommarito’s 
account ought to reflect this context-sensitivity. There are many ways to manifest concern for 
moral goods, and some ways are better—from a social risk perspective—than others. Thus, while 
anger can sometimes play a positive role in our moral lives, there are additional context-sensitive 
factors involved in determining anger’s role, and these additional factors suggest that anger 
might not be appropriate, even when it manifests a concern for moral goods.  
 
C. Second Objection: Anger Has Too Much Heat 
 
Additionally, even if anger’s delivery manifests clear concern for the wrongdoer, anger 
still may not be useful to express simply because it has too much heat. Even if angry forms of 
expressed blame result in the best short-term moral outcome (i.e. they successfully motivate 
wrongdoers to change in the immediate aftermath of the wrongdoing), perhaps this strategy is 
harmful for the long-term dynamic between wrongdoer and blamer. Stirring up all that heat and 
blinding intensity involved in Senecan varieties of anger is not worth the short-term, cathartic 
benefit of expressing heated blame. Again, the issue is largely with heated and blinding Senecan 
forms of anger, and less with cooler forms of anger.  
Some commentators agree with me. As writer Rebecca Solnit argues in her article 
“Facing the Furies”, “Much political rhetoric suggests that without anger there is no powerful 
engagement, that anger is a sort of gasoline that runs the engine of social change. But sometimes 
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gasoline just makes things explode.”108 Contra the traditional view that heated forms of anger 
demonstrate one’s engagement in a given case of wrongdoing, Solnit explores how even if anger 
initially motivates a call for moral change, it might not create actual change. Instead, it might 
create too much heat. Like gasoline, a little bit is needed to fuel a car, but too much creates an 
explosion. This implies that sometimes anger is not effective in achieving the aim of actually 
creating lasting change. Implicit in Solnit’s remark is the idea that there are better, more 
accurately directed, engines of social (or moral) change beyond anger. If anger tends to make 
things explode, perhaps an alternative strategy is wise. 
In a recent empirical study, Jennifer Lerner and Dacher Keltner found that feeling angry 
makes people as optimistic about the outcome of a situation as feeling happy would. In other 
words, “anger may make people miserable, but it also makes them more confident and obliterates 
other, more introspective miseries: pain, fear, guilt, uncertainty, vulnerability. We would rather 
be mad than sad.”109 As this finding demonstrates, there is a real and compelling allure to anger. 
When we are wronged, anger masks other painful emotions like fear, guilt, or uncertainty that we 
might not want to feel or be ready to feel. Feeling angry when we are wronged can, at least in the 
moment, feel good. Rather than introspecting about why we feel those ways, sometimes we lash 
out and express anger instead. It can be easier and more rewarding in the short-term to express 
anger than to feel the fear, guilt, and uncertainty. But again, the problem with angry blame is 
how quickly it can escalate and spiral out of control, and how hard it can be to regulate it once it 
has begun spiraling. 
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Returning to Solnit’s gasoline example, it is clear that there is a very fine line between 
anger serving as productive moral fuel, and anger ‘exploding’, making it hostile to 
understanding.110 Additionally, knowing when we are expressing too much heat seems to require 
profound self-awareness. Caught up in the heat of the moment, this can be hard. Angry blame 
serves the purpose of clearly signaling that wrongdoing has occurred. But, there may be clearer 
and more effective signals. For example, angry blame does not convey to wrongdoers how to 
make moral changes, or what resources are available.  
 This is not to suggest that we should try to completely get rid of all angry impulses. It 
would be naïve to presume we have all that much control over our impulses. Instead, we have the 
power to harness our anger, and to fully feel it, but not need to express it as angry blame. One 
can fully feel the emotion of anger without inflicting it onto others. Indeed, we can recognize 
anger arising in us as an internal signal that something needs to change. Perhaps one can 
transform that anger into productive, solution-oriented energy.111 Further, feeling obligated to get 
angry, and express it via angry blame, in the face of every daily instance of moral wrongdoing 
we encounter would be exhausting. None of us actually practice this, nor would it be advised to 
do so. Knowing that our moral emotions have a limited bandwidth, we can effort to be more 
focused in the cases we choose to get worked up over.  
This insight provides support for the view that even if anger is fitting for a given 
situation, it still may well be inappropriate to express. While Cherry and Bommarito each 
provide positive arguments for anger, they have both drastically underestimated the potential 
destructive after-effects of anger. Rather than view anger as appropriate if it manifests a concern 
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for moral goods (Bommarito), or when it serves the goal of justice (Cherry), I propose that angry 
blame is rarely appropriate, given its destructive social after-effects.  
Thus, a moderate form of eliminativism argues that even if angry blame serves some 
useful functions, it also comes with many troubling elements, elements which should, on the 
whole, dissuade us from expressing angry blame, for worry of it exacerbating expressed blame’s 
already pernicious sting. Thus, in this section, I demonstrated that a more moderate version of 
eliminativist theories about anger (and by extension, angry blame) is more a plausible and 




 In my discussion of these four authors’ works, I have presented a critical discussion of 
several competing views on the role of anger in our daily moral lives. Nussbaum’s and Wolf’s 
accounts served as contrast cases about angry blame, while Flanagan’s and Bommarito’s 
accounts served as contrast cases about generic anger.  
Nussbaum’s account helped establish the case for regarding angry blame as retributive. 
Some readers might think that retributivism is a wholly appropriate response to being morally 
wronged, and thus would argue that the fact that blame is at least incipiently retributive is not a 
problem for our interpersonal moral lives. Some might even argue that blame’s retributive nature 
is a good thing. But, Nussbaum’s argument convincingly demonstrates the ways in which 
retribution does not solve our moral problems. Retributive modes of response may make one feel 
as if they are gaining closure after having been wronged. But in reality, retributive modes of 
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response do not offer productive moral resolution because they are premised on magical thinking 
or status down ranking (or both).  
In addition, the Stoics’ eliminativist view about anger offered an extreme ideal for our 
daily moral lives, entirely devoid of anger. Differently, I am proposing a more realistic, Stoic-
inspired account involving a move away from angry blame due to its incipient social risks, rather 
than a complete elimination of angry blame from our daily moral lives.  
My discussion of these various accounts of anger has led me to the following conclusion: 
anger’s heat tends to exacerbate blame’s retributive foundation. Angry blame, thus, seems to me 
to be the worst kind of expressed blame, and best avoided at all costs. Whereas civilized forms of 
blame seem at least a few steps removed from blame’s primitive, retributive origin, angry blame 
seems much closer to blame’s retributive origin. We can extrapolate from this that angry blame 
more easily devolves into retribution than more civilized, affectively ‘cooler’ forms of blame do, 
because angry blame is closer to the uncivilized, retributive root.  
The aim of this chapter has been to highlight the worst-case scenario in our daily blaming 
lives: the toxic combination of anger, blame, and retribution. Even though not all forms of blame 
are this prone to devolve, being aware of the most unstable forms of blame should inform our 
understanding of and reliance on the practice of expressing blame as a whole. Thus, my new 
argument from this chapter is that anger exacerbates blame’s nascent retributive impulses, and 
this finding lends itself to my overarching argument that given the social risks involved in 
expressed blame, it may fit a situation, yet is not appropriate to express. Given our proclivity 
towards expressing blame coupled with anger in our daily moral lives, we have another strong, 
prima facie reason to break the habit of expressing blaming so readily and automatically in our 
interpersonal moral lives. 
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Chapter Three. A Further Argument Against Expressed Blame: Epistemic Skepticism 
 
The previous two chapters discussed constitutive elements of blame itself, whose nature 
provided strong prima facie reasons for refraining from expressed blame. This chapter 
approaches the topic from a different angle, epistemic reasons to refrain from expressed blame. 
In this chapter, I will build my case by drawing on an account of epistemic skepticism from 
Gideon Rosen (2002, 2004). Rosen is skeptical about our warrant to judge the blameworthiness 
of others. I will extend Rosen’s skepticism regarding culpability in general to a skepticism 
regarding the moral status of wrongdoers. I will then argue that Rosen has exaggerated the scope 
of our epistemic skepticism. He is wrong to think we are never warranted to make positive 
judgments of culpability. Rosen’s skepticism is too global. We are sometimes right to make 
positive judgments of culpability against wrongdoers. Yet, I will argue that even when we are 
warranted to make positive judgments of culpability, we might not be warranted to express that 
blame. The warrant to make positive judgments of culpability is distinct from the warrant to 
publicly express that blame. 
In chapter one I argued that blame has retributive origins. In chapter two I argued that 
retribution is a key ingredient in angry forms of blame and that it is socially risky. Worse, I 
argued that anger exacerbates blame’s retributive root. In this chapter, I shall add to those two 
arguments against blame a third line of argument that because of the high stakes of public blame 





I. Rosen’s Epistemic Skepticism 
 
A. Rosen’s Account  
First, I will review the details of Rosen’s account. Rosen is skeptical about moral 
responsibility altogether. In his paper “Culpability and Ignorance”, Rosen considers two types of 
ignorance, factual and moral. An example of factual ignorance is when someone innocently 
trespasses on private property. Say this person is out on a hike on an unmarked patch of land and 
she winds up on someone else’s property. Ordinarily, trespassers are liable to be blamed. But, 
Rosen counters, if one’s trespassing occurs due to factual ignorance, one is not blameworthy for 
trespassing. In this case, there are no signs on the property telling the trespasser that she has 
overstepped her bounds. Without a clear sign, she has no way of knowing that she is trespassing. 
As a result, she inadvertently strays onto someone else’s property without their permission.  
Rosen argues that it would be wrong to blame the trespasser for this transgression since it 
was an innocent instance of factual ignorance.112 Because there were no signs, she was not to 
know better. We cannot expect her to have acted any differently. On the other hand, when 
someone drives down a crowded street in Times Square furiously texting on her phone with her 
face glued to the screen and she runs into another pedestrian, she should have known better. She 
is ignorant of the practical risks involved in texting while driving, especially in a crowded metro 
area. This case, unlike the hiking case, is an instance of culpable ignorance because the Times 
Square texter was not ignorant about the facts of driving etiquette in a crowded metro area. We 
all know that texting while driving, especially in a crowded metro area, is risky. The Times 
Square texter knows her distracted driving is risky, but she does it anyways. The texter 
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intentionally engages in dangerous behavior, whereas the hiker does not intentionally engage in 
illegal behavior.  
Then there are cases of moral ignorance. Rosen cites ancient Hittite slavery as an 
example of moral ignorance that is non-culpable. Imagine that an ancient slaveholder truly 
believes that it is morally permissible for him to buy and sell slaves and then force them to work.  
Rosen claims that because ancient slaveholding was so prevalent and not seen as a moral issue at 
the time, it was not a culpable moral wrong.  He writes, “We may condemn the act. We may rail 
at the universe or at history for serving up injustice on so vast a scale. But in my view it makes 
no sense to hold this injustice against the perpetrator when it would have taken a miracle of 
moral vision for him to have seen the moral case for acting differently.”113  
When we try to apply our current moral attitudes about slavery to this case of ancient 
slavery, of course we want to say that ancient slaveholding was terribly wrong. It was, certainly, 
wrong. Despite this correct intuition, Rosen maintains that ancient slaveholders were non-
culpable for their moral ignorance. As he explains, ancient slaveholders lacked the correct moral 
concepts—or perhaps the capacity to employ the correct moral concepts—to see this practice as 
a moral wrong. Ancient slaveholders were acting in accordance with the prevalent moral 
attitudes of their time. Given the prevalent pro-slavery attitudes of the time, slave owners were 
not to know better. They were acting in line with their peers. Differently, if one were to engage in 
slaveholding today, one would be culpable, since at this point in history, one really must know 
better. It would be impossible to be ignorant about the moral impermissibility of slaveholding 
today. However, the prevalent moral attitudes about slavery today are vastly different than they 
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were in ancient times. Thus, Rosen concludes, ancient slaveholders’ moral ignorance is non-
culpable. 
In both the factual and moral cases of ignorance, Rosen’s account relies heavily on our 
ability to determine whether a wrongdoer’s ignorance is blameworthy or not. For Rosen, the 
non-culpability of the wrongdoer’s ignorance determines the culpability of the resultant act. 
Rosen expands these examples to the general claim:  
If X does A from ignorance, then X is culpable for the act only if X is culpable for the 
ignorance from which X acts.114  
 
When wrongdoers act from ignorance, they are only culpable if they are culpable for their 
ignorance. This is not to say that there will not be any consequences to an agent’s actions done 
from ignorance. Rosen’s view is not that extreme. Agents who commit crimes done from 
ignorance might well have to face punishment—social, legal, and so on. But, the issue of 
punishment is separable from the issue of judgments of culpability. A wrongdoer might be 
punished, by law, for a given action. But, if her morally wrong action was done from non-
culpable ignorance, Rosen deems her non-culpable in a strictly moral sense. He further explains:  
When I am passive with respect to an occurrence—when it merely happens in me or to 
me or around me—then I am responsible for the occurrence only if it is the (foreseeable) 
upshot of prior culpable activity on my part. I can be responsible for falling asleep at the 
wheel. I can be responsible for forgetting your name. But I am responsible for such things 
only if they result from some prior culpable act or omission on my part—taking sleeping 
pills before the long drive, for example, or neglecting to say your name over and over to 
myself when we were first introduced.115 
 
This is a very striking passage, and one worth examining in greater detail. Rosen suggests 
that if a driver falls asleep at the wheel, she is responsible for doing so only if it is a result of a 
prior culpable act, such as taking sleeping pills. If she knowingly took sleeping pills and then got 
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into her car, she is culpable because she knowingly risked falling asleep at the wheel and 
endangering other drivers on the road. However, if she falls asleep at the wheel without any prior 
culpable act—it just happens—then she is not culpable. This line of thinking runs counter to 
traditional intuitions about cases like this, where an asleep driver is likely culpable, barring any 
medical emergencies. 
Yet, it is not clear what Rosen means in the first lines of the passage in which he writes 
“when it merely happens in me or to me or around me”. The statement is ambiguous. What does 
it look like for an occurrence to happen in me? For example, when anger arises in me and I 
express that anger, am I responsible for any uproar and harm that results from my expression of 
anger? What is the difference between me being angry and anger “merely happen(ing) in me”? 
Additionally, there is further ambiguity in what it means for an occurrence to happen around me. 
At what point am I centrally involved in an occurrence that happens around me, rather than 
passively involved in an occurrence that happens around me? Relating this ambiguity to Rosen’s 
case of the asleep driver, it is unclear what external factors happen in her versus what factors 
happen around her. If it gets very dark on the road and this causes the driver to feel drowsy, 
eventually falling asleep, is she culpable for falling asleep behind the wheel, on Rosen’s view? 
Likely not. However, intuitively, most people would describe the act of falling asleep behind the 
wheel as culpable, since the driver failed to pull over and stop driving as soon as she recognized 
she was getting drowsy. She did not take a preventative action—pulling over—and is culpable 
for this negligence. 
Additional discussion from Rosen of what he means by ‘in me’ and ‘around me’ in this 
context is lacking from his text. Whichever way we choose to interpret those phrases, though, his 
argument remains bold. The standard interpretation of this case would be that the driver is 
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culpable for falling asleep, no matter why it happened. As I mentioned above, there may be some 
leniency if her falling asleep was beyond her control, such as in the case of a medical emergency. 
But, if she knowingly got into the car when she was very tired, or if she knew she tended to fall 
asleep on long drives, but kept driving anyways, I gather that most folks would consider this an 
act of negligence and deem her culpable.  
Differently, Rosen argues that if there is no prior ignorance on the driver’s part, then the 
wrong action that results—falling asleep at the wheel—is non-culpable. Rosen adds that  
Unless you have some further exculpatory information, you should suspend judgment…You 
should embrace a version of what I shall call skepticism about moral responsibility. You 
should hold that confident positive judgments of responsibility are never justified.116 
 
 This is a radical claim. Rosen is not merely saying that we should make sure someone is 
responsible before making a positive exculpatory judgment about them. Instead, he is saying we 
can rarely know whether or not someone is culpable because we can almost never be sufficiently 
warranted in our judgment. The reasoning is that there are too many potentially relevant external 
factors at play in a given case of wrongdoing. We often cannot be sure in our judgments of 
culpability, so Rosen suggests suspending judgment altogether. For Rosen, most confident 
positive judgments of responsibility are unwarranted based on “current contingent and possibly 
temporary limits on our knowledge.”117 This means that Rosen is open to us one day having a 
better grip on how to effectively determine others’ culpability. But given our current cognitive 
limits, judgments of culpability are largely unwarranted. In the next section, I shall respond to 
Rosen’s radical view and present my own version of epistemic skepticism regarding expressed 
blame in particular. 
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 B. Is Rosen’s Account Overstated? 
 On the face of it, Rosen’s account seems extreme. If we adopt his model, hardly anyone 
would ever be culpable. An obvious worry is that we would let many culpable wrongdoers go 
without moral address by following a Rosen-like methodology. I have two main responses to 
Rosen’s view. The first response is that his skepticism is too global. We may well be warranted 
to make positive judgments of culpability. However, this warrant is distinct from warrant to 
express blame. We should treat these two warrants (private judgments and public expressions) in 
a differential way. Second, when it comes to determining whether one has warrant to express 
blame, I will argue that the stakes of the case and the context are crucially important, and 
Rosen’s account is insufficiently sensitive to these important factors. While I agree with many 
aspects of Rosen’s account, I will instead propose a more moderate skepticism than Rosen’s, and 
one that takes stakes and context into account. 
 
i. Against Wholesale Skepticism 
First, Rosen’s skepticism is too global. There are some cases of wrongdoing in which we 
can be quite sure who is culpable. Contra Rosen, we are sometimes warranted in judging another 
person to have engaged in clear-eyed akratic wrongdoing. Rosen argues that it is very difficult to 
identify genuine akrasia because “it is not readily distinguishable from an impostor: ordinary 
weakness of will.”118 However, Rosen is overstating how little we can know about someone’s 
culpability. It is too simplistic to think we lack warrant to judge others culpable, full stop. 
Sometimes we know with definitive certainty who the wrongdoer is, that they are culpable, and 
for what crime.  
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Some cases of moral wrongdoing are clearer than others, and Rosen’s account fails to 
acknowledge this fact. For example, imagine that my friend Alex punches our mutual friend John 
completely out of the blue. When I ask Alex why he did it, he replies, “I just felt like it. I wanted 
to hurt him.” I have given Alex a chance to explain himself, but his explanation does not offer 
any mitigating circumstances or explanations. In this case, Alex is culpable. He has even 
admitted as much! His wrongdoing is clearly distinguishable from ordinary weakness of will, as 
his own testimony confirms. It is not that Alex tried not to punch John but simply could not help 
himself (weakness of will). Rather, it is that he chose, in a clear-eyed way, to punch John. 
Therefore, Rosen is wrong to argue especially in cases like these, that we lack warrant to 
judge another person to have engaged in akratic wrongdoing. Of course, in our daily moral lives, 
cases of wrongdoing are rarely as simple as the case of Alex and John that I have just presented. 
Nevertheless, occasionally cases of interpersonal moral wrongdoing are this simple, and Rosen’s 
view does not allow for these sorts of straightforward cases. Sometimes wrongdoers fully admit 
to their wrongdoing, and no mitigating circumstances can be found. As such, Rosen is wrong to 
embrace wholesale skepticism regarding culpability. The scope of his skepticism is too wide; 
there are some cases of wrongdoing in which we do have warrant to judge an agent blameworthy 
because the epistemic reasons behind the wrongdoer’s actions are clear. 
 
ii. Stakes 
Second, even if we really do have the proper warrant to blame someone, there is still 
reason to be skeptical of whether or not to express blame to them. There is not necessarily an 
exact correlation between the warrant to judge someone culpable and the warrant to express 
blame publicly in light of that judgement. This distinction is important, and builds on the 
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arguments I have made in the first two chapters about the heightened social and practical risks 
involved in expressing blame, due to its retributive root and the ways in which anger exacerbates 
blame’s retributive tendencies. 
A similar epistemic argument can be made based on this concept of stakes. Even if an 
agent has warrant to privately judge another culpable, she might not have warrant to publicly 
express that blame. Expanding on Rosen’s discussion of warrant, I argue that expressing blame 
publicly is a higher stakes scenario than is a private judgment of blame. Public expressions of 
blame involve all kinds of social factors that private judgments of blame lack. For one, public 
expressions of blame are said out loud. The risk of getting it wrong is patently worse if it is said 
out loud to another agent. Two, public expressions of blame risk being interpreted in a variety of 
(uncharitable) ways by their recipients. When we make private judgments of blame, we are our 
only audience, and so we always interpret our judgment of blame correctly.  
We can categorize the social risks involved in public expressions of blame along (at least) 
three categories. First, there is the ethical risk: one's expressed blame may hurt the wrongdoer, 
lead them to rebel, or lead them to amplify their bad behavior. Second, there is a practical risk: 
one's expressing blame publicly might backfire and make the moral situation worse in various 
ways. Third, there is the obvious and practical epistemic risk: it is worse to be wrong if one has 
said it out loud to another person. Taking these risks together, the compound risk is quite high, 
certainly much higher than the negligible risk involved in keeping one’s judgment of blame to 
oneself. As such, as I will now argue, the warrant we have to make private judgments of blame is 
different from the warrant we have to make public expressions of blame. 
One reason for this is that public expressions of blame may not be interpreted by others 
correctly. This asymmetry in interpretation or reception between private judgments and public 
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expressions of blame effects our warrant to express blame. While I do not have room to go in 
depth into the nuances of these social factors, I will discuss what I have in mind by way of an 
example. In order to make this case, I will also draw upon literature on contextualism by Jason 
Stanley (among others). While Stanley’s account is largely a semantic thesis, I will demonstrate 
that his account is highly relevant to Rosen’s epistemic account. Further, my creative application 
of Stanley’s account in this epistemic framework will highlight the context-sensitive conditions 
we ought to place on Rosen’s account in order to make it seem more plausible.  
First, a primer on Stanley’s contextualism. Stanley explains that “contextualism is the 
semantic thesis that knowledge ascriptions, instances of ‘x knows that p’, are context-sensitive in 
a distinctively epistemological way.”119 Context-sensitive sentences express different propositions 
depending on their different usages. Contextualism claims that our knowledge ascriptions are 
similarly context-sensitive. A general idea of the view is that, “S ‘knows’ that p depends partly 
on something in the context of ‘the attributor’, and hence the view is often called attributor 
contextualism. Because an utterance is context-dependent, so too is whether the knowledge 
attribution is true context-dependent.”120 The crucial contextual feature in any given scenario is 
the attributor’s practical stake in the situation. In the case above, the crucial contextual feature 
would be S’s practical stake in the truth of p. S’s practical stake in the truth value of p effects S’s 
knowledge of p. 
Stanley’s view is not, on the face of it, equipped to deal with, nor be applied to, my view 
about expressed blame. He is interested in what ‘know’ really means and his work carves out 
space to investigate this within the semantic realm. However, I propose a creative application of 
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his semantic account of knowledge as applied to the stakes involved in expressed blame. As I 
will argue, Stanley’s view is relevant to and supportive of my view.  
Consider the following example. Say that Kayla hears second hand—from a mutual 
friend—that her assistant, Arjuna, has been secretly stealing money from her for months. Kayla 
is a very successful business woman. Beyond this second-hand information, Kayla had no 
inkling that Arjuna was stealing from her at all. Kayla fully trusted Arjuna in all areas of their 
working relationship, and has done so for several years. After hearing this information, Kayla 
certainly suspects that Arjuna is stealing from her. But, does she know that Arjuna is stealing 
from her? Kayla has no first-hand evidence. Her knowledge is limited to an external source of 
information. Moreover, the stakes for this case are high. If Kayla accuses Arjuna of stealing from 
her—whether or not it is true that Arjuna really is stealing from her—such an accusation will 
likely alter, if not end, their professional relationship going forward, since trust is such an 
essential aspect of a close working relationship.  
Compare the stakes involved in Kayla’s knowing that Arjuna has been stealing from her 
with the stakes involved in my knowing that Arjuna has been stealing from Kayla. I am merely a 
third-party observer. I do not know either agent well, and have no personal stakes in the 
situation. Given that Kayla is a public figure, the story has been in the news. When I hear about 
the case, I might interpret the facts in such a way as to conclude that Arjuna must have stolen 
from Kayla. In this case, my judgment of blame is private. I am not publicly declaring that 
Arjuna stole from Kayla, I am just thinking it to myself. I have no relevant party to tell about my 
judgment, since I do not know any of the agents involved. The stakes involved in my private, 
third-party judgment of blame are much lower than the stakes involved in Kayla publicly 
expressing blame to Arjuna. This is because no one will be hurt by my private judgment of 
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blame about Arjuna. In fact, no one will even know this is how I feel unless I verbalize it. The 
stakes involved in my private judgment are nearly zero. Differently, public expressions of blame 
have social consequences, and sometimes those consequences are quite high.  
For example, Kayla’s public blame of Arjuna could lead to both emotional and legal 
ramifications for Arjuna, especially since Kayla is in the public eye. There could be real, 
damaging consequences of Kayla’s decision to express blame to Arjuna. Because of this, the 
stakes involved in Kayla’s knowing are much higher than the stakes involved in my knowing. 
Before Kayla publicly accuses Arjuna of stealing from her, she will likely want to gain more 
sources of knowledge about the situation. Her private judgment (based on the second-hand 
information) that Arjuna has stolen from her might well be warranted, but the public expression 
of that judgment might not be warranted, since it could lead to a very negative consequence for 
Arjuna. As this case demonstrates, a public expression of blame has far higher stakes than a 
private judgement of blame, on the assumption that expressing blame publicly is more likely to 
lead to negative social consequences. In the case at hand, the negative social consequence is 
other people blaming Arjuna too, or treating him negatively, perhaps even punishing him for an 
action he may not have done. Therefore, a higher degree of justification in public expressions of 
blame than in private judgments of blame is called for.  
Expanding this example out into a wider argument, the general point this case reveals is 
that the stakes involved in what counts as knowing depend both on who is doing the knowing 
and how that knowing is expressed (publicly or privately). Public expressions of blame are, 
generally speaking, higher stakes scenarios than private judgments of blame. This may seem 
quite obvious, since more people are involved in public expressions of blame than in private 
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conclusions of blame, but this distinction is seemingly absent from discussions of expressed 
blame in the literature, including from Rosen’s view. 
When the high stakes of a case are salient, we are best served not ascribing certainty 
about the case, unless we are fully certain, without a shadow of a doubt, because it is too socially 
risky. We should be nearly certain about our ascriptions of knowledge when the stakes of the 
moral wrongdoing are high. In public expressions of blame, the stakes are automatically higher 
than in private expressions of blame. Therefore, when the stakes are salient, we have to rethink 
the centrality expressed blame plays in our daily moral lives. This should remind readers of the 
fitting versus appropriate distinction I raised in chapters one and two. Because of the high stakes 
of public expressions of blame, I argue that even if blame is fitting for a given moral conflict, it 
might not be appropriate to express.  
In sum, I am arguing: 
Premise: Public blame is a higher stakes scenario than private blame  
Conclusion: Therefore public blame requires greater warrant than private blame. 
 
Rosen is equally worried about judgments of blameworthiness and expressions of blame. 
We can infer that he sees the two types of blaming practices as on a par, and further that he is a 
global skeptic about our warrant to blame (publicly or privately) in general. But Rosen’s stance 
of treating the two on a par stops him from recognizing the different levels of warrant required in 
the two cases. Contra Rosen, I argue that some people really are blameworthy. In these cases, we 
sometimes can and should privately judge them blameworthy. However, this does not entail that 
we should express that blame. I argue that we ought to exert extreme caution over making these 
judgments of blame public. By publicly blaming too readily, we risk ignoring the specific and 
relevant context-dependent elements and stakes involved in cases of blame, which effect 
someone’s warrant to make public expressions of blame.  
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Thus, Stanley’s pragmatic contextualism about epistemic warrant is highly relevant to the 
view I am advancing about the different levels of warrant required respectively for judgements 
and communications of blame, even though on first pass you might not think so. I have offered a 
novel interpretation of his semantic account as it relates to Rosen’s epistemic argument more 
broadly, as well as to my own narrower focus on expressed blame. I argued that the social stakes 
of a case of moral wrongdoing matter a great deal. Generally speaking, cases of public blame 
involve higher stakes than cases of private judgments of blame. There are further important 
distinctions to be made within the general set of cases of public blame. Some cases of public 
blame have higher stakes than other cases of public blame, due to any number of contextually-
sensitive factors and interpersonal dynamics involved. Attention to this extreme context-
sensitivity with regards to expressed blame helps highlight the ways in which most all 
expressions of public blame involve higher stakes, and this insight should inform how readily we 
express blame in our daily moral lives.  
 
II. Harman’s Reply to Rosen 
 
I will now turn to another facet of Rosen’s view, which will further clarify the differences 
between my view and Rosen’s view. Rosen’s view has garnered several objections. Among them 
is Harman’s response in her paper “Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate?”. Harman rejects Rosen’s 
claim that positive judgments of culpability are unwarranted. On this, she and I agree. We can, 
she argues, often make positive judgments of culpability, and we can do so with certainty. 
However, Harman’s account is otherwise a big departure from my own view. As I will explain, 
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Harman’s view is just as radical as Rosen’s view, though their views are radical in different 
ways. 
According to Harman, even if someone’s false moral beliefs stem from ignorance, they 
are still culpable for acting wrongly.121 Harman argues “We are morally obligated to believe the 
moral truths relevant to our actions (and thus not to believe false moral claims relevant to our 
actions), and we are often blameworthy for failing to meet these moral obligations, even if we 
have not been guilty of mismanagement of our beliefs, and even if our ignorance is not 
motivated.”122  
By this, Harman means that we each have a moral duty to believe true moral claims 
relevant to our actions. Failing to meet this moral duty is culpable, even if the failure arises 
without an agent ever having mismanaged her beliefs. Even if an agent’s failure to act in the 
morally correct way stems from ignorance, she can still be culpable if she has failed to believe 
the moral truths relevant to her actions. For Harman, this requirement trumps any excusing 
conditions, such as moral or factual ignorance.  
This is a very strong claim, one that is extreme and implausible. Harman’s view requires 
that we are pretty much always morally responsible for our wrong behaviors, despite any 
relevant mitigating circumstances. On her view, there are very few cases in which exempting 
conditions apply. For Harman, even if we have not mismanaged our beliefs, we are morally 
obligated to believe and act upon correct moral truths, and not doing so is culpable.  
Harman is unrealistic to propose that we can reasonably expect the average moral agent 
to root out her false beliefs at all times. This seems impossibly demanding. In her proposal, 
Harman is essentially expecting each of us to be moral saints for whom constant diligence and a 
                                                        
121 Harman, Elizabeth. (2011) “Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate?” Ratio, vol. 24, p. 464. 
122 Harman, p. 459. 
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scrupulous investigation of our beliefs is the norm. The epistemic demands of such a daily 
practice are too great for an average moral agent, myself included. This is not to say that we 
should place no epistemic demands on the agents in our shared moral community. That would be 
extreme on the opposite end of the spectrum. Instead, our epistemic demands should be 
reasonable such that they can plausibly be enacted by the average moral agents among us in our 
shared community.  
The following example, which Harman discusses in her article, sharpens the significant 
differences between Rosen’s view and Harman’s view.  
Example: A doctor forgets to double check a patient’s chart before giving her a blood 
transfusion. As a result, he accidentally gives her a blood transfusion of the wrong blood type. 
He ordered type A blood for the transfusion but the patient has type B blood. Obviously, this 
mistake has severe repercussions for the patient. Although double-checking patients’ charts is a 
standard medical procedure, the doctor forgets this one time.  
 
On Rosen’s view, the doctor’s ignorance that the patient has type B blood means she is not 
culpable for her wrong transfusion order. She might be blameworthy for her failure to check the 
chart if this was indicative of some prior culpable behavior, like a routine failure to double-check 
a patient’s chart. But if this case of forgetfulness was a one-off instance, she is not 
blameworthy.123  
Differently, Harman argues that the doctor is culpable because she does not have false 
beliefs. The doctor knows better, yet she fails to act in line with her correct knowledge. She does 
not put her true moral beliefs about how to properly prepare for a patient’s blood transfusion into 
practice. She might have the correct moral beliefs about double checking charts as an important 
practice, but she fails to act in accord with this correct belief. Even if this is a one-off instance of 
forgetfulness, on Harman’s view the doctor is still culpable. Of course, in my discussion of this 
                                                        
123 See Harman, p. 447 for further discussion. 
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case, I am only considering moral responsibility, not legal or professional responsibility.  
To emphasize the contrast between her view and Rosen’s view, Harman brings up one of 
Rosen’s own examples. 
Example: Imagine a traditional, 1950’s American father who has a son and a daughter. This 
father intentionally chooses not to save money to send his daughter to college, but does 
intentionally save money to send his son to college. This father does not see a need for his 
daughter to go to college, so he does not put aside any money for her. He is sexist in his 
treatment of his children.124  
 
If we apply Rosen’s line of argumentation to this case, the sexist father is likely non-culpable. 
For one, the father does not believe his actions are wrong. Second, he might not be conscious of 
how his decision to save for college for his son but not his daughter is sexist. If this is the case, 
his ignorance about this decision may be non-culpable. Third, even if the father is aware that his 
decision is sexist, he does not believe the action is morally wrong. He does not appear to have 
mismanaged his beliefs. The father is applying his beliefs correctly to his financial decision 
about saving for his son to go to college, but not saving for his daughter to go to college. His 
actions align correctly with his own beliefs (sexist as they may be).  
So, on Rosen’s view, we can predict that the sexist man is non-culpable because he is 
non-culpable for the beliefs from which his actions stem. Differently, Harman argues that this is 
implausible. The sexist father must be culpable. For her, even if one manages one’s beliefs 
correctly, one can still be blameworthy for one’s morally wrong actions. Recall Harman’s strong 
argument that  
We are morally obligated to believe the moral truths relevant to our actions (and thus not 
to believe false moral claims relevant to our actions), and we are often blameworthy for 
failing to meet these moral obligations, even if we have not been guilty of 
mismanagement of our beliefs, and even if our ignorance is not motivated.125 
 
                                                        
124 Harman, p. 457. 
125 Harman, p. 459. 
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As this passage reveals, underlying Harman’s view is the claim that we are morally obligated to 
both believe and live up to our shared moral norms in our actions in every instance. Whereas 
Rosen’s view gives a pass to anyone who acts wrongly but does so without any culpable 
mismanagement of their beliefs, Harman’s view does not grant a pass to anyone who fails to 
meet our shared moral obligations.  
Still, Harman needs to explain why agents are blameworthy for failing to live up to our 
shared obligations. On the surface, her account is a normative claim about how people should 
act. Harman expands on this point, remarking that  
Beliefs (and failures to believe) are blameworthy if they involve inadequately caring 
about what is morally significant. Believing a certain kind of behavior is wrong on the 
basis of a certain consideration is a way of caring about that consideration.126 
 
As this passage demonstrates, Harman argues that wrongdoers’ beliefs are blameworthy if they 
involve inadequately caring about the morally salient features of a given situation. However, 
Harman under-describes what the morally salient features of a given case of wrongdoing are. For 
one, it is not clear whether all agents involved in the wrongdoing need to agree about what the 
morally salient features of the situation are.  
Returning to Rosen’s ancient slaveholding example, recall that Harman claims that 
enslaving someone is blameworthy in virtue of the fact that the slave owner knowingly enslaves 
someone. Harman argues that the slave owner fails to care about the morally significant feature 
of the case, the moral wrongness of knowingly enslaving someone. This seems impossibly 
demanding of the average ancient moral agent given the prevailing cultural attitudes at the time. 
Recall that Rosen exculpates the slave owner on the grounds that the slave owner did not know 
that what he was doing was wrong, since his actions were in keeping with his peers’ actions at 
                                                        
126 Harman, p. 460. 
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the time. Rosen writes, “In my view it makes no sense to hold this injustice against the 
perpetrator when it would have taken a miracle of moral vision for him to have seen the moral 
case for acting differently.”127 Harman thinks knowingly enslaving someone is blameworthy 
whether or not one believes it is wrong. For her, the only morally salient feature of the case is a 
clear distinction between what is morally permissible (not enslaving others) and what is not 
morally permissible (enslaving others).  On Harman’s view, whether or not someone is ignorant 
about what is morally permissible is irrelevant. 
Accordingly, it seems Harman would simply reject Rosen’s considerations about ancient 
slaveholders not being in the epistemic position to know better. She might say that Rosen’s 
consideration of the prevailing moral attitudes of the time is not a morally salient feature of the 
case. But, this is a normative claim without much support. I argue that both Rosen’s and 
Harman’s views are too extreme. Rosen’s view is too lenient, while Harman’s view is too 
demanding with respect to our epistemic limitations. My proposed view stops short of Harman’s 
excessively strong requirement that we are “morally obligated to believe the moral truths 
relevant to our action”128, regardless of our epistemic limitations. Similarly, my proposed view 
stops short of Rosen’s excessively lenient suggestion that we nearly always lack the warrant to 
judge others blameworthy. A moderate view in between these two extremes best accounts for the 
fact that sometimes wrongdoers really are blameworthy and that we really do have the warrant to 
judge them blameworthy, while at the same time, we need not be so constantly and scrupulously 
judging each other’s moral characters. 
George Sher’s epistemic account will help clarify my moderate view. In his book, Who 
Knew?, Sher rejects a common philosophical argument, the Searchlight View. After my 
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discussion of Sher’s view, I will propose that a moderated version of Rosen’s skeptical view 
allows us to utilize the insights of all three of these philosophers’ arguments into an account that 
remains skeptical about the utility of expressed blame, but nevertheless recognizes that agents do 
sometimes have real warrant to judge others blameworthy. 
 
III. Sher on the Searchlight View 
 
 In his book Who Knew? Sher presents and then rejects what he deems a standard 
philosophical view on blame, the Searchlight View. There is a widely held and unspoken 
assumption in the literature in favor of a view akin to the Searchlight View. The Searchlight 
View proposes that we are only responsible for things that are within our awareness. Think of the 
searchlight a car emits. When it is very dark outside, a driver can only see those things that the 
car’s searchlight reveals to her. Similarly, in our interpersonal moral lives, we can only be 
responsible for things that are on our radars, i.e. on our inner searchlights. Sher himself rejects 
the Searchlight View. In this way, Sher’s diagnostic account supports Harman’s view about the 
arduous requirements of our moral epistemic responsibilities.  
As Sarah K. Paul (2017) notes, the Searchlight View is widely assumed in the 
philosophical literature, “though not often explicitly defended.”129 According to the Searchlight 
View,  
An agent’s responsibility extends only as far as his awareness of what he is doing. He is 
responsible only for those acts he consciously chooses to perform, only for those 
omissions he consciously chooses to allow, and only for those outcomes he consciously 
chooses to bring about.130  
 
                                                        
129 Paul, Sarah K. (2017). “Good intentions and the road to hell”, Philosophical Explorations, pp. 44. 
130 Sher, George (2009). Who Knew? Responsibility without Awareness. New York: Oxford University press, p. 4. 
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This means that one is responsible for a given action only if one is aware of what one is doing. 
An agent’s responsibility tracks their choices. Paul further notes the similarities between the 
Searchlight view and what Thomas Nagel (1979) has labeled the Control Condition on moral 
responsibility: that one should not be morally assessed for what is due to factors beyond one’s 
control.131 
Sher argues that the Searchlight View is a popular but wholly inadequate way of 
assessing responsibility. The Searchlight View suggests that responsibility is limited solely to 
acts (or omissions) that an agent chooses. The view does not dole out responsibility to agents 
who are not aware of what they are doing.  As an alternative, Sher proposes a more complex 
account of responsibility. On his view, even agents who unwittingly act wrongly or foolishly can 
be responsible for a given wrong if 1. They have information that supports the conclusion that 
their acts are wrong or foolish, and 2. They fail to draw that conclusion based on prior 
information, and 3. The failure is caused by the constellation of psychological and/or physical 
features that make them the persons they are.132 On first glance, this view sounds quite similar to 
Harman’s view. Harman claims that one can be culpable even when one does not consciously 
choose an action. Sher similarly argues that one can be culpable even when one does not 
consciously choose a wrong action. 
 In his paper “Out of Control”, Sher makes the seemingly obvious, but important, 
descriptive claim that we often hold agents responsible for their actions “even though 
considerations unrelated to determinism strongly suggest that they cannot help performing 
them.”133 To illustrate the point, Sher provides the following example: 
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Caught off Guard—Wren is on guard duty in a combat zone. There is real danger, but 
the night is quiet. Lulled by the sound of the wind in the leaves, Wren has twice caught 
herself dozing and shaken herself awake. The third time she does not catch herself. She 
falls into a deep slumber, leaving the compound unguarded.134 
 
Sher argues that Wren is definitely culpable and may be liable to punishment, even though when 
she falls asleep “she does not set her duty aside but ceases to be aware of it.”135 It does not seem to 
be a problem of Wren’s will so much as it is a problem that something external (sleepiness) that 
overtakes her will. Sher assesses whether Wren’s sleepiness is something Wren has the capacity 
to control. If she does have the capacity to control it, but fails to control it, then it is a culpable 
case of negligence. Yet, if Wren does not have the capacity to control her sleepiness and it is not 
something she could have reasonably foreseen, then she is non-culpable.   
This case bares strong resemblance to Harman’s case of the doctor and her failure to 
check the chart. In Sher’s case, the issue is about negligence—is Wren’s sleepiness something 
she ought to have predicted and have known well enough to avoid? In Harman’s case, the issue 
is about forgetfulness—is the doctor’s one-off forgetfulness something she ought to have 
predicted and have known well enough to avoid? The standard reading of both cases would be 
that both Wren and the doctor are culpable. Sher draws a general conclusion: 
Agents are at best obligated to prevent the development of habits and traits that are 
markedly worse than normal.136 
 
In the case of Wren, Sher argues that there is no reason to think that Wren is any more 
irresponsible than the average person.  Further, Sher notes that “we draw a blank when we look 
for wrongfully forgone opportunities for self-improvement in which to locate their responsibility 
for their later wrong acts.”137 This is troubling for Sher because it appears to conflict with the 
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Searchlight View’s assumption that a lack of control excuses an agent from responsibility. As I 
indicated, the Searchlight View has long been the established and default philosophical position 
on culpability. But, Sher maintains, there is a real tension between our intuition that Wren is 
culpable and the fact that she lacked control over her sleepiness.  
 Sher concludes, contra the Searchlight View, that agents can be responsible for acts 
whose wrongness they are unaware of. There is nothing Wren fails to realize or know as she is 
dozing off. She simply lacks control to not fall asleep. Still, on Sher’s view, Wren is 
blameworthy even though she was unable to stop herself from dozing off.  This is the same 
conclusion that Harman would reach, based on her conclusions about the doctor. In this way, 
Harman and Sher (in similar but not identical ways) reject the Searchlight View in favor of a 
more stringent approaches to judgments of culpability. For both authors, even if a given act is out 
of one’s conscious control, one can still be culpable. Now that I have presented Rosen, Harman, 
and Sher’s views, I will revisit the doctor case to further argue for a moderated version of 
Rosen’s skepticism.  
 
IV. Revisiting the Doctor Case: A Moderated Skepticism 
 
 
The doctor case involves the doctor’s failure to check a patient’s chart. Without knowing 
all the particulars about the case, I can reasonably imagine that the doctor had to work very hard 
and pass many tests in order to get where she is. She surely spent many years in medical school 
studying and learning to prove her qualifications for her role as a doctor. Forgetfulness is not a 
quality that gets you very far as a doctor.  
On one level, we would not ascribe any false beliefs to the doctor. She is not culpable, as 
Harman describes the case, for having a false belief. She had the correct moral beliefs, but she 
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made a mistake by failing to act on her correct moral beliefs. Intuitively, this seems less serious a 
wrong than having actual false beliefs about proper medical practice. The doctor likely knew 
better (through her years of medical training) than to not double check the chart. She had the 
right beliefs, she just failed to act on them. This is a different kind of error than having entirely 
wrong beliefs. 
While the doctor should hardly be off the hook for giving her patient the wrong type of 
blood transfusion, this mistake is not necessarily culpable. We cannot be sure whether her 
forgetfulness was partially due to any number of external, mitigating factors. Indeed, this is 
precisely Rosen’s view. Rosen and I agree on this aspect. Without knowing more specific details 
about the situation, Rosen’s deep skepticism applies insofar as both private judgements of blame 
and public expressions of blame would be unwarranted. 
This is not to say the doctor is not causally responsible for the mistake of switching up 
the blood types. Clearly, she is the one who mixed them up. Rather, I argue that Rosen’s account 
gives us good reason to be skeptical about our warrant to judge the doctor culpable with any 
degree of certainty. If we lack sufficient warrant to deem the doctor’s forgetfulness culpable, we 
lack sufficient warrant to express blame to her. Harman would likely respond by saying that even 
if the doctor’s forgetfulness was a one-off case of forgetfulness, still, it cannot go unnoticed. 
Whether she was aware of her forgetfulness or not is irrelevant. Moreover, as Sher argues, we 
can be culpable for acts whose wrongness we are unaware. There was a clear failure on the 
doctor’s part, and that failure is culpable. 
  Harman and Sher’s points about the doctor and Wren are instructive. Intuitively, I agree 
with both of them that these agents are culpable, even though their omissions do not necessarily 
arise from a conscious choice. So, they are right to think that a Rosen-type argument is too 
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passive in the face of a real, and life-threatening case of wrongdoing. However, Harman and 
Sher’s line of thought is that there may be some underlying beliefs, desires, or attitudes behind 
these wrong acts that are culpable. On this point, Rosen’s skepticism is instructive. Without more 
information, we cannot know which beliefs, desires, and attitudes were involved behind the 
scenes in the doctor’s negligent actions. As such, we (from an external perspective) do not have 
the warrant to declare, with certainty, that those underlying beliefs, desires, and attitudes can be 
traced to a culpable source. More importantly, because of the higher stakes involved in 
expressions of blame, especially public expressions of blame in places like a large hospital 
setting, we lack sufficient warrant to express blame to the doctor. We must practically asses the 
social risks of what publicly expressing blame to the doctor might look like, and what 
repercussions it could have. 
 There are many social risks in this case; the stakes are fairly high. Say that the doctor’s 
forgetfulness does not result in any harm done to the patient having the blood transfusion. 
Despite this good and lucky outcome, say that the doctor gets publicly blamed in front of the 
patient’s family. The patient’s family learns that the doctor failed to check the chart before the 
blood transfusion, thereby endangering their daughter’s life. The family could get unnecessarily 
worked up, angry, sad, etc. They might sue the doctor (or the hospital) for negligence. They 
might refuse to pay the bill for their daughter’s treatment. They may tell their friends what a 
terrible hospital it is and suggest that others boycott the hospital. These outcomes are 
unnecessary and risky. Even if there is good reason to judge the doctor blameworthy, publicly 
expressing might result in unnecessary emotional harm for the patient’s family. This, again, 
highlights the distinction in stakes between judgements of blame and public expressions of 
blame. 
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That being said, we ought not remain silent when wrongdoing occurs. This is where an 
extreme, Rosen-type view is insufficient. My moderated version of his skepticism attends to 
context-sensitive factors. For example, based on the context and persons involved, it might make 
sense to publicly blame the doctor. It might make sense for the doctor to lose her job or to have 
to retrain in certain aspects of her job. Given the dynamics of the situation and agents involved, 
expressing blame might be both fitting and appropriate. But, before expressing blame, we must 
question the default assumption that having warrant to make judgments of blame automatically 
grants one warrant to publicly express blame. Harman and Sher’s more rigid views add 
instructive depth and context-sensitive reasons for why expressed blame might be more 
appropriate in some contexts than others. 
 
V. Confucian Support for Epistemic Skepticism 
 
 To deepen my discussion of epistemic skepticism, I will now turn to an entirely different 
framework, Confucianism. The Confucian text, the Analects, raises very similar concerns about 
judgments of culpability as the concerns expressed above. First, let me provide some background 
on this text. The Analects is a collection of conversations between Confucius, his students, and 
colleagues, collected between the fifth to third centuries BCE. It discusses what it means to lead 
a positive life and what it means to be a leader. One central concern in Confucianism, throughout 
its various developments and permutations, is the notion of self-cultivation and becoming an 
excellent ethical being.138 For example, one topic discussed in the Analects is how reluctant we 
should be to make negative judgments of others.  
                                                        
138 See Ivanhoe (2000) for a great introduction to the central themes of the Analects.  
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One question raised in the Analects in relation to this topic is: Under what circumstances 
should we give others the benefit of the doubt? Confucian scholar Hagop Sarkissian explains that 
the text addresses these topics from a very particular perspective—one of a highly interconnected 
social world. In his article “When you think it’s bad it’s worse than you think”, Sarkissian 
explains that according to the Confucian perspective,  
How any single person acts in any social occasion hinges greatly on the behavior of the 
other individuals at hand. Hence, whenever one wishes to explain or understand another’s 
behavior—that is, whenever one were to judge it in some way—one would look beyond a 
person’s motivations, goals, or traits of character.139 
 
Confucians believe that we can only understand human behavior by thinking about that human 
behavior in our larger, interdependent social framework. Sarkissian further remarks that 
Confucius viewed “behavior as highly interconnected, prompted and shaped by one’s social and 
environmental contexts…it would seldom be appropriate to discount or overlook such factors in 
accounting for the person’s behavior, as they might carry great explanatory weight.”140 
Given the social nature of the Confucian framework, it is no surprise that the Confucian 
recommendation in cases of moral wrongdoing is to first consider any relevant social or 
environmental factors that may have factored into the wrongdoing. These external social factors 
might include: the nature of the wrongdoer and wronged agent’s relationship, any sort of 
communication or moral norms the agents have already established between them, or any prior 
history of conflict between them.  Perhaps the wrongdoer is having an off day. Perhaps she was 
up all-night caring for her sick child. Perhaps she is in a new environment and does not know all 
of the local moral norms in her new culture.  
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There are any number of personal, attitudinal, environmental, and situational factors at 
play in each of our behaviors and moral decisions. The Confucians were highly aware of and 
sympathetic to these external factors in judgments of culpability. Sarkissian adds,  
There is a distinct pattern in these passages that concerns how the moral exemplar is 
supposed to react when dealing with recalcitrant, disagreeable, or otherwise bad 
individuals—that is, when one has reason and opportunity to make negative judgments of 
others. The pattern is one of caution and restraint.141  
 
This Confucian caution and restraint strategy reinforces my argument that expressed blame is 
socially risky and best avoided. Indeed, the caution and restraint strategy highlights the social 
risks involved in expressing an incorrect judgment of blame. As Sarkissian further explains,  
It is not uncommon to misinterpret others’ signals or to fail to convey our own intentions 
clearly. Wires get crossed, identities are mistaken, and unwarranted assumptions are made. 
Sadly, such miscues are often taken to be highly diagnostic of character and purpose, 
weighted accordingly, and thus reciprocated by real-life ‘defection’—our tendency to have 
negative impressions harden into obstinate beliefs.142  
 
Because the chance of misfire is so high in our judgments of others, the suggestion we can 
extract from the Analects is that fostering the habit of giving others the benefit of the doubt is, on 
the whole, preferable to rushing to express blame without certainty.  
Steering away from a default stance of expressing blame immediately can allow “fruitful, 
constructive, and productive relationships to unfold”143 between the wronged agent and 
wrongdoer, because suspending judgment of others does not risk getting judgments of culpability 
wrong. The thought is that due to the inherent risk of misjudgment, we should maintain a default 
position of epistemic skepticism with regards to culpability, recognizing that we could always be 
mistaken about someone’s culpability. This initial epistemic skepticism preserves the 
relationship between the wronged agent and wrongdoer, and allows for these agents to 
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communicate about the wrongdoing together, without a potentially wrong judgment of blame 
looming over their discussion. To be clear, this is not a strategy of doing nothing. The Confucian 
account suggests pausing before taking action, but not it does not endorse taking no action at all.  
The Confucian account offers another compelling epistemic case for exhibiting caution in 
expressing blame. Even if we are able to make a positive judgment of culpability with a high 
degree of certainty, we still need to attend to the social risks of expressing blame. Up until this 
point, the Confucian account has paralleled my own view that we ought to avoid expressing 
blame, in order to avoid getting it wrong. However, Sarkissian explains that writers in the 
Analects allow for expressions of blame, as long as the case of moral wrongdoing has been put 
under deep reflective scrutiny. Though passages in the Analects suggest pausing and reflecting as 
an initial strategy, expressing blame later on in the interaction is appropriate if it is ultimately 
deemed warranted.  
The Confucian account correctly asserts that there are cases of moral wrongdoing in which 
we can clearly identify who the wrongdoer is, and thus sometimes we can be confident, if not 
certain, in our expressions of blame. The Confucian account acknowledges that sometimes 
blamers are in a very good epistemic position to judge an agent culpable, and in these cases 
blamers, should feel free to express blame to that agent. In chapter four, I will discuss the 
Confucian strategy in greater detail as part of a proposal for an alternative strategy of moral 
response instead of expressed blame. For now, my goal in presenting Sarkissian’s interpretation 
of the Confucian framework has been to lend support to my argument that there are several 
epistemic reasons (from varied philosophical sources) to support the view that we ought to exert 





In this chapter, I have argued for several epistemic reasons for thinking expressed blame 
is a socially risky response to moral wrongdoing. I argued for what I called a moderated 
epistemic skepticism regarding both the culpability status of apparent wrongdoers as well as the 
question of whether expressing blame is warranted in any given situation. I argued that Rosen’s 
account exaggerates the scope of epistemic skepticism regarding culpability, on the grounds that 
there surely are some cases in which we can be highly certain of one’s culpability. Rosen is 
mistaken to think that we are never warranted to blame others. Sometimes, we really do know 
that a judgment of culpability would be warranted and whether it would be warranted to express 
that judgment through blame.  
Further, I discussed Stanley’s epistemic contextualism to argue that the stakes of a given 
case of wrongdoing can change our warrant for judgment in that particular context. I argued that 
expressions of blame involve higher stakes than private judgments of blame do. Those higher 
stakes involved in public blame include social risks such as over-exaggeration and escalation, 
retributive or hostile emotions, unfair or false accusation, and so on. The warrant we have to 
express public blame is determined by the specific context, stakes, and agents involved in a 
given case of wrongdoing. Even if we have the proper warrant to make a given private judgment 
of blame, that warrant does not automatically extend to the public realm. We might not have the 
warrant to express that judgment of blame because of the higher stakes involved in public 
expressions of blame.  
Before I move on to chapter four’s discussion of alternative responses to moral wrongdoing, 
I will first summarize the main arguments in these first three chapters. There are (at least) three 
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reasons to proceed with extreme caution before publicly expressing blame. First, I argued that 
blame is retributive at root, and even civilized versions of blame are not so many steps evolved 
from this primitive root. Second, I drew upon Nussbaum’s account to argue that following our 
retributive impulses is irrational, because our retributive impulses are either premised on magical 
thinking, or on an excessive focus on one’s status-rank, neither of which are helpful responses to 
wrongdoing. Relatedly, I presented a further worry about expressed blame when it is coupled 
with Senecan anger, an exacerbating feature of blame’s retributive root. Third, assuming that 
blame ought only to be expressed to those who are actually blameworthy, and assuming that we 
often lack sufficient warrant to make judgments of culpability, expressing blame is a high-risk 
strategy. I have therefore proposed that we ought to make a much greater epistemic effort before 
expressing blame publicly. 
Returning to the distinction between fittingness and appropriateness I raised in chapters one 
and two, I maintain that while deeming someone blameworthy may be fitting, it is often not 
appropriate to express that blame given the high social stakes of public expressions of blame. 
Similarly, I proposed that an initial Confucian stance of pausing and reflecting, rather than a 
default mode of blame, is best. If, after the blamer has paused and reflected on the nature of the 
wrongdoing and has decided blame is still appropriate, she has another hurdle to pass: the social 
risks of expressing blame. She can get a sense of these risks based on what she knows about the 
wrongdoer and the dynamics of their relationship.  
My modified epistemic skepticism requires that all would-be blamers need to pass both the 
epistemic and social risk hurdles before making the decision to express blame. These hurdles are 
significant. We ought to adopt a differential approach between private judgments of blame and 
public expressions of blame, since they carry different levels of risk. The epistemic risk of 
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getting our private judgments of blame wrong, in addition to the heightened social risks of 





























In this final chapter, I will present concrete and detailed ways to hold others responsible 
without expressed blame. I will also advocate for the importance of context-sensitivity in 
response to moral wrongdoing. It would be silly to think that there is only one way to respond to 
moral wrongdoing. Expressing blame is one option we have in our moral toolbox, among several 
others. Context determines which of the various modes of moral response best fits a given case 
of wrongdoing.  
There are several reasons for this. For one, we each know the details of our own 
interpersonal lives as well as the nuances of our close relationships better than anyone else does. 
Some people are very defensive when they are blamed, others receive moral feedback well. 
Some agents we know very well, and thus deeply understand (and perhaps also sympathize with) 
the reasons behind their moral transgressions. Because of this close relationship, perhaps we are 
more willing to excuse or overlook their wrong behavior.  Other agents we know less well, and 
in these cases we are perhaps are less willing to grant them the benefit of the doubt. These 
interpersonal nuances all impact whether expressing blame makes good sense or not in a given 
situation.  
Second, the complexities of our interpersonal relationships are constantly changing; they 
are not static. As each of us grows and gains more moral knowledge over time, this affects the 
dynamics of each of our interpersonal relationships, as well as what sort of response to moral 
conflict best serves the current interpersonal dynamic of the relationship. Imposing artificial 
structures on our interpersonal relationships will not capture the variety and depth contained 
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within our interpersonal relationships as well as the varying degrees of psychological and 
emotional sensitivity among us. A one size fits all approach to wrongdoing will not sufficiently 
meet our diverse and evolving interpersonal moral needs.  
With this context-sensitivity in mind, this chapter serves as a toolkit of non-retributive 
moral responses to wrongdoing. It remains an open question which of them is the best response 
to wrongdoing in a given situation. Expressed blame remains an option for responding to moral 
wrongdoing, but I argue that we also have several other options at our disposal that might be 
more efficacious. 
There is a pervasive line of thought in the literature144 that a wrongdoer cannot fully grasp 
the nature of her wrongdoing unless she feels appropriate remorse or guilt for her actions. 
Relatedly, many argue that remorse and guilt further serve vital motivating functions for 
wrongdoers. Vargas explains  
Guilt and the process of repentance have restorative functions: they provide us with the 
impetus to undertake courses of action that repair or restore that status. In their absence, 
genuine acknowledgment of wrongdoing is difficult.145 
 
However, contra this standard view regarding guilt and remorse, Blustein argues that “It is 
simply not always the case that when someone acts wrongly, the most powerful or effective way 
to show him what it does to another person (including oneself), to elicit remorse, and to defend 
the moral order he violated is to punish or threaten to punish him for it.”146 One of my overarching 
goals in this chapter is to demonstrate that Blustein’s assertion is correct. I will extend Blustein’s 
statement and argue that wrongdoers can grasp the nature of their wrongdoing without being 
made to feel guilty or remorseful by the blamer, and that doing so is preferable.  
                                                        
144 For example, see works by Vargas; Fricker; Bennett; and Duff. 
145 Vargas, p. 263. 
146 Blustein, Jeffrey (2018). “Forgiveness and the Moral Psychology of Sadness”. Unpublished manuscript, p. 20. 
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Indeed, I do not think receiving blame (and subsequently feelings of guilt or remorse) is a 
necessary aspect of wrongdoers gaining the required motivation to make positive moral changes 
in their lives. We can hold wrongdoers responsible (construed as answerability, which I explain 
below), and they can have the proper motivation to change their bad behaviors, without directly 
blaming them and inciting remorse or guilt in them. This is not to say that the wrongdoer should 
feel no remorse or guilt about what they did. Negative feelings from the wrongdoer, blamer, or 
both seem an inevitable part of responding to wrongdoing, with or without blame. To suggest we 
can do away with negative feelings altogether in cases of wrongdoing seems unrealistic and 
unhealthy.  
Instead, I argue that although finding fault (in the normative sense) in others is, to some 
degree, an inevitable part of living in a shared moral community, expressed blame and the 
subsequent cycle of inducing guilt and remorse in wrongdoers is not also an inevitable part of 
living in a shared moral community. Because there are alternatives to expressed blame, and 
because expressed blame comes with a host of negative, affective elements, it seems prudent to 
shift our moral responses away from expressing blame and towards these alternatives.  
It is important to not only understand these alternatives to blame in theory, but also make 
sense of their practical applicability. Alternatives to blame, understood as legitimate responses to 
moral wrongdoing, have not been given enough credit in the moral philosophical literature; this 
chapter aims to fill that gap. 
The alternatives I present in this chapter are each consistent with (but do not require) 
finding fault in a wrongdoer’s behavior. There is a way for us to find someone blameworthy but 
not express blame to them. Our moral lives and interpersonal relationships are, and should be, 
dynamic and ongoing conversations. They are not static. We are each constantly growing and 
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expanding our moral knowledge and understanding, and this is reflected in our interpersonal 
relationships. In responding to moral wrongdoing, we will not get it right every time, and should 
not expect ourselves or others to. That is impossibly demanding. Instead, I aim to steer us away 
from our habitual mode of blaming as the default response to wrongdoing. 
The three strategies I will discuss in detail in this chapter are: 
1. Responsibility Without “Affective” Blame 
2. Emotional Conversion 
3. Confucian Answerability 
 
The first strategy takes inspiration from Hanna Pickard and Nicola Lacey’s work, in which they 
use the term “affective” blame. As I will explain in greater detail, I take the term “affective” 
blame to mean roughly the same as the term expressed blame that I have been using throughout 
this dissertation to refer to affective, publicly communicated forms of blame. Further, as I will 
demonstrate, these first two strategies can work well alongside the third strategy, which is 
Confucian Answerability. In fact, Confucian Answerability serves as a unifying framework to 
understand each of these modes of alternative moral response. 
 
II. Responsibility as Answerability 
 
 
Before I discuss the various alternative responses, I ought to clarify how I am 
understanding the idea of holding others responsible. Since I argue that we can hold others 
responsible without expressed blame, it behooves me to get clear on what, exactly, I take holding 
others responsible to mean. There is widespread discussion in the philosophical literature of what 
it means to hold others morally responsible.147 For example, in “Two Faces of Responsibility”, 
                                                        
147 See Smith (2012); Smith (2005); Shoemaker (2011) 
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Gary Watson introduced a distinction between responsibility as attributability and responsibility 
as accountability.148 Then, in “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider 
Theory of Moral Responsibility” David Shoemaker expands on Watson’s argument and makes 
the case that there are three distinct conceptions of moral responsibility: attributability, 
answerability, and accountability. Finally, Angela Smith (2012) argues that answerability is the 
core of what is at stake in our practices of holding others responsible, and in what follows I will 
adopt her view. 
Accountability typically refers to an agent being an appropriate object of the Strawsonian 
reactive attitudes.149 Shoemaker argues that to hold someone to account is “precisely to sanction 
that person, whether it be via the expression of a reactive attitude, public shaming, or something 
more psychologically or physically damaging.”150 Accountability, defined as Shoemaker 
describes, involves expressing blame publicly through various sanctioning practices and the 
reactive attitudes.151 Without public sanctioning, according to this view, a wrongdoer is not fully 
held to account for their actions. This is in line with Strawson’s view that our moral 
responsibility practices are inherently social. It is through publicly expressing the reactive 
attitudes “that we communicate to fellow members of the moral community our interpersonal 
expectation for a reasonable degree of goodwill.”152 Thus, according to the strategy of 
accountability, publicly expressed blame (through the reactive attitudes) is required for holding 
wrongdoers responsible. As should already be clear, I disagree with this account, since I do not 
                                                        
148 Watson, Gary (1996). “Two Faces of Responsibility”. in Agency and Answerability. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 260-86. 
149 See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/ for a more detailed account. 
150 Shoemaker, David (2011). “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral 
Responsibility,” Ethics: 121, p. 623. 
151 For further support of this view, see Bennett (1980) and Wallace (1994). 
152 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility. 
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think we need to publicly sanction wrongdoers via the reactive attitudes in order to hold them 
responsible. 
Answerability, on the other hand, refers to the way a given agent held to account as an 
appropriate object of justificatory challenge. Angela Smith argues that to hold someone 
responsible “is to say that that agent is open, in principle, to demands for justification regarding 
that thing.”153 For her, the practice of holding someone responsible just is to hold them answerable 
for their actions. The blamer must demand reasons from the wrongdoer, and in response, the 
wrongdoer must provide those reasons for her actions. Smith further states that to blame an agent 
“always embodies (at least implicitly) a demand to her to justify herself.”154 Relatedly, Shoemaker 
describes answerability as being “susceptible for assessment of, and response to, the reasons one 
take to justify one’s actions. The sorts of answers one gives will reveal one’s ends, the things one 
takes to be important.”155   
Answerability requires that we hold others responsible by tasking them with justifying 
their actions. This justification can happen via public blame that demands response from the 
wrongdoer, or via a process of moral inquisition that need not be based in public blaming at all. 
Recall McGeer’s argument from chapter one for the dialogical exchange between wrongdoer and 
blamer. This sort of back and forth dialogue lends itself well to the conditions of answerability. 
In the inquisitive dialogue session, the blamer demands justification from the wrongdoer, and the 
wrongdoer is given a chance to explain herself—to state her reasons for action—and potentially 
exonerate herself. However, it remains to be seen whether that inquisitive dialogue can 
effectively function without an underlying foundation of blame. In the next section, I will 
                                                        
153 Smith, Angela (2012). “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: In Defense of a Unified Account”. 
Ethics, Vol: 122 (3), p. 578. 
154 Smith, p. 578. 
155 Shoemaker, p. 623. 
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analyze whether inquisitive dialogue can serve the goals of answerability without expressed 
blame. 
Finally, attributability refers to cases in which a given action is attributable to a given 
agent. Attributability does not require sanctioning or justification. Instead, attributability 
accounts offer a “ledger” view of moral responsibility, according to which “the practice of 
ascribing responsibility involves assigning a credit or debit to a metaphorical ledger associated 
with each agent.”156 In other words, an agent is responsible if a fault or credit is properly 
attributable to her; she did it, so the attributability is on her. 
Shoemaker argues that “certain morally significant things may be properly ‘attributable’ 
to an agent, and therefore open her to certain distinctive forms of moral appraisal, without that 
agent being ‘answerable’ for those things.”157  Intuitively, it makes sense that we can only blame a 
case of moral wrongdoing on a given agent if that wrongdoing is properly attributable to her. 
However, that a given wrong is attributable to a given agent is not sufficient to conclude that the 
given agent is responsible for the given wrong. For example, say that I was late to a business 
meeting due to an unforeseeable delay on the train. Though my tardiness is appropriately 
attributed to me, this is not sufficient reason to hold me responsible for my tardiness. I planned 
as best as I could to be on time, and circumstances beyond my control—unforeseeable transit 
delays—prevented my being on time.  
At the same time, it seems that attributability is a baseline condition for accountability. 
Working backwards, it is logical that a given wrong action must be attributable to a given person 
in order to make her accountable and/or answerable for that wrong action. For example, a 
                                                        
156 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/. See also Watson (1987) and Frischer & Ravizza (1998) for 
further discussion. 
157 Smith, p. 578. 
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standard account of responsibility concludes that “it would seem unfair to hold someone 
accountable for an action via reactive attitudes such as resentment or indignation, if the action 
was not properly attributable to the agent--say, because she succumbed to a genuinely coercive 
psychological compulsion.”158 Just because a given wrong action is attributable to a given agent 
does not imply or require that the agent is accountable or answerable for that action.  
Shoemaker, then, argues that the concepts of accountability, answerability, and 
attributability come apart, both analytically and also extensionally. However, Smith responds to 
Shoemaker’s article in “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: In Defense of a 
Unified Account”, by arguing that there are not, in fact, three separate notions of responsibility. 
Instead, Smith argues that answerability is “the only kind of moral responsibility there is”.159 
Despite the clear differences in meaning among these three terms, Smith argues that our moral 
practices “do not embody three distinct conceptions of moral responsibility…our moral 
responses hang together in a theoretically unified and satisfying way around the notion of 
answerability.”160 For Smith, answerability is a sufficiently unifying way to hold others 
responsible. 
It is clear that attributability is not a unifying conception of moral responsibility, since its 
requirements are fairly thin. So, in order to investigate Smith’s claim that answerability is a 
unifying conception of moral responsibility, I will examine the distinctions between 
answerability and accountability to assess whether the latter can be collapsed into the former. 
Shoemaker defends the distinction between answerability and accountability on the grounds that 
accountability involves “nonsanctioning modifications to one’s actions and attitudes toward the 
                                                        
158 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/. 
159 Smith, Angela, p. 576. 
160 Smith, p. 589. 
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agent, while accountability licenses more explicit forms of sanctioning activity.”161 Smith agrees 
that we respond to moral wrongdoing with varying degrees of sanctioning activities, but does not 
think this fact means that accountability and answerability are two distinct forms of holding them 
responsible. Instead, both forms are unified under the umbrella of answerability, which can 
encompass both sanctioning and non-sanctioning modes of justificatory challenge. 
 I agree with Smith that answerability is the core of what is at stake in our moral practices 
of holding others responsible. Her view is entirely consistent with my argument that there are 
both blaming and non-blaming ways to hold others morally responsible. Some ways of 
responding to wrongdoing involve obvious sanctioning activities, while others do not. Put 
another way, some responses to wrongdoing involve accountability in the sanctioning sense, 
while some lack this sense of accountability. But, whether a response is sanctioning or not, when 
we hold someone responsible for a moral wrong, at a bare minimum we do hold them to a certain 
level of justificatory challenge. 
Thus, Smith is right to think that our moral responses hang together in a reasonably 
unified way through the notion of answerability. At the very least, the notion of answerability 
provides a major foundational aspect of what it means to hold others responsible, because it 
demands that the wrongdoer explain herself in the fully normative sense of offering reasons. 
Even if there is no sanctioning activity involved in the response, holding others responsible still 
requires this normative sense of offering reasons. Accordingly, I will apply Smith’s argument 
about answerability to the issue of how we can hold each other morally responsible without 
expressed blame.  
                                                        
161 Smith, p. 586-87. 
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In what follows, I will discuss several alternatives to blame that meet Smith’s 
answerability requirements without requiring expressed blame. I will argue that the process of 
moral inquisition through justification need not involve expressed blame. The mode of 
answerability can be consistent with expressed blame, but it does not require that expressed 
blame remain in the picture. In the three alternatives I present, I will demonstrate how each fits 
the requirements of answerability. 
 
III. Responsibility Without (Affective) Blame 
 
 
The first blame alternative draws on the account Lacey and Pickard present in their article 
“From the Consulting Room to the Court Room? Taking the Clinical Model of Responsibility 
Without Blame into the Legal Realm”. Building on Pickard’s extensive experience in clinical 
psychology and Lacey’s extensive experience in the legal field, the authors argue that we are 
better off addressing wrongdoers without affective blame. It should be noted that while Lacey 
and Pickard’s model does not map onto the answerability framework perfectly, still the two 
models have a great deal in common. Further, the answerability framework is consistent with 
their focus on therapeutic and rehabilitative benefits to wrongdoers. In both of our accounts, the 
wrongdoer is actively involved in her own treatment and rehabilitation. I will first provide a 
critical summary of Lacey and Pickard’s account, before assessing the feasibility and utility of 
their account as a non-blaming strategy. 
They describe affective blame as:  
The range of hostile, negative attitudes and emotions that are typical human responses to 
blameworthiness. Blame can include, for instance, hatred, anger, resentment, indignation, 
disgust, disapproval, contempt and scorn, and can be manifest in any number of ways, 
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including seeking retaliation, retribution, and vengeance, rejection and banishment from 
the community, and the withdrawal of basic respect.162 
 
As we can see from the list above, Pickard and Lacey pick out retaliation, retribution, and 
vengeance as fundamental aspects of blame. They note that while we tend to feel that these 
negative blaming attitudes and emotions are justified and appropriate ways to feel towards 
wrongdoers, these attitudes and emotions can be excessive, even irrational.163 As I argued in 
chapters one and two, expressed blame very often involves retributive elements as well as the 
negative blaming emotions. In this way, Lacey and Pickard’s term affective blame closely 
parallels what I have referred to as expressed blame throughout this dissertation, because we 
both identify retributive and hostile emotions as central to our blaming practices. Lacey and 
Pickard’s overall strategy is to steer our habits of moral response to wrongdoing away from our 
traditional hostile and retributive methods and instead towards rehabilitative models. Their 
discussion remains focused on what rehabilitation for wrongdoers would look like in the legal 
realm. In this section, I will translate their focus in the legal realm into the non-legal realm of 
moral wrongdoing and posit what rehabilitation would look like in interpersonal moral contexts. 
In “Responsibility without Blame for Addiction” (2016), Pickard cautions against the 
damaging effects of affective blame, remarking that  
Blame is understood within clinical practice to undermine the capacity of responsibility 
and accountability to enable change and empower, because of its propensity to make 
patients feel rejected, worthless, ashamed and uncared for, thereby rupturing the 
therapeutic relationship as well as damaging any sense of hope for the future they might 
otherwise have, and, correspondingly, any motivation or belief that they really can 
overcome their difficulties.164  
 
                                                        
162 Lacey, Nicola and Hanna Pickard (2012). “From the Consulting Room to the Court Room? Taking the Clinical 
Model of Responsibility Without Blame into the Legal Realm.” Oxford J Legal Studies vol. 33:1, p. 3. 
163 Lacey and Pickard, p. 19. 
164 Pickard, Hanna (2016). “Responsibility without Blame for Addiction”. Neuroethics (Special Issue on Marc Lewis’ 
The Biology of Desire: Why Addiction is not a Disease), p. 7. 
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Therapeutic patients who feel shame about what they did often feel less hopeful about the future. 
Pickard argues that this hopelessness largely prevents patients from gaining the motivation they 
need to want to make positive moral changes in their behaviors and actions. Without this 
motivation, these agents fail to change their bad behaviors, creating a loop of hopelessness in 
their minds. Simply put, it does not work. 
Even though this empirical finding stems from a specific setting (a clinical therapeutic 
context) I will discuss Lacey and Pickard’s work in the context of interpersonal wrongdoing 
more generally. I predict that affective blame has all the same flaws in daily interpersonal cases 
of wrongdoing as it does in clinical therapeutic settings. The two contexts are not dissimilar. 
Lacey and Pickard also recognize their account’s wider applicability, explaining  
Nobody likes to be blamed. We all have some grip on what it is like to feel the object of 
another’s hostile, negative attitudes and emotions, and why this might be detrimental to 
one’s sense of self-worth, one’s relationships with others, and one’s hopes for the future 
and motivation to change aspects of oneself that are difficult to face.165  
 
  Instead of receiving affective blame, Lacey and Pickard suggest that wrongdoers need to 
be encouraged to recognize their capacity for change, and to be praised for their progress. 
Responsibility in this context is not concerned with a negative moral evaluation, but instead with 
the wrongdoer’s motivation and capacity to change.166 This is a forward-looking, hopeful 
approach. Yet, this is not to suggest that wrongdoers are not held to account for their actions. 
Part of the work of the therapist (in the clinical therapeutic model) “involves pointing out or 
indeed imposing consequences should they fail.”167 On Lacey and Pickard’s model, wrongdoers 
are still held responsible without expressed blame. If patients fail to learn from their 
transgressions, the therapist’s job is to point this out and create appropriate consequences for 
                                                        
165 Lacey and Pickard, p. 14. 
166 Lacey and Pickard, p. 16. 
167 Lacey and Pickard, p. 13. 
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their patients. Similarly, outside of therapeutic contexts, we can hold others responsible (by 
pointing out consequences to wrongdoers) without expressing hostile or retributive forms of 
blame. In this way, Lacey and Pickard advocate for responsibility without affective blame, and 
their view can reasonably extend to non-therapeutic contexts, too. 
 As Lacey and Pickard’s strategy demonstrates, we can hold others responsible (construed 
as answerable for their actions) without affective blame. Holding others responsible can be 
rehabilitative and need not involve the charges of retribution, anger, indignation, resentment, etc. 
For example, when my student failed to turn in his final paper, he failed my class. This is an 
obvious punishment for an obvious failure to meet established expectations. I did not get angry 
or blame him for his choice, he simply suffered a negative consequence for his choice not to 
write the final paper. Similarly, in our moral lives, there can be consequences for our actions that 
do not involve such affectively-heated elements, as is the case most strongly in angry blame. 
Lacey and Pickard’s clinical therapeutic model replaces affective blame with what they 
call detached blame, which provides an attitude of “concern, respect and compassion for the 
person, while nonetheless questioning, challenging and reproving their conduct.”168 Detached 
blame involves holding others responsible without the hostile, incipiently retributive elements of 
blame. Their detached blame model demonstrates that the attitudes of concern, respect, and 
compassion, rather than the typical, hostile and angry blaming emotions can effectively hold 
wrongdoers responsible. With the detached blame therapeutic model, the communication 
towards the wrongdoer involves concern and compassion, alongside basic respect and decency, 
even in the face of blameworthiness.169 Rather than respond to wrongdoers with anger, 
indignation, and resentment, Lacey and Pickard argue that we ought to respond to wrongdoers 
                                                        
168 Lacey and Pickard, p. 19. 
169 Lacey and Pickard, p. 19. 
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with care and compassion. The difference in emotional tone between the two approaches (hostile 
versus compassionate) is striking and runs completely counter to our traditional way of dealing 
with moral conflict.  
Some readers might worry that Lacey and Pickard’s approach, while appealing in theory, will 
not provide a practical or realistic way to hold wrongdoers to proper account, especially in a 
legal context, for their actions. However, Lacey and Pickard are not opposed to punishing 
wrongdoers (even in a legal sense) for crimes they have committed. Lacey and Pickard are not 
opposed to punishing wrongdoers in appropriate and proportionate ways given the severity of 
their wrongdoing. But, any punitive consequences ought to be imposed for “psychiatric 
improvement, not out of retaliatory vengeance.”170 Cast in this light, holding wrongdoers 
responsible consists of a rehabilitative, not retaliatory aim.  
Lacey and Pickard’s account extends well beyond the narrow confines of their clinical 
therapeutic context. Indeed, the overall goal of Lacey and Pickard’s model, applied to everyday 
cases of moral wrongdoing, is to integrate the rehabilitative ideal and justice model in order to 
“move us away from backward-looking retaliation and wrath, and towards a more human and 
forward-looking attitude towards offenders.”171 Lacey and Pickard’s account makes good sense as 
a theory of punishment in the legal realm, the context they are focused on. If a wrongdoer is 
sentenced to prison, then it should be a prison sentence that involves work experience, clinical 
therapeutic forms of rehabilitation, positive reward schemes for good behavior, educational 
opportunities, etc.  
Further, Lacey and Pickard’s model is unlike traditional forms of expressed blame in two 
senses. For one, it removes the negative affective element. For another, its aim is explicitly 
                                                        
170 Lacey and Pickard, p. 19. 
171 Lacey and Pickard, p. 28. 
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rehabilitative, not retaliatory. Both of these aims strongly support my own view which is that 
affective and retributive forms of blame are unnecessarily hostile and socially damaging, and that 
we can hold wrongdoers to account without these elements. Agreeing with Lacey and Pickard, 
Blustein writes  
The suffering or distress of the offender may not be necessary to accomplish (blame’s goals). 
Perhaps offenders can be brought to fully acknowledge the moral significance of what they 
have done and to atone for it without needing to use distress as the medium through which to 
bring this about, by instead showing them love and compassion or by exposing them to 
positive role models.172 
 
Blustein helpfully adds that not all wrongdoers need to receive affective blame in order 
acknowledge the significance of their actions and be motivated to change. This further supports 
my argument that in cases of interpersonal moral wrongdoing context matters a great deal. There 
is a great degree of variation among agents’ temperaments, psychological states, and values. 
Some wrongdoers are more emotionally sensitive than others, so much so that they are able to 
self-correct their moral transgressions.173 These agents likely do not need to be publicly blamed in 
order to have the motivation to make positive moral changes to their behaviors. Other agents 
need more prodding. 
 
A. Answerability Without (Affective) Blame 
Lacey and Pickard’s argument about rehabilitation in the legal realm is highly applicable to 
the interpersonal realm, too. Providing rehabilitation for wrongdoers in interpersonal settings is 
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 132 
consistent with holding them answerable to their wrongs. Further, this can happen without 
affective (used interchangeably with “expressed” here) blame. Say that my partner and I have 
gotten into the same argument about him failing to complete his household chores dozens of 
times. We repeatedly engage in this same conflict and each time, no new information is 
expressed from either of us. It happens again. I recognize that my blame—expressed in the 
exasperated tone of anger and resentment—is not motivating him to change his behavior and 
actually complete his chores. My expressions of blame have repeatedly failed to motivate him to 
do the dishes. I have a choice in front of me. I need to either give up my hope that he changes his 
behavior, or choose another strategy of response to get him to understand and be motivated to 
change. If I continue to express blame about this same issue, it will likely lead to heightened 
resentment, anger, or defensiveness, from one or both of us.  
Instead, say that I adopt Lacey and Pickard’s strategy—an approach grounded in 
curiosity and compassion, without affective blame. Perhaps this involves me asking him 
questions about his choice not to take out the trash, do his dishes, etc. I get curious. I aim to get 
more information from him and to deeply listen to his point of view about our conflict. In getting 
more information from him, I prompt him to justify his actions. In doing so, I try to get to the 
root of the problem, to better understand why this behavior keeps happening. Maybe my 
expressing blame to him makes him extremely defensive and self-righteous, encouraging him to 
dig in his heels about this point of conflict further. Perhaps neither of us really understands the 
other person’s needs about this issue, and we need to engage in non-blaming, inquisitive moral 
dialogue in order to get to the root of one another’s needs. 
With this strategy of inquisitive moral dialogue, I do not aim to point fingers at him or 
scold him. Instead, I aim to gain information and understand his own reasons for action. He 
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surely is aware that his behavior hurts me, and that he is failing to live up to a prior agreement 
we made. My expressing blame towards him is not uncovering any new insight he did not 
already have. By engaging in this dialogue, I might be able to uncover the root of his behavior, 
and we can jointly figure out how to solve the problem. Even though I do have hurt feelings 
about this repeated issue, I can recognize that a hostile and retributive expressed blame approach 
is simply not productive. Furthermore, my inquisitive dialogue meets the conditions of 
answerability insofar as it seeks a justificatory response from the wrongdoer.  
I will now extend a Lacey and Pickard-type detached blame model into my own, more 
targeted account of how to hold others answerable without affective blame in our interpersonal 
moral lives. The specific factors involved in this method are: 1. Compassion, 2. Curiosity, and 3. 
Inquisitive dialogue. On my account, prioritizing a sense of compassion and real curiosity about 
the wrongdoing is consistent with still holding wrongdoers responsible. In addition, as I will 
argue, compassion and curiosity are not on a par with the third factor, inquisitive dialogue. 
Instead, compassion and curiosity are useful features that support the primary goal of fostering 
inquisitive dialogue between the agents as means to hold the wrongdoer answerable for her 
actions.  
 
B. Inverting the Paradigmatic Response: Foregrounding Compassion 
i. Compassion  
Compassion may underlie expressions of blame and non-blame alike. For example, angry 
blamers may think that despite the harshness of their expressions of blame, underlying that 
harshness is compassionate, warm concern for the wrongdoer’s moral growth and wellbeing. As 
the saying goes, we often get most angry at those we care about (or love) the most. As we saw in 
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chapter two, that is certainly Susan Wolf’s view. However, it can be hard for receivers of angry 
blame to feel that underlying compassion and love, in any real sense, because what is expressed 
is often emotionally heated and hostile. We have all heard the expression “It is not what you say 
it is how you say it”. 
The forcefulness of the blaming emotions involved in most expressions of blame likely 
mask any underlying senses of care and compassion. Of course, some cases of wrongdoing call 
for harsh responses. Sometimes, if the blamer communicates in a calm and relaxed manner, the 
wrongdoer might not get the moral message forcefully enough and might do serious harm to 
herself or others. However, in our interpersonal moral lives, not all cases are so urgent or grave.  
In these less urgent and grave cases, a Lacey and Pickard-type approach, which puts 
compassion at the forefront of the communication, is a viable blame-alternative. In this strategy, 
the blamer’s compassion is not hiding in the background, underneath the harshness of expressed 
blame, but is instead leading the charge of the communication. Specifically, I propose inverting 
the communication such that care and compassion are clearly expressed up front. Further, any 
responsibility measures are held secondary to the primary overt focus of verbally expressing and 
demonstrating care and compassion for the wrongdoer. Foregrounding compassion and care does 
not restrict one from finding fault in the wrongdoer’s behavior and holding them responsible 
later.  
This inversion has two significant benefits in our interpersonal moral lives. First, it can 
reduce the wrongdoer’s tendency to feel defensive or attacked. Second, it can create space for 
and foster productive dialogue between the two agents. This moral dialogue can lead to moral 
understanding between the agents as well as rehabilitation of the wrongdoer. The wrongdoer is 
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able to feel overtly cared for despite her wrongdoing and can heal and commit to acting in 
morally better ways in the future. 
By reducing the manifest emotional heat and hostility involved in typical expressions of 
blame, the inquisitive dialogue between blamer and wrongdoer is more likely to go better. This 
argument is supported by empirical work on anger. In “The Positive and Negative Effects of 
Anger on Dispute Resolution: Evidence From Electronically Mediated Disputes”, authors 
Friedman, Anderson, Brett, Olekalns, and Goates argue that “an expression of anger lowers the 
resolution rate in mediation and that this effect occurs in part because expressing anger generates 
an angry response by the other party.”174175 Again, this is a modest proposal, and one that is 
consistent with judging others’ behavior  blameworthy and also expressing blame to them if it is 
deemed appropriate after the compassion-based inquisitive dialogue. In sum, this paradigmatic 
inversion seeks to provide a safe and more caring space for moral dialogue. 
 
ii. Curiosity 
Second, curiosity is a central aspect of non-hostile and non-retributive responses to 
wrongdoing. Specifically, curiosity involves the inquisitive dialogue aspect I mentioned in the 
example of my unmotivated, messy partner. Before expressing blame, a blamer can simply aim 
to get curious about why the wrongdoer acted as she did. She can ask questions in a non-
judgmental, non-blaming tone. This does not prevent her from expressing blame to the 
wrongdoer later, it might just delay the process. Alternatively, it might lead to a new insight that 
                                                        
174 Friedman, Ray, Cameron Anderson, Jeanne Brett, Mara Olekalns, and Nathan Goates (2004). The Positive and 
Negative Effects of Anger on Dispute Resolution: Evidence From Electronically Mediated Disputes” Journal of 
Applied Psychology: 89 (2), p. 369. 
175 See also: Tiedens, L. Z. (2001). “Anger and advancement versus sadness and subjugation: The effect of negative 
emotion expressions on social status conferral.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: 80(86). 
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prompts her to conclude that expressing blame to the wrongdoer is not appropriate for this 
particular situation. Either way, the benefit of getting curious is that it helps mitigate 
defensiveness from the wrongdoer. By foregrounding curiosity, the blamer is neutrally seeking 
information, rather than actively seeking to criticize the wrongdoer. Even if the same information 
is conveyed in the curiosity strategy as in the typical expressed blame paradigm, the difference in 
tone is striking. In getting curious, the blamer delivers her questions without a loaded judgment 
of culpability towards the wrongdoer. The affectively-neutral delivery of the curiosity strategy 
better allows for authentic dialogue to occur.  
Indeed, in getting curious, the blamer aims to get clarity about why the wrongdoer acted 
as she did, and the wrongdoer has a chance to explain herself. The blamer does not aim to 
accuse; she first seeks to understand and to gain more information. In doing so, this process of 
moral inquisition acts as a way to hold wrongdoers answerable for their actions. Wrongdoers are 
called to justify their actions and provide reasons through the back and forth dialogue. Further, 
this process meets the conditions of answerability. Foregrounding curiosity will not work for 
every case of moral wrongdoing. For example, when I witness my friend shouting racial slurs at 
a stranger, getting curious is clearly not the best initial approach. Time is of the essence in this 
case. But in lower stakes, less urgent cases of blame, there will be more space and time for an 
approach grounded in curiosity. 
Additionally, this curiosity strategy has theoretical support from Rosen’s account as well 
as the Confucian epistemic account discussed in chapter three. Indeed, as Rosen highlighted, 
there are limits on our epistemic capacities such that getting curious is a useful step towards 
gaining more information about the case that we are unlikely to already have complete insight 
about. In getting curious, the blamer seeks to better understand the wrongdoer’s motives, 
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perspective, and any external factors involved in the given case of wrongdoing. In doing so, she 
gathers useful information and meets the conditions of answerability insofar as she seeks reasons 
(in the normative sense) from the wrongdoer. The curiosity strategy is consistent with the blamer 
deciding to express blame after the process of moral inquisition. However, expressed blame is 
not required. We can hold wrongdoers answerable for their wrongs through a focus on moral 
dialogue, because in the inquisitive dialogical exchange, each agent has a chance to offer their 
own reasons for action. 
Finally, this curiosity strategy has additional support from Lacey and Pickard’s 
therapeutic model of holding others responsible, in which they endorse an attitude of “concern, 
respect and compassion for the person, while nonetheless questioning, challenging and reproving 
their conduct.”176 Expressed blame has largely become the default first response to wrongdoing in 
our culture. I propose, by contrast, that we cultivate a curious, dialogue-based first response in 
the aftermath of moral wrongdoing. This proposal requires that we invert our paradigmatic 
response to wrongdoing. The inquisitive dialogue that forefronts compassion might reveal 
something unknown, which might alter the need for blame. Moreover, the inquisitive dialogue 
might better foster authentic communication and resolution between the agents. In either of these 
cases, the outcome is less affectively-heated and retributive-based than traditional forms of 
expressed blame. 
 
iii. Answerability  
 Third, we can hold wrongdoers responsible (construed as answerability) largely through 
the process of moral inquisition itself. I have already argued this in my discussions of 
                                                        
176 Lacey and Pickard, p. 19. 
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compassion and curiosity above, but I will now make this point more explicitly and in greater 
detail. Once the blamer has questioned the wrongdoer and expressed compassion, she has more 
information about the nature of the wrong. Then, the next step is to decide how to hold the 
wrongdoer responsible. Lacey and Pickard advocate holding wrongdoers responsible through 
traditional punitive means, i.e. legal liability, but without the hostility and retribution involved in 
affective styles of blame.  
 Differently, I argue that what it means to hold a wrongdoer responsible depends on the 
nature of the relationship between the two agents, and the nature of the specific wrongdoing. 
Like deciding whether or not to express blame, deciding what it means to hold others responsible 
is similarly dynamic and context-sensitive. There is not a one-size fits all approach to holding 
others accountable, especially in our evolving interpersonal relationships. In our interpersonal 
lives, there are some people who we are more willing to be lenient towards in our judgments of 
moral responsibility, because we know personally that they are going through a hard time or are 
dealing with a something that warrants special consideration. This variation is to be expected. 
There is, inherently, variability in the ways that moral responsibility is administered within our 
close, personal relationships.  
How to hold an agent responsible in a given situation will depend, for one, on what has 
transpired through the inquisitive dialogue between blamer and wrongdoer. There are a variety of 
ways to hold others to account, as well as a variety of ways to express it. The position I am 
proposing here offers a way to meet the demands of answerability without expressed blame, 
through the process of inquisitive dialogue itself. Getting curious and asking the wrongdoer 
questions in a compassionate manner is consistent with demanding a justificatory response from 
her.  
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 Putting these three elements together, I have proposed a combination of Lacey and 
Pickard’s detached blame model combined with a new element: a heightened emphasis on 
prioritizing inquisitive dialogue. I am not suggesting that this method will work in every case of 
interpersonal wrongdoing. It might require emotionally engaged, vulnerable, and sensitive 
humans to engage in this sort of dialogue. It is hard emotional work, and I deeply recognize that. 
Nevertheless, it is valuable to carve out space for this sort of response to moral wrongdoing as an 
alternative option to expressing blame. 
 
IV. Transforming Hostile Emotions: The Emotional Conversion View 
 
Chapter two surveyed Nussbaum’s account of Transition-Anger, in which she argues that we 
ought to transform our heated anger into Transition-Anger, as quickly as possible. In chapter 
two, I discussed why angry blame in particular is especially pernicious. Now, I will argue for a 
similar emotional transformation process, with respect to our hostile blaming emotions more 
generally. This argument is focused on especially heated forms of angry blame and on 
converting angry blame into cooler emotions. One way to respond to wrongdoing without 
expressed blame is to transform our hostile blaming emotions into their cooler, less aggressive 
counterparts. Instead of getting angry when someone wrongs us, perhaps we can channel and 
convert that anger into, for example, disappointment, grief, or sadness. As we shall see, there is 
reason to regard this emotional transformation as preferable not only from a social perspective, 
but further from the point of view of answerability. While this strategy of emotional 
transformation is often not a sufficient response to wrongdoing on its own, I argue that it is an 
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effective strategy when used in tandem with other strategies such as getting curious and engaging 
in inquisitive dialogue.  
In this section, I will first discuss what these cooler emotions consist of, then I will argue 
why we can meet the conditions of answerability through cooler modes of response such as 
sadness, disappointment, or grief. In doing so, I argue that the emotional conversion view is a 
strong alternative response to moral wrongdoing. 
 
A. Emotionally Cooler Modes of Response 
Recent empirical work demonstrates the utility of responding to wrongdoing by 
converting angry emotions into cooler emotions, such as sadness. Before discussing this 
research, I will first present recent work by Jeffrey Blustein on sadness in particular. 
Although his work remains focused on sadness, I take it to be the case that the same 
argument holds true for other cool emotions such as disappointment, grief, and even 
compassion. So, this more focused discussion of sadness supports my overall goal of 
arguing that emotionally cooler modes of response can be effectively converted from the 
retributive or otherwise hostile emotions that tend to accompany expressed blame.  
Blustein (2017) argues that we can effectively respond to wrongdoing with sadness instead of 
heated forms of blame, such as angry blame. Sadness is a very different emotion than anger.177  
For one, payback is not a conceptual feature of sadness the way that payback (as I have argued in 
chapters one and two) is a conceptual feature of expressed blame and anger. Second, sadness is 
an inward-looking emotion, whereas anger often spills outside of us and tends to be directed at 
others. Some philosophers claim that the fact that sadness lacks this payback aspect 
                                                        
177 For a more detailed discussion, see: Bonanno, George (2009). The Other Side of Sadness: What the New Science of 
Bereavement Tells Us About Life After Loss. Hatchett Book Group, p. 30. 
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automatically disqualifies it from the range of appropriate responses to moral wrongdoing. 
Christopher Evan Franklin (2013) holds this view. Franklin argues that  
Expressing sadness does not indicate to others that an object of moral value was treated 
in an objectionable way and thus does not help to safeguard the value against further 
mistreatment…. (thus) sadness is not an apt substitute for blame since it does not carry 
the condemnatory aspect embedded in blame.178 
 
On Franklin’s view, we must respond to wrongdoing with condemnation, and blame is the 
best way to do so. Sadness does not meet this condemnatory requirement. In addition, unlike 
anger, indignation, or resentment, sadness is generally thought of as a softer or gentler emotion. 
Sadness, generally speaking, does not sting its intended recipient in the way anger does. Sadness 
does not seem as antagonistic as anger. Yet, sadness still (like anger, indignation, etc.) has a 
negative valence, which may lend itself well to responding appropriately to moral conflict. 
Responding to a serious moral wrongdoing with joy, for example, would be intuitively odd and 
discomforting. But because sadness is negatively charged, it is not so far removed from 
traditionally negative responses so as to seem out of place. 
David Goldman (2014) argues that sadness can play a functional role similar to resentment or 
indignation in response to moral wrongdoing, and that sadness is in fact preferable to resentment 
or indignation. One might worry, however, that sadness is too passive a response to serious 
moral wrongdoing. This worry is inaccurate. Sadness, and similarly cool emotions need not be 
passive nor announcements of resignation. Instead, the reflective and introspective space cooler 
emotions bring can help an agent clarify how she feels about the wrongdoing. Cooler emotions 
provide an active, emotionally rich resource to process and respond to moral wrongdoing insofar 
                                                        
178 Franklin, Christopher Evan (2013). “Valuing Blame.” In Blame: Its Nature and Norms, eds. D. Justin Coates and 
Neal A. Tognazzini. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 222. 
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as they can relay a clear sense of disappointment to the wrongdoer, while simultaneously 
allowing space for introspection from both agents.179180  
Further, Blustein argues that sadness “does not necessarily prevent one from 
holding the wrongdoer responsible for his actions or from deliberating about and taking 
these further steps: it may in fact sustain the effort to do so. And importantly, it can do so 
even in the absence of anger or some other vengeful passion.”181 At the same time, a sad 
response to moral wrongdoing is consistent with finding fault in wrongdoers’ behaviors. 
Emotions like sadness, disappointment, and grief are thus very flexible and helpful first 
responses to moral wrongdoing, because (among other things) they are non-hostile, non-
retributive, and do not prohibit further modes of response.  
 
B. Empirical Research on Anger and Sadness 
Recent empirical work further supports the view that emotionally cooler modes of response 
are helpful first responses to moral wrongdoing. In particular, recent findings suggest that cooler 
emotions like sadness can blunt, or prevent, our experience of heated emotions like anger. Karen 
Page Winterich, Seunghee Han, and Jennifer S. Lerner (2010) have termed this effect the 
‘Emotional Blunting Hypothesis’, which predicts that a specific emotion can carry over to blunt 
the experience of a subsequent emotion. The authors’ studies confirm that inducing sadness 
                                                        
179 Relatedly, disappointment has many characteristics in common with sadness. In “The Moral Emotions”, Jesse 
Prinz argues that disappointment is “just a form of sadness.” On Prinz’s view, disappointment would not be 
considered a separate emotion, but instead a strand of sadness itself. 
180 For further literature on sadness, see specifically: Kurt Gray and Daniel Wegner (2011). “Dimensions of Moral 
Emotions”. Emotion Review: 3(3), p. 258; Phoebe Ellsworth and Craig Smith (1998). “From Appraisal to Emotion: 
Differences Among Unpleasant Feelings,” Motivation and Emotion, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 271-302; Galen 
Bodenhausen, Lori Sheppard, and Geoffrey Kramer (1994). “Negative affect and social judgment: the differential 
impact of anger and sadness,” European Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 24, pp. 45-62. 
181 Blustein, p. 15. 
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blunts subsequent anger, and inducing anger blunts subsequent sadness.182 This finding, if true, 
offers substantial support for my own view, the Emotional Conversion View. 
For example, say that I find out that my coworker has taken credit for a project I 
completed all by myself. Our mutual boss praises my coworker for her excellent work, 
and as a result gives her a raise. I consider this betrayal morally wrong. If I experience 
sadness in response, the Emotional Blunting Hypothesis suggests that my experience of 
sadness will likely blunt my experience of anger. I cannot feel both sad and angry at the 
same time (or at least not both sad and angry in full force at the same time). Additionally, 
Winterich, Han, and Lerner suggest that sadness is characterized by situational agency, 
whereas anger is characterized by appraisals of human or individual agency.183184  
If I were to get angry about the situation, that anger could quickly escalate, and I 
might lash out and say something I do not mean to my coworker or, even worse, our boss. 
As I argued in chapter two, a strongly negative feature of Senecan anger is its tendency to 
spiral out of control. My heated anger, the Emotional Blunting Hypothesis suggests, will 
also blunt, if not prevent, me from experiencing the event through a cooler emotion, like 
sadness. Knowing this, it seems less socially risky and therefore, on the whole preferable, 
to aim to respond to this case with sadness instead of angry forms of blame. It is less 
socially risky because experiencing the wrongdoing through sadness blunts my chance of 
                                                        
182 Winterich, Karen Page, Han, Seunghee, and Lerner, Jennifer S. (2010). “Now That I’m Sad, It’s Hard to Be Mad: 
The Role of Cognitive Appraisals in Emotional Blunting”. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin: 36(11), p. 
1467. 
183 Winterich, Lee, and Lerner, p. 1469. 
184 This finding is confirmed by Haidt (2003) who showed that anger is specifically aimed at regulating 
behavior and opinions towards people not situations. We can make sense of this finding in the case of 
expressed blame by understanding sadness as an affective response that arises due to negative feelings 
about the situation (the wrongdoing), and understanding anger as an affective response that arises due to 
negative feelings about the individual, (the wrongdoer herself).  
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expressing anger, and potentially losing my temper, escalating the situation, and inciting 
lasting emotional damage.  
That being said, I am not suggesting we can (or should) cherry-pick our emotional 
responses to being wronged. In the heat of the moment, I might not be able to decide 
whether I want to experience the case of wrongdoing through sadness or anger.  I am not 
under the delusion that we can (or should) choose our emotional responses. Nevertheless, 
armed with the knowledge of the Emotional Blunting Hypothesis, trying to experience 
the situation through sadness, to whatever degree possible, is a worthy, and socially 
useful aim.  
Beyond anger’s tendency to escalate, there are additional reasons why sadness is a 
socially preferable response. For one, anger is an intrinsically unpleasant and negative 
emotion to be on the receiving end of. Second, anger is instrumentally dysfunctional as a 
response to wrongdoing because it promotes defensiveness and is unlikely to motivate the 
wrongdoer to open up and feel encouraged to make positive moral changes in her 
behavior. If the goal of expressing angry blame to a wrongdoer is to motivate her to 
change her behavior, anger is likely not the most effective way to achieve this goal. 
Instead, by actively attempting to blunt our natural angry responses and substitute them 
for a cooler emotion, we can transform our habits of moral response towards more 
effective and compassionate ways of engaging with wrongdoers.  
In her article “What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation” 
Miranda Fricker describes several pathologies of blame. As she argues, one of these 
pathologies is when blame is not administered at the appropriate register. Fricker states 
Blame should be appropriately contained in its proper remit, both temporally and in terms 
of the relationship(s) it affects. This means that blame’s expression should not be allowed 
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to go on too long, and should not be allowed to migrate into regions of the relationship 
where it does not belong, or indeed to wantonly damage other relationships into the 
bargain. Blame should be allowed neither to fester nor to spread.185 
 
In the passage above, Fricker argues that blame should not linger excessively long, nor should it 
seep into parts of the agents’ dynamic where it does not belong. Blame needs to be contained, 
temporally and in terms of which agents it affects. One clear advantage of responding to 
wrongdoing with sadness, over anger, is that sadness starts the conversation at an emotionally-
cooler register. Because of this, the chance of the communication festering where it does not 
belong is already lessened. The troubling spiraling and escalating characteristics of angry blame I 
have discussed throughout this dissertation do not apply to sad expressions of blame. While 
sadness may be partially contagious in that we are sometimes negatively affected by others’ sad 
moods, its spread is not nearly as pernicious as anger’s is. Further, I am positing, based on 
Winterich, Lee and Lerner’s findings, that sadness is less likely to fester and spread in 
emotionally damaging ways than anger is. Therefore, as this empirical research demonstrates, we 
have good reason to think that sadness may be a good antidote to anger, and that we can 
transform our angry blaming responses to sad responses. 
 
C. Answerability Through the Emotional Conversion View  
In “Should We Get Rid of Blame”, Blustein suggests that perhaps no blame 
whatsoever is needed in order for wrongdoers to understand the moral significance of 
their behaviors. He explains,  
Perhaps offenders can be brought to fully acknowledge the moral significance of what they 
have done and to atone for it without (distress), by instead showing them love and 
compassion or by exposing them to positive role models…There is no reason to think that 
moral understanding and self-correction could not be accomplished by measure that do not 
                                                        
185 Fricker, Miranda. (2016). “What's the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation”. Noûs, 50, p. 169. 
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reprimand, measures that might in fact be preferable to blame because there is less of a risk 
of backlash and defensiveness from the offender who stands accused of wrongdoing.186 
 
The view Blustein expresses in the passage above is fairly close to the view I will now propose. I 
argue that an emotionally cool response to wrongdoing can sometimes be a better affect to 
accompany the inquisition of answerability than more hostile responses like anger. 
Some might argue that a response of sadness, disappointment, or grief is incompatible with 
holding wrongdoers answerable for their actions because these cooler emotions are largely 
outcome or situation-oriented, rather than individual focused, and there is a real worry that this 
situation-focus prevents us from holding specific individuals responsible for their actions. Put 
another way, the worry is that an attitude of generalized sadness, disappointment, or grief does 
not pick out a specific person as having done something morally wrong, and thus is not a 
sufficient way to hold others answerable for their actions. 
 We can resolve this worry. Emotionally cooler responses to wrongdoing are not 
incompatible with holding a specific person answerable for her morally wrong action(s). For one, 
the emotional component of a wronged agent’s response is not the only mechanism by which 
answerability happens. As mentioned above, the emotional conversion technique can work in 
tandem with getting curious and asking the wrongdoer questions about her actions—and in doing 
so making her a proper object of justificatory challenge.  
For example, I can feel generalized sadness about the wrong having happened while also 
feeling and expressing that a specific agent is culpable. The emotional component of expressed 
blame need not be directed exclusively on the wrongdoer herself. That exclusivity is needlessly 
limiting. Assuming that responses like sadness, disappointment, and grief are antithetical to 
                                                        
186 Blustein, p. 21. 
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holding wrongdoers responsible (construed as answerability) makes it seem as if our (heated) 
emotional reactions are the only way we hold others responsible. Further, not only are affectively 
cooler responses consistent with the aim of answerability, they can be a better way to achieve the 
aim of answerability. For one reason, a major benefit of converting our hostile and retributive 
blaming emotions into emotionally cooler substitutes is that doing so does not risk escalating the 
situation and dynamic between the agents. As Blustein puts it in the above passage, with sadness 
there is “less of a risk of backlash and defensiveness from the offender who stands accused of 
wrongdoing.”187  Second, these emotionally cooler modes of response fundamentally lack the 
retributive edge that is so troubling about angry forms of blame. 
Third, it may be easier to demand justification from the wrongdoer when that demand is 
delivered in an emotionally cooler tone. The blamer can more easily probe the wrongdoer for her 
reasons for action with an emotionally cooler tone. With transforming anger into emotionally 
cooler substitutes, there is less tendency of defensiveness from both agents and a better chance 
for productive dialogue between the agents. Fourth, responding to moral wrongdoing in 
emotionally cooler ways does not prohibit further modes of response, including expressing 
blame. Other things being equal, then, it seems best to respond to moral wrongdoing first with 
sadness, grief, or disappointment, rather than more hostile responses like anger. 
 
V. Confucian Answerability 
 
A third strategy of responding to wrongdoing without expressed blame stems from the 
Confucian epistemic skepticism I surveyed in chapter three. This method additionally provides 
                                                        
187 Blustein, p. 21. 
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us with a practical psychological technique for converting retributive or hostile blaming 
emotions into calmer ones. I have termed this third strategy Confucian Answerability. Like the 
first two strategies, this third strategy also meets the conditions of answerability, and does so 
without expressed blame. Moreover, this third strategy may well provide a unified way to meet 
the conditions of answerability and combine elements of the first two strategies surveyed in this 
chapter. In this way, Confucian Answerability provides a comprehensive account of how to 
achieve answerability without expressed blame.  
 
A. Sarkissian’s Commentary 
In his papers “When you think it’s bad it’s worse than you think: Psychological bias and the 
ethics of negative character assessments” and “Virtuous Contempt in the Analects”, Sarkissian 
offers an interpretation of the Analects, a collection of sayings of Confucius and his followers. 
Sarkissian’s interpretation of the Analects is one interpretation out of many interpretations of the 
text. Sarkissian’s view is not necessarily the Confucian view, but rather is a compelling 
interpretation of the text, and one that supports my own argument.  
In chapter three I questioned the epistemic capacity of blamers to truly know, with certainty, 
whether a given wrongdoer is fully culpable. One interpretation of the Confucian view regarding 
culpability is that we ought to, whenever possible, give others the benefit of the doubt. When 
wrongdoing occurs, our first response should be no-response. Instead of responding with blame 
immediately, the suggestion is to simply pause. Blamers are invited to investigate the nature of 
the wrongdoing and reflect on it, before taking any external action. The strategy is to initially 
avoid finding fault on either side, and to see what arises from deep reflection about the nature of 
the wrong before taking further action.  
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Then, on Sarkissian’s interpretation of the Confucian perspective, if one has truly engaged in 
this reflection and still deems the wrongdoer culpable, it is permissible to blame her. Sarkissian 
explains that the Confucian approach of giving others the benefit of the doubt is 
A strategy with a limited shelf life; the cognitively demanding act of staving off blame and 
resentment can be expected to last only so long. The injunction to give others the benefit of 
the doubt…will prove effective only when others provide evidence of the transitory or 
contingent nature of their initial disagreeable behavior.188  
 
In this passage, Sarkissian argues that the strategy of giving others the benefit of the doubt only 
last so long. There must be evidence of the wrong behavior being explainable by transitory or 
contingent circumstances. If nothing is found to exculpate the agent, then it is permissible to 
blame her. On Sarkissian’s interpretation, the Confucian view does not encourage giving other 
agents the benefit of the doubt in an open-ended, enduring fashion. Rather, the benefit of the 
doubt strategy is a good initial strategy, with a limited shelf life. But then, without evidence to 
the contrary, expressing blaming is permissible.  
Indeed, this interpretation of the Confucian view deems expressing blame appropriate if the 
wronged agent (blamer) decides, after thorough reflection on the given case, that he is not to 
blame for the action and that the culpability in fact lies at least partially with the other person.189 
Sarkissian explains, “We find an analogue to the Tit for Two Tats strategy: Pause not once but 
twice before retaliating with a defection—in this case, with a negative character assessment.”190 If 
the wronged agent has truly paused and reflected on the wrong twice, and both times concludes 
that the wrongdoer is culpable and worthy of blame, then expressing blame is appropriate. This 
strategy certainly seems like a reasonable method. 
                                                        
188 Sarkissan, H. (2015). “When you think it’s bad it’s worse than you think: Psychological bias and the ethics of 
negative character assessments” in The Philosophical Challenge from China. Brian Bruya (ed.). MIT Press, p. 16. 
189 For example, the blame may lie solely with the other person, or the two agents might be mutually blameworthy for 
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190 Sarkissian, p. 16. 
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In this section, I will consider what it would look like to take Sarkissian’s interpretation of 
the Confucian view to its logical conclusion.  Is there a way to both hold wrongdoers responsible 
for their actions and continue to give them the benefit of the doubt? On the face of it, these two 
elements are at odds with one another. However, careful analysis of Sarkissian’s account helps 
resolve this tension. It is important to note that the Confucian strategy is not a wholly passive 
response to wrongdoing. It is not endorsing pausing and reflecting in isolation. Instead, it is an 
active process of seeking out the causal and epistemic factors involved that might explain the 
wrongdoer’s behavior.  
Sarkissian argues that on the Confucian interpretation, the wronged agent’s immediate 
impulse should be to see how he might have engendered the bad moral conduct himself: Was he 
indiscrete or unkind? Did he lack patience or resolve? The first step is to try to come to a proper 
or complete understanding of what may have caused the person to act as they did.191 Similarly, the 
wronged agent’s first thought should be to reflect on how he might be implicated in the wrong. 
Has he, in any way, participated in or created the dynamic between himself and the wrongdoer 
that might have impacted the wrongdoing directly?  
Second, if the wronged agent feels confident that he did not contribute in any way to the 
wrong, then the next step is to investigate any relevant external factors that may have influenced 
the wrong. Perhaps the wrongdoer is tired. Perhaps she is having a bad day, is in pain, or is 
otherwise preoccupied. These external factors include not only being tired or distracted, but also 
include the impact that other peoples’ actions and moods have on our own actions. Indeed, the 
Confucian view is profoundly sensitive to the impact we have on one another and the ways in 
which our interpersonal dynamics inform our own behaviors. This is not to say any of these 
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external factors are necessarily mitigating factors, only that they might be relevant to 
understanding the nature of the wrongdoer’s actions, and therefore should be thoroughly 
investigated.  
Third, Sarkissian explains that the wronged agent is encouraged to consider whether his 
emotions appropriately signal the severity of the wrong. Are his emotions excessive, given the 
situation? Are they deficient, given the situation? The wronged agent should reflect on ways in 
which his own emotional responses to the wrongdoing might be interfering with his ability to 
have a clear and rational view of the case. Is his anger blocking his ability to recognize that the 
wrongdoer is not (fully) at fault? Is his degree of anger, indignation, or resentment appropriate 
for the situation? There are a variety of mitigating circumstances that might be revealed through 
this reflection. 
It might be the case that the wrongdoing triggered an emotional response in the wronged 
agent that has nothing to do with the wrong itself, and instead has to do with the wronged agent’s 
unique psychological wiring or past painful experiences. Further, the wronged agent should 
consider whether his emotions are reliable indicators of the wrongdoing. It could be the case that 
his current emotional state is colored by his own psychological wiring. He should consider 
whether he is currently reacting in a way that he will feel good about in the future. On the 
Confucian view, these are all questions wronged agents should consider and reflect upon 
seriously before deciding whether to express blame.  
Still, it can be hard to make sense of this seemingly passive approach in the face of serious 
moral wrongdoing.192 For example, In Hard Feelings (2013), Macalester Bell suggests that while 
                                                        
192 In a similar vein, writer Rebecca Solnit argues, “Sometimes there are good reasons for a strong response, including 
the prevention of further harm. But more often lashing out is a way to avoid looking inward…anger may make 
people miserable, but it also makes them more confident and obliterates other, more introspective miseries: pain, 
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we generally have good reasons to be civil towards one another, not everything deserves a civil 
response. 193 Bell argues that to respond civilly to persons who publicly express superiority “is to 
risk condoning the superbia they express, thereby further damaging moral relations.”194 Bell 
argues that contempt plays a vital role in response to wrongdoing insofar as it helps put 
wrongdoers in a position of reflection. For example, to respond with contempt to someone who 
just uttered a racist remark serves to helpfully allow that person to step back and reflect on her 
racist attitudes. Contempt, Bell argues, is the best way to object to this person’s racist attitudes 
and to encourage their self-reflection. Responding with civility, Bell claims, might not enable 
such an outcome.195 
Like Bell, I recognize that harsh emotional responses like contempt are natural responses to 
being wronged, and I do not deny that they serve as helpful signals in certain contexts, as in the 
case of the racist utterance. However, as Rebecca Solnit argues, strong negative emotions like 
contempt and anger can sometimes mask the deeper emotional internal work we each need to do 
in the aftermath of moral wrongdoing. Put simply, we would rather be mad than sad. But, as we 
have already seen, being mad and expressing it through our reactive attitudes has a negative, and 
sometimes irreversible, impact on others. So, the message we ought to gather from both 
Sarkissian and Solnit is to introspect about the various internal and external factors that might be 
involved in both the wrongdoer’s actions, and in the blamer’s response to his actions. Again, this 
is not a passive process. Rather, it is an active, dynamic interrogation of the situation and one’s 
                                                        
fear, guilt, uncertainty, vulnerability. We’d rather be mad than sad.” Solnit, Rebecca. “Facing the Furies.” Harper’s 
Magazine, 1 May 2017. https://harpers.org/archive/2017/05/facing-the-furies. 
193 Bell, Macalester (2015). Hard Feelings. Oxford University Press, p. 14. 
194 Bell, p. 219. 
195 For similar defenses of the harsh emotions (anger, contempt, etc.) see also Jaggar (1989) and Spelman (1989). 
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involvement in it in order to gain a better understanding of the situation and to respond 
effectively. 
Though I have not discussed contempt yet in this dissertation, Bell’s work is highly relevant 
as a critique to the seemingly passive Confucian view just proposed. Furthermore, contempt 
strikes me as worse to express than blame. Bell defines contempt as having four distinguishing 
characteristics: 1. A judgment concerning the status of the object of contempt, 2. An affectively 
unpleasant way of regarding or attending to the object of contempt, 3. A comparison to the object 
of one’s contempt, resulting in a positive self-feeling as compared to the object of one’s 
contempt, 4. Psychological withdrawal or distance regarding the object of one’s contempt.196 As 
this definition demonstrates, contempt involves a complex, psychologically-deep scorn of 
another person, as well as a withdrawal from them. Though expressed blame can involve this 
sort of deep and intentional scorn or withdrawal, it need not to. In fact, sometimes in expressing 
(especially angry forms of) blame, we engage in the exact opposite of withdrawal insofar as we 
get right up in the wrongdoer’s face and intimately convey to them our displeasure with their 
behavior.  So, contempt comes with many of the social risks (escalation, spiraling) I have argued 
that expressed blame has, and likely additional and more troubling risks, too. 
 In “Virtuous Contempt in the Analects”, Sarkissian argues that if an agent 
has properly concluded that another agent is truly contemptible, then she ought to 
publicly signal her contempt for the wrongdoer. Sarkissian strongly argues that “a disposition to 
despise is a feature of morally exemplary persons in the Analects.”197 A major benefit of publicly 
signaling one’s contempt for a contemptible person stems from the motivation to protect other, 
                                                        
196 Bell, Macalester (2005). “A Woman’s Scorn: Toward a Feminist Defense of Contempt as a Moral Emotion”. 
Hypatia Vol. 20: 4, pp. 83-4. 
197 Sarkissian, Hagop (2017). “Virtuous Contempt in the Analects”. The Oxford Handbook of Chinese Philosophy, ed. 
Justin Tiwald. Forthcoming, p. 12. 
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innocent agents who might be duped by the wrongdoer in the future. Sarkissian further explains 
that “part of what it means to be a morally exemplary person is to feel and display genuinely 
negative, aversive feelings toward a range of appropriate targets.”198 
It is important to keep in mind the deeply social framing of the Analects. The context is less 
related to the interpersonal context I am discussing in this dissertation, and more of a broader 
social concern. From this broader social vantage point, Sarkissian argues that we owe it to each 
other to publicly express contempt when someone wrongs us, in order to protect our fellow 
community members. For example, if I feel that my coworker is a truly contemptible person and 
that I have done a thorough and fair investigation in order to come to this conclusion, and I am 
worried that if others do not know then they too will be victimized, it would be a moral failing of 
mine not to signal contempt.199 On this view, if one feels contempt in one’s heart about a given 
agent’s actions, one should not hold back that contempt for moral reasons, because one needs to 
signal to and warn their shared community that the wrong has occurred.  
This is clearly demonstrated in a passage in the Mencius, another classical Confucian text 
expanding upon Confucius’s teachings: 
Suppose someone were to be harsh in their treatment of me. A junzi (noble person) would, in 
such a case, invariably examine himself, thinking “I wasn’t benevolent; I lacked propriety. 
How else could such a thing have come about?” But if, after examining himself, he discovers 
he had been benevolent, he had acted with propriety, and yet the person still treats him 
harshly, then the junzi will again invariably examine himself, thinking “I must have lacked 
commitment.” But if he discovers that he was, in fact, committed, and the person still treats 
him harshly, only then would the junzi say, “I suppose he is the incorrigible one.”200 
 
In the above passage, the noble person has been a victim to disagreeable conduct directed his 
way. As Sarkissian comments on the case,  
                                                        
198 Sarkissian, p. 12. 
199 I’ve paraphrased this example from email correspondence with Sarkissian on the topic of contempt in the Analects.  
200 Sarkissian, p. 16. 
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His first impulse is to see how he might have engendered the conduct himself: Was he 
indiscrete or unkind? Did he lack patience or resolve? Here he is merely trying to come to 
a proper or complete understanding of what may have caused the person to act in such a 
fashion.  
 
Only after arriving at a more definite understanding of the situation is the noble person content 
and justified in blaming the other person. Again, this Confucian interpretation encourages agents 
to freely express blame to wrongdoers, but only after the situation has been thoroughly 
investigated and the blamer feels that she has a complete understanding of the case and the 
factors involved. Sarkissian’s recommendation is thus seemingly in tension with my argument 
that it is preferable not to express blame even after the time of reflection has made one’s 
culpability clear. However, as I will argue in the next section, we can maintain most of 
Sarkissian’s interpretation of Confucianism without the moral tool of expressed blame, and 
further, can still meet the conditions of answerability.  
 
B. Confucian Answerability  
I propose that the Confucian recommendation to pause, reflect, and investigate, in tandem 
with inquisitive moral dialogue, meets the requirements of answerability, and can do so without 
expressed blame or expressed contempt. By adding the strategy of inquisitive moral dialogue to 
the Confucian strategy of pause, reflect, and investigate, I present a more nuanced account of 
what taking the Confucian recommendation might look like, practically speaking, in our 
interpersonal moral lives. I have termed this strategy Confucian Answerability, and argue that it 
is a comprehensive way to achieve the demands of answerability in response to moral 
wrongdoing without expressed blame. 
The first reason for this is that, like the Emotional Conversion technique, the Confucian 
Answerability strategy requires an awareness of one’s own emotional state and the practical need 
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to temper hot and reactive emotions. Part of this initial non-reactive response includes 
recognizing the ways in which we often try to use our strong, negative emotions as self-
protective defense mechanisms, rather than as morally efficient communications. This desire is 
understandable, yet not all that useful. Prioritizing the need to enter into an emotionally-cooler 
affective state when in dialogue about a moral conflict increases the chances of said dialogue 
between the two agents functioning more effectively.  
Second, the Confucian Answerability strategy embraces the highly social-nature of our moral 
lives. This insight encourages a more nuanced and context-specific understanding of cases of 
moral wrongdoing. Focusing on the deeply social and interconnected nature of our moral lives, 
we can see the complex relationships and interpersonal dynamics involved in each case of 
wrongdoing. In addition, initially suspending our judgments of blame allows for a more critical 
epistemic inquiry into the nature of the wrongdoing. I take it as given that most of us care about 
and value our friendships, and do not want to publicly blame those close to us without epistemic 
warrant.201 
Third, the Confucian Answerability strategy encourages blamers to direct their reflection in 
the aftermath of wrongdoing upon themselves first. On this view, blamers are prompted to 
introspect about whether they themselves have been culpable in any way for the wrong that has 
just occurred, rather than merely considering the ways in which the wrongdoer is solely culpable. 
This deep self-reflection reduces the social harm of expressed blame because the blamer is 
coming to the process of moral inquisition from a place of self-awareness and recognition of her 
own potential involvement in the wrong. 
                                                        
201 For discussion of epistemic partiality in friendship, see Stroud (2006) and Keller (2007). 
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Finally, the Confucian Answerability strategy is highly compatible with both of the strategies 
I surveyed above. After first pausing, investigating, and reflecting, the blamer is free to pursue 
either of those strategies as well as expressing blame, if deemed appropriate. For example, the 
blamer can begin an inquisitive dialogue with the wrongdoer about the nature of the wrongdoing. 
The blamer can, and should, still demand reasons for action from the wrongdoer. After each 
agent has taken the time to independently investigate and reflect on the nature of the 
wrongdoing, that period of reflection can strengthen the efficacy of their shared dialogical 
exchange. After each agent has thoroughly reflected and introspected, then productive and 
inquisitive moral dialogue, grounded in curiosity and compassion, can more organically occur. If 
the introspection and reflection does not amount rendering the wrongdoer non-culpable, then the 
onus remains on the wrongdoer to justify her reasons for action. 
The Confucian Answerability strategy can be utilized in a wide array of interpersonal moral 
wrongdoing scenarios, and in conjunction with a variety of other strategies. For this reason, it is 
a unifying and comprehensive strategy of response to moral wrongdoing, and one that can 
demand justification from wrongdoers without expressed blame. 
 
C. When Immediate Response is Required 
In response to the reflective, non-urgent strategy of Confucian Answerability, one might 
argue that sometimes an immediate response to moral wrongdoing is required. There is good 
reason to think that urgency is sometimes required in responding to moral wrongdoing and that 
the Confucian Answerability strategy is ill-equipped to meet these demands. Perhaps these sorts 
of cases require special consideration. If the blamer waits to see if her emotions cool off over 
time, the time for moral reform and dialogue with the wrongdoer might have passed. It might be 
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too late. If the goal of blaming others is to promote reform and moral correction, time may be of 
the essence. If one waits too long to express blame, it might not be as meaningful and motivating 
to the wrongdoer.  
This is a legitimate worry. However, moral reform is not exclusively available in the 
immediate aftermath of wrongdoing, and thinking that urgency is always required is a needlessly 
limited view. Moral wrongdoing does not always require an immediate response. We might be 
tempted to think that moral course correction is most likely to happen in the direct aftermath of 
wrongdoing because emotions are so heated and seemingly primed for action and moral 
response. However, we can also motivate wrongdoers to make positive moral changes in the 
days, if not months, after the wrongdoing. It is incorrectly limiting to think that reform must 
immediately follow bad moral action. Wrongdoers understand the wrongness of their actions at 
different times and in different contexts. Sometimes it takes an unbiased external party to get the 
moral point across. Sometimes it takes additional life experience to motivate wrongdoers to 
change.  
Related to this worry about urgency is the distinction between immediate and settled 
emotions. In the direct aftermath of wrongdoing, our emotions might not be authentic indicators 
of our emotional response to the wrongdoing. After a few days of reflection, our heated emotions 
about the wrongdoing might be much weaker or cooler, or perhaps even resolved. At best, our 
emotions correctly capture how we feel about the situation at that exact moment. But who is to 
say that those emotions will persist over time? There is an important distinction between our 
hasty, immediate emotional responses to being wronged, and our more considered, settled 
emotional responses to being wronged.  
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Joseph Butler makes a similar distinction in the case of resentment between settled (or 
deliberate) resentment and hasty (or sudden) resentment. Hasty resentment, Butler argues, is an 
immediate response to “mere harm without appearance of wrong or injustice.”202  He argues that 
hasty resentment can be excessive or misguided. It might not be informed of all the relevant 
facts. Differently, settled resentment takes injustice as its object. It has a broader scope than 
hasty resentment. Settled resentment aims at pursuing justice and is not excessive or misguided.203 
In a similar vein, our immediate blaming emotions risk being excessive or misguided. 
Because our immediate blaming emotions can often be misguided, there is no sense in hastily 
expressing a misguided view. In the initial aftermath of wrongdoing, our emotions might be 
overly focused on the injury done to oneself, rather than on correcting the injustice more 
generally. There might be more the blamer needs to learn about the situation, and her initial 
emotional responses likely lack this information.  
In light of this, I argue that we ought to restrain or control our negative emotions in the direct 
aftermath of a moral conflict to avoid an immediate response dictated by our baser, hostile 
emotions. Indeed, this is the same conclusion I presented with the Emotional Conversion 
technique, which argues that responding to moral wrongdoing with cooler emotions like sadness 
is preferable to responding to moral wrongdoing with heated emotions like anger. Assuming we 
want to express blame to wrongdoers in a way that accurately depicts how we feel about their 
moral actions over time, our more thought-out, considered emotions and attitudes are the 
blaming emotions we want to express, if we decide to express blame at all. Attention to this 
potential shift in emotional intensity is important in our discussion of blaming emotions, because 
                                                        
202 Butler, J. (1726). Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel. London: J. and J. Knapton, Sermon VIII. 
203 See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/butler-moral/ for a more detailed account of Butler’s distinction between 
hasty and settled resentment. 
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what the ‘blaming emotions’ refer to might naturally shift (and lessen in intensity) over time. 
With this in mind, taking a pause before responding, in order to respond authentically, may (at 
least in some cases) be more important than any felt urgency about responding.  
 
V. The Moral Failure to Not Express Blame 
 
Even if I am right to think that we can hold others responsible without expressed blame, there 
is an additional remaining worry. That worry is that even if we can hold others accountable 
without expressed blame, the act of blaming itself is necessary to avoid condoning the wrongs 
that are going unblamed. Some may further argue that it is a moral failure to not express blame 
publicly when wrongdoing occurs, even if there are alternative methods of holding wrongdoers 
responsible. In this final section of the chapter, I will consider and reject arguments of this kind 
to demonstrate that my view does not imply or assume that we should condone the wrongs that 
are going unblamed.  
One form of this argument for the necessity of blame is that blamers owe it to their 
wrongdoers to publicly express blame to them. Another form of this argument is that the process 
of holding others accountable is incomplete without the public charge of blame. Moreover, some 
argue that expressed blame serves as a statement of respect, in two ways. First, by expressing 
blame, the blamer is demonstrating that she respects herself and refuses to be treated wrongly by 
the wrongdoer or by anyone else. Second, by expressing blame, the blamer is indicating her 
respect for the wrongdoer as an agent in our shared moral community who should be held 
accountable for her wrongdoing. The blamer respects the wrongdoer as a moral agent who can, 
and should, act in morally better ways. Without the moral tool of expressed blame, the worry is 
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that wronged agents (i.e. blamers) have no way to assert their rights, and thus are essentially 
condoning the wrongs that are going unblamed. 
 
A. The Moral Duty to Express Blame 
Several authors204 argue for some version of the view that we have a moral duty to express 
blame when wrongdoing occurs. For example, Angela Smith proposes a view of blame as moral 
protest. Protest, in this context, refers to an “outward statement of disapproval, whose explicit 
aim is to draw public attention to some serious moral wrong.”205 Smith argues that to morally 
blame another agent is to “register in some significant way one’s moral protest of that agent’s 
treatment of oneself or others.”206 According to Smith, when someone morally wrongs us, we 
protest their actions through expressing blame, thereby “challenging the moral claim implicit in 
the wrongdoer’s action.”207 Moreover, Smith proposes that blame expressed as protest aims to 
prompt moral recognition and acknowledgment not only from the wrongdoer, but also from 
others in the community.208 Smith further argues that the ability to express blame as protest is 
necessary and sufficient for being a morally responsible agent.209 So for Smith, publicly expressed 
blame serves the vital function of protesting wrongdoers’ behaviors to challenge their actions 
and prompt acknowledgment both from the wrongdoer and from the greater moral community. 
John Kekes makes a related argument in defense of blame in his article “Blame Versus 
Forgiveness” (2009). Kekes argues that forgiveness is not an appropriate response to 
                                                        
204 Bennett (2008); Hieronymi (2001); Smith (2013); Kekes (2009); Boxill (1976) 
205 Smith, Angela (2013). “Moral Blame and Moral Protest”. in Blame: Its Nature and Norms, (eds.) D. Justin Coates and Neal 
A. Tognazzini. Oxford University Press. 
206 Smith, p. 1. 
207 Smith, p. 22. 
208 Smith, p. 22. 
209 Smith, p. 22. 
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wrongdoing. Forgiveness, in this context, can be thought of as the failure to blame.210 For Kekes, 
forgiveness is not an appropriate response to wrongdoing because wrongdoers should be blamed 
continuously, and forgiveness is not compatible with that aim. According to Kekes, a failure to 
express blame is inconceivable as a response to moral wrongdoing. Kekes explains 
Forgiving people have a very low opinion of themselves. They find it natural to be 
abused because they doubt that they are worthy of anything else. They lack self-
respect…In refusing to blame wrongdoers who have inflicted moral injury on them, 
habitually forgiving agents are colluding in the violation of moral requirements.211  
 
In this passage, Kekes argues that forgiveness is not only a vice, but, more strongly, that 
forgiving people fundamentally lack self-respect.212 Kekes argues that we must express blame to 
wrongdoers, and that a failure to do so is a violation of our moral duty. On Kekes’s view, to not 
find fault with wrongdoers’ behaviors and publicly express it to them is a failure to respect them 
as moral agents. Worse, this failure does not give wrongdoers the motivation to act in morally 
better ways in the future. 
Smith’s and Kekes’s arguments each defend the important role public expressions of 
blame play in our moral lives. Consider the following example. Say that my sister borrows my 
car without asking and then gets into an accident and totals my car. When I find out, I express 
blame towards her. Part of my expression of blame involves me valuing of my rights and my 
property (my car). My sister stole something of mine without asking. When I express blame to 
her, I challenge her actions and signal to her (and our shared moral community) that I will not 
                                                        
210 Though deciding not to blame someone and forgiving them are different concepts, they are closely related, so for 
the sake of this argument I will use them interchangeably. When we forgive someone, we no longer blame them. We 
have decided to let go of the hard feelings that we have had towards them over their wrongdoing, and make amends. 
Alternatively, perhaps we never blamed them to begin with, and we were able to forgive them right away.  
211 John Kekes (2009).  “Blame Versus Forgiveness,” The Monist, vol. 92, no. 4, p. 493. 
212 In “Servility and Self-Respect”, Thomas Hill makes a related argument about self-respect. Hill argues that a servile 
person is one who tends to deny or disavow his own moral rights because he does not understand them or has little 
concern for the status they give him. For Hill, a failure to understand and acknowledge one’s own rights is a moral 
defect, equivalent to accepting servility. 
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tolerate that kind of behavior. If I fail to express blame to her, this might give her the idea that 
she can steal any of my things without asking again in the future. She might even start stealing 
things from others, too. Her morally bad behavior could escalate and expand quickly. If I fail to 
make it clear to her immediately that her behavior is morally unacceptable, perhaps I am not 
asserting or valuing my own rights. Further, perhaps my failure to publicly blame her is a sign 
that I do not respect her as a moral agent capable of acting better.  
 
B. Response to the Moral Duty to Express Blame Objection 
I have two responses to the general argument that we have a moral duty to express blame to 
wrongdoers. Before those responses, however, I would like to make clear that my dissertation 
has largely assumed that our interpersonal relationships are valuable and worth fostering, even in 
the face of serious moral conflict. This is a value ranking that not all authors on this subject 
share. There seems to be a very strong Kantian attitude of individualism and autonomy operating 
in the background of arguments about our moral duty to express blame. It might be the case that 
some authors, such as Kekes, do not fundamentally peg any of the value of one’s life onto the 
value of one’s relationships. As such, if you value the strong importance of individualism, my 
view throughout this dissertation might be less compelling. If one does not value the 
maintenance and growth of our interpersonal relationships, it might seem less urgent to not 
rupture those relationships with expressed blame. Beyond this basic distinction, I have two 
additional objections to the view that we have a moral duty to express blame.  
 
i. Manifestations of Respect 
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Many advocates of blame213 cite expressed blame as a key way to show the wrongdoer that the 
blamer respects her and her capacity to act in morally better ways next time. Even if blame-
alternatives exist, some philosophers maintain that the very act of blaming itself is a way to 
demand respect, and for this reason, blame must remain a central feature of our moral lives. 
Respect can certainly be made manifest through expressed blame, but respect also has many 
other outlets. For example, we can respect wrongdoers and their capacities as moral agents to act 
in morally better ways by initiating the type of compassionate, curiosity-based, inquisitive 
dialogue I have presented throughout this chapter. This inquisitive dialogue creates space for 
learning more about how the wrongdoer understands her own wrong actions. For example, the 
wrongdoer might already feel remorse, guilt, or shame. She might already be involved in 
thoughtful, moral self-correction. In these cases, expressed blame is likely superfluous. This is 
especially true for wrongdoers with a high degree of emotional sensitivity and self-awareness. 
These agents already understand what about their behavior needs correcting. They do not need 
further moral instructions from the blamer. 
Moreover, respect can sometimes involve giving a wrongdoer the benefit of the doubt. 
When someone wrongs us, we can keep their actions in mind, but do not necessarily need to 
express blame to them in this particular instance. We can forgive an agent for their wrongdoing 
right away, and doing so is consistent with maintaining respect for them. Certainly, this is not to 
say that their past wrong actions will not alter the ways we interact with them in the future. For 
example, we might keep a mental note of their actions as an instructive guide for how we interact 
with them in the future. But this does not require that we publicly express blame to them.  
                                                        
213 In addition to Smith and Kekes, see also work on this topic by Christopher Bennett and Antony Duff. 
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 We do not need to so diligently express blame about others’ moral transgressions. This 
constant effort is exhausting and impractical. Additionally, we may choose not to express blame 
to a given wrongdoer simply because we may not care that much about the harm they caused us. 
We may be able to see that in the greater scheme of things, their moral wrong in this instance is 
not worth getting worked up over or even commenting on. As these considerations reveal, failing 
to express blame in response to a case of moral wrongdoing is not necessarily a violation of our 
moral duty, nor does it mean that one has a fundamental disrespect for our shared moral norms.  
 
ii. Dignity 
Relatedly, we do not need to constantly assert or demand self-respect from others in order to 
feel a deep-seated sense of self-respect. Having self-respect is at least partially an internal 
practice, and one that need not be continuously exhibited in a public setting in order to be 
authentic. This strikes me to be precisely what dignity is. Although dignity is traditionally 
defined as “a sense of pride in oneself’ or simply “self-respect”214, it connotes something over and 
above self-respect. Rather than needing to publicly declare that someone has self-respect, one 
who has dignity feels grounded in their self-worth regardless of their moral treatment by 
wrongdoers. Of course, there are times in which public affirmation of respect is symbolically 
important, and there is a real need to publicly assert one’s rights. Extreme and systemic cases of 
wrongdoing certainly call for public response. Indeed, there is nothing theoretically wrong with 
wanting to continuously affirm and announce one’s self-respect in a public setting. 
However, it is not necessary for cultivating and maintaining self-respect. Failing to blame 
others does not pigeonhole one into the role of a doormat or lacking self-respect. As such, 
                                                        
214 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dignity. 
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responding to moral wrongdoing in a calm and kindly fashion, without expressed blame, does 
not imply that one 1. Condones the wrongs that are going unblamed, 2. Lacks self-respect, or 3. 





In this chapter, I presented three methods of responding to moral wrongdoing that each 
depart from our traditional Western, hostile blaming practices. Agreeing with Smith, I argued 
that answerability, defined as a requiring reasons (in the normative sense) from the wrongdoer, is 
the leading conception of what it means to hold wrongdoers morally responsible. Given that 
answerability is the correct conception of moral responsibility, I further argued that we can go in 
for justificatory challenge without expressed blame, and that it is preferable to do so without 
expressed blame. That is, expressed blame is not required to meet the conditions of 
answerability, and, more strongly, that we have reason to think that the interaction between 
wrongdoer and blamer will go better without expressed blame. 
In my discussion of the various alternative methods to respond to moral wrongdoing, I have 
drawn upon the work of Lacey and Pickard, Blustein, and Sarkissian, as well as some empirical 
findings on the ways in which certain emotions have the capacity to blunt other emotions from 
arising. I have not claimed that any of the alternative methods I have presented will always serve 
the exact function of blame. Further, it is obviously not possible to hold every wrongdoer 
responsible in our interpersonal lives. For some things, it is best if we just let go. It is inaccurate 
to think that we can, or should, try to hold every wrongdoer responsible for their wrongs, big and 
small. Attempting this would likely involve the majority of our days spent regulating others’ 
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behavior. This is not consistent with the demands and joys of our lives. Instead, we are putting 
less strain on our interpersonal relationships by steering away from our daily blaming practices. 
Assuming that preserving and growing our interpersonal relationships is valuable, I have argued 
that this is a preferable outcome to expressing blame.  
Throughout the dissertation, I made use of the idea that even if blaming a wrongdoer is fitting 
for a given situation, it might not be appropriate to express. Because of the higher stakes and 
social risks that the hostile and retributive blaming emotions present, it might not be appropriate 
to publicly express blame, even when expressing blame fits a given moral situation. I am 
confident that we have the philosophical tools necessary to resolve moral conflicts in our 
interpersonal daily lives without any manner of expressing blame. My hope with this project, 
more generally, is to have expanded the range of useful responses to interpersonal moral 
wrongdoing that we can take. Put simply, I have aimed to shift our default interpersonal 
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